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The Indian government’s Village Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Committee 
(VHSNC) program seeks to improve rural access to the fundamental entitlements of 
public health. Although over 500,000 VHSNCs have been officially formed, they have 
so far failed to serve as viable local bodies. In 2013, the government introduced 
guidelines to invigorate VHSNCs. 
 
This dissertation examines the contexts that facilitate and hinder VHSNC 
functionality, and explores the impacts of VHSNCs on marginalized communities and 
the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that support them. The study draws on 
longitudinal qualitative research from rural north India.  
 
The study found that contextual features at the community, health facility, health 
administration, and societal level were often at odds with VHSNC functionality. 
Despite challenges at the community level, inclusive VHSNCs were formed, and the 
members received training, held monthly meetings, and attempted to improve local 
public services. However, barriers in the other contextual spheres undermined 
committee capacity to bring concrete improvements (chapter 5).  
 
VHSNCs created some opportunities for participants to re-negotiate power 
inequalities within the community, particularly around gender. Power inequalities 
between the communities and outside actors (e.g. government officials) were 
 iii 
manifest in a “discourse of responsibility,” whereby outsiders sought to assign 
broad responsibility for improving public services onto VHSNCs. Some community 
members accepted this discourse and then blamed their peers for failing to take 
action, entrenching a negative collective identity. Others rejected the discourse, and 
positioned participation in the VHSNC as futile, since responsibility lay beyond 
VHSNC control (chapter 6).   
 
The NGO that implemented the VHSNC-intervention played a crucial role in building 
community capacities to engage with government and helped overcome many 
community-level barriers to participation. These beneficial processes were made 
possible by the NGO’s “in-between status” as community advocate and government 
helper. Yet this role came at a high cost for NGO staff, who found themselves 
promoting VHSNCs with little control over key factors that influenced the program 
(chapter 7).  
 
This study highlights the urgent need for supportive contexts in which people can 
not only participate in health committees, but also access the power and resources 
needed to bring about actual improvements to their health and wellbeing.   
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Primary health care, basic sanitation, and adequate nutrition form the bedrock of 
public health, yet billions of people in low and middle income countries (LMICs) lack 
access to these basic entitlements (WHO 2008; Bhutta et al. 2011; Murray and Lopez 
1997). Inaccessible health services, inadequate sanitation, and poor nutrition 
continue to cause high rates of avoidable illness and death among the poor (Black et 
al. 2008; WHO 2015a; Scrimshaw and SanGiovanni 1997; Benova, Cumming, and 
Campbell 2014). For example, the deaths of 3.1 million children under five in 2011 
(45% of all under-five child deaths that year) were rooted in undernutrition, which 
interacts synergistically with infection due to poor sanitation and escalates due to 
insufficient health care (Black et al. 2013). The vast majority of the 280,000 
maternal deaths in 2013 occurred in LMICs and were rooted in a lack of basic health 
care, exacerbated by unsanitary conditions and maternal undernutrition 
(Kassebaum et al. 2014).  
 
Although decades of national and international policy and programs have enabled 
great improvements, there are still far too many gaps (WHO 2015a). A vast range of 
inter-connected factors contribute to whether basic public health interventions 
reach the people who need them, including political issues of prioritization and 
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governance, implementation issues of management and scalability, and community 
issues of engagement and trust.  
 
Village health committees, composed of community members and frontline public 
system functionaries, have emerged as one strategy to address many of these 
factors, for example by bolstering public sector accountability, generating local 
resources, and deepening community engagement (Molyneux et al. 2012; McCoy, 
Hall, and Ridge 2011). While there is evidence that these committees have the 
potential to strengthen public systems and ultimately improve health (Loewenson, 
Rusike, and Zulu 2004b; Sohani 2005; Bjorkman and Svensson 2009; Iwami and 
Petchey 2002b; Manandhar et al. 2004), a positive impact is by no means 
guaranteed (Azad et al. 2010). I present more detail on the historical context of 
community participation and health committees in the next chapter. Research into 
how specific contexts bolster or hinder committee functionality and how these 
committees are experienced by the communities in which they operate is vital to 
develop better health committee support strategies.  
 
This dissertation examines India’s Village Health, Sanitation and Nutrition 
Committees (VHSNCs), a program that seeks to improve rural access to the basic 
rights of health, sanitation, and nutrition on a massive scale. Since the program’s 
launch in the mid-2000s, VHSNCs have been officially formed in over 500,000 
villages and have ostensibly involved at least 3.5 million members (MoHFW India 
2013a). However, these committees have not reached their potential as robust 
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institutions for community engagement in public health. Members often do not 
know their roles, composition rarely adheres to guidelines, meetings are often 
irregular and poorly attended, many committees are entirely dormant, and there is 
often negligible participation in budgeting or developing village health plans 
(Bajpai, Sachs, and Dholakia 2009; PHRN 2008; R. Singh and Purohit 2012).  
 
In response to their initial lackluster performance, the Indian government 
developed Guidelines for Community Processes (MoHFW India 2013a) to strengthen 
VHSNCs. Data for this dissertation are drawn from a 1.5-year study (2014-2015) 
that examined the implementation of a draft version of these guidelines in 50 
villages in rural northern India.  
 
1.2 Study aims 
 
The aims of this study were to: 
Aim 1: Describe social and political conditions that facilitate and hinder VHSNC 
functionality. 
Aim 2: Understand how power inequalities operate through the VHSNC to create 
social costs and opportunities for community participants. 
Aim 3: Explore the experience of a local non-governmental organization (NGO) 
implementing the VHSNC support package, to identify the struggles, strategies, and 
trade-offs that arise from working between communities and government. 
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1.3 Organization of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. This first chapter introduces the 
study. In chapter 2, I present an overview of the literature on community 
participation in health and village health committees, as a specific vehicle for 
community participation. In chapter 3, I discuss the Indian and local north Indian 
context. In Chapter 4, I present the study design and data collection. 
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 consist of three manuscripts that I will be submitting for 
publication to peer-reviewed journals. Chapter 5 examines the interplay between 
context and VHSNCs, highlighting that the capacity of these committees to bring 
about changes in the health system and sustain community interest was hindered by 
incomplete decentralization, a severely under-resourced health system, poor 
intersectoral collaboration and unclear hierarchies of responsibility.  Chapter 6 
explores the social costs and opportunities born by communities, as power 
inequalities are mediated through the “social space” of the VHSNC. Chapter 7 
explores how the NGO that implemented this community engagement intervention 
was placed in the challenging position of seeking to retain community trust while 
serving as a “government helper.”  
 
I conclude in chapter 8 with an overall summary of the results, examining how this 
research can inform the village health committee program in India and discussing 
the implications of my findings for community participation in health more broadly.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Community participation in health 
 
Communities can be understood as groups of people who, despite being 
heterogeneous, share (1) an identity, (2) a set of social representations (symbols, 
knowledge, aspirations) and (3) conditions and constraints of access to power 
(Campbell and Jovchelovitch 2000; Howarth 2001). These traits are most frequently 
manifested among people who share a common geographical space, such as those in 
villages. Community is the means through which individuals integrate into society 
and the means through which society constructs individuals (Howarth 2001). 
Although communities are sites where damaging social relations and forms of social 
exclusion are reproduced, they can also be sites of empowerment, where unequal 
relations can be challenged and resisted (Joffe 2003; Howarth, Foster, and Dorrer 
2004). Theories of community empowerment draw upon the ecological approach to 
community development, which moves beyond seeing community as “lots and lots 
of people” to an “ecosystem with capacity to work towards solutions to its own 
community identified problems” (Hawe 1994).   
 
Community participation has been promoted as an essential feature of primary 
health care since the landmark Alma Ata conference on primary health care in 1978. 
The Alma Ata declaration on primary health care stated that “people have the right 
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and duty to participate individually and collectively in the planning and 
implementation of their health care” (WHO/UNICEF 1978). Attempts to enable 
people to realize this “right and duty” have frequently manifested in community 
mobilization processes, which can be usefully defined as: 
 
… A capacity-building process through which community 
members, groups or organizations plan, carry out, and 
evaluate activities on a participatory and sustained basis to 
improve their health and other conditions, either on their 
own initiative or stimulated by others (Howard-Grabman 
and Snetro 2003, 3)  
 
Rifkin (1996) suggested that engaging community members in planning and 
managing their health systems makes them more: (1) likely to access existing 
services and help sustain new services, such as community health worker programs; 
(2) able to offer material resources and manpower to support the minimal 
resources allocated for health care; (3) inclined to change their poor health 
behaviors when they have been involved in exploring the consequences of their 
behavior; and (4) prone to gain information and experience, thus allowing them to 
have greater control over their lives and challenge the existing political, economic 
and social system. Underpinning these outcomes is the idea that participation can be 
an emancipatory process, with benefits that include but go beyond specific health or 
health system outcomes. These broader emancipatory outcomes include increased 
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critical awareness of inequalities (or conscientization, as discussed by Freire (1973)) 
and ownership of health rights issues (Guareschi and Jovchelovitch 2004; Zakus and 
Lysack 1998). Robert Chambers (1994) further argued that many social programs 
failed to bring about positive changes in marginalized communities because they 
were developed by urban elites who did not understand local needs and realities. He 
therefore called for bottom-up development based on participatory learning and 
action techniques designed to “enable local people to share, enhance and analyze 
their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act” (Chambers 1994, 1253).  
 
Despite significant enthusiasm for community participation in health systems, the 
process has been complex and often failed to achieve its potential (Cueto 2004; 
Rifkin 2014). Power inequalities within communities can lead participatory 
interventions to disproportionately or exclusively benefit local elites and at times 
even harm the most marginalized (Guijt and Kaul Shah 1998; Mosse 1994; Meinzen-
Dick and Zwarteveen 1998; Wilkes 2000). For example, Mosse (1994) noted that 
participatory processes in Tamil Nadu privileged male knowledge and expertise 
over female, as women lacked the ability to articulate their concerns in public and 
through acceptable mediums (e.g. maps and diagrams). In a Jamaican participatory 
program, the more educated and better-networked community members dominated 
decision making and were more likely to gain access to social investment projects 
that matched their preferences (Rao and Ibáñez 2005). In Kenya, the owners of slum 
housing in Nairobi found numerous ways to limit the influence of the more 
marginalized tenants; for instance, some structure owners insisted that their 
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tenants register the owners’ name as residing in the property, in an attempt to block 
future land dispersal to tenants (Rigon 2014). Participatory interventions have been 
blamed for causing community burn out, competition within communities to benefit 
from interventions, sanctions against those who do not go along with mainstream 
processes, and the loss of credibility for community leaders who champion 
processes that fail to live up to expectations (Smith 2004; McTague and Jakubowski 
2013; Katz, Cheff, and Campo 2015; Mosse 2001; Mosse 1994; Becher 2010).  
 
Many researchers argue that these problems are linked to implementation failures, 
illustrating for example that development interventions bearing the label 
“participatory” frequently fail to truly pass control over to communities, with 
control being the process hypothesized to mediate between participation and 
improved well-being (Arnstein 1969; Naimoli et al. 2012; Rifkin 1996). Others reject 
aspects of the philosophical underpinnings of this health and social development 
strategy. They note the high opportunity costs of participation, wherein participants 
in poor communities who invest their limited resources into new initiatives can end 
up worse off if the intervention does not deliver the anticipated benefits (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001). Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen (1998) found that for many women in 
South Asia, the balance between costs and benefits of participation is often negative: 
for instance, complying with the rules and practices of water management groups 
involved considerable time costs and social risks, compared to obtaining irrigation 
services through informal, but less secure, means.  More broadly, community 
participation has also been critiqued as a tool for neo-liberal economic practices, 
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specifically through legitimizing the reduction of public services and increasing the 
role of volunteerism within the social sector (Geddes 2006; O’Reilly 2011). Some 
suggest that participatory processes can distract marginalized groups from broader, 
systemic political issues by demanding excessive time and energy be focused on 
micro level issues (Harriss 2001; Fine 1999; Katz, Cheff, and Campo 2015).  
 
Nonetheless, even those most critical of participation do not suggest abandoning it 
as a strategy (Mosse 1994; Cooke 2004). While it is challenging to measure 
definitive links to health outcomes, often because there is no standard definition of 
“community” and “participation,” reviews nonetheless identify health 
improvements as a result of participation (Rifkin 2014; Atkinson et al. 2011; Prost 
et al. 2013; McCoy, Hall, and Ridge 2011). Instead, critical scholars stress that an 
acute awareness of participation’s potential harms and pitfalls, positioned within 
careful consideration of power relations and stakeholder motivations to promote it, 
can enable a more considered engagement with this complex process (Kesby 2005a; 
Williams 2004; Mosse 1994; Hickey and Mohan 2004).  
 
2.2 Health committees 
 
The principle of community participation in health is often manifested through the 
formation of health committees. These committees can be defined as groups 
composed primarily of laypeople that take action to improve local health within the 
public system. Health committee activities often include supporting or overseeing 
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health centers or health workers, playing a role in public health budgeting, 
contributing to health-promotion activities such as immunization drives or health 
rights awareness campaigns, and supporting environmental health through, for 
example, vector-control or sanitation activities.  The specific role and scope of 
village committees varies widely across contexts. 
 
2.2.1 Evidence linking health committees to health and health system outcomes 
 
McCoy, Hall, and Ridge’s (2011) systematic review examined the factors that 
influence the performance and effectiveness of community health committees in 
LMICs. To be included in the review, studies had to use experimental or case control 
design. Only four studies met this criterion: a retrospective study on Local 
Committees for Health Administration (CLAS) in Peru (Iwami and Petchey 2002b), a 
case-control study of Health Center Committees (HCC) in Zimbabwe (Loewenson, 
Rusike, and Zulu 2004b), a before-and-after intervention study of Dispensary Health 
Committees (DHCs) in Kenya (Sohani 2005) and a randomized case-control study of 
Health Unit Management Committees (HUMC) in Uganda (Bjorkman and Svensson 
2009). All four found improvements in health service quality and coverage as well 
as health outcomes.  
 
In Peru, CLAS facilities did better than non-CLAS facilities on a number of measures 
including user satisfaction and access for the poorest (Iwami and Petchey 2002b). In 
Zimbabwe, the HCC wards compared to non-HCC wards showed a higher likelihood 
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of health service use for the last illnesses, greater use of antenatal care, fewer cases 
of diarrhea, greater use of oral rehydration salt therapy, more staff, better 
community health indicators (health knowledge, health practices, and use of health 
services), and stronger links between communities and health workers (Loewenson, 
Rusike, and Zulu 2004b). In Kenya, when comparing indicators before and after the 
implementation of DHCs, Sohani (2005) reported that health care utilization and 
revenue generation increased, weekend outreach services for the most distant 
villages were initiated, medicines became more readily available, village health 
workers were revitalized, and leakage of funds and financial mismanagement were 
reduced. The Uganda intervention, which bolstered the performance of HUMCs (in 
many cases dissolving pre-existing committees and electing new ones), also showed 
impressive results. The intervention communities compared with the control 
communities had significantly improved immunization and vitamin A 
supplementation coverage and higher clinic utilization for general outpatient 
services, deliveries, antenatal care and family planning. Most remarkably, children 
born in the intervention areas in 2005 had a 35% lower likelihood of death 
compared to children born in the control villages (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009).  
 
In a systematic review on community accountability in peripheral health facilities, 
Molyneux et al. (2012) report that local committees are the most widely 
documented accountability mechanism. Village health committees and groups were 
the focus of 19 of the 21 papers identified, with some information on their 
implementation or impact from a wide range of countries including Kenya, Uganda, 
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Tanzania, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Zambia, South Africa, Peru, Mexico, Cambodia and 
Nepal. The outcomes of these interventions were mixed. In Bolivia, corruption 
declined where local oversight groups were active (Gatti, Gray-Molina, and Klugman 
2002). However in Uganda, some health management committees actually added to 
the problem by expropriating drugs themselves (McPake et al. 1999). Molyneux et 
al. conclude that the evidence base on how community accountability mechanisms 
operate and influence health services remains limited, and that there is a particular 
dearth of literature on the depth of community involvement. They emphasize that 
very little has been documented on the extent to which committees move beyond 
providing information to consultation, representation, and actual influence over 
health-related decisions. 
 
2.2.2 Contextual factors influencing health committees 
 
McCoy et al. (2011) and more recently George et al. (2015) examined contextual 
factors that influence health committee performance and effectiveness. McCoy and 
colleagues developed a framework for describing contextual features at the 
societal/community, health systems/facility and committee levels (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: McCoy et al.’s conceptual framework of determinants of health 
facility committee performance 
 
 
George et al.’s framework focused on contextual factors most relevant to health 
committees at the societal, health administration, health facility and community 
level. Both frameworks highlight the multiple levels of factors that influence health 
committee effectiveness and both studies highlight the interconnected nature of 
these levels. McCoy et al. delineated features of the health facility committee itself, 
noting that committees were more effective when there was clarity about their role, 
mandate, and authority. Establishing the appropriate balance of authority and 
accountability was central: when committees had too much power they could end 
up interfering with the day-to-day functioning of hospitals; without discretionary 
power to reward and discipline health workers they were found to have little 
capacity to improve health worker performance. Similarly, committees could be 
quickly frustrated and discouraged when they were constrained by having to 
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comply with directives from above or when large portions of their funds were 
earmarked already.  
 
At the interface between communities and health committees, both reviews 
emphasize the importance of the committee selection process to ensure the 
members are seen as legitimate representatives. Closely linked to the formation 
process are issues of community awareness of the committee and community trust 
in the health committee members’ motivation; in many papers, a lack of awareness 
and community skepticism undermined health committee influence and value 
(Falisse et al. 2012; Ngulube et al. 2004; Macwan’gi and Ngwengwe 2004; Mubyazi, 
Mushi, Shayo, et al. 2007; Sepehri and Pettigrew 1996; Meier, Pardue, and London 
2012). In Kenya, Goodman et al. (2011) found that local people often elected 
respected elders who lacked the literacy to effectively handle budget duties. In 
Uganda, public participation in committees was undermined by local political 
processes. Kapiriri et al. (2003) found that elected political leaders dominated 
planning and priority setting and did not communicate with or consult community 
members.  
 
At the health facility level, some committees were primarily used as tools for health 
workers to meet their targets rather than avenues for community oversight or 
engagement (Leppard et al. 2011; Falisse et al. 2012). Many health committees were 
unable to improve health worker performance or bring about community-driven 
changes because they lacked discretionary power to reward or punish staff  
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(Loewenson 2000a; Kapiriri, Norheim, and Heggenhougen 2003; Mubyazi and 
Hutton 2003; Loewenson, Rusike, and Zulu 2005; Mosquera et al. 2001; Mubyazi, 
Mushi, Shayo, et al. 2007). A lack of formal support and capacity building from the 
health administration was a major factor that hampered the functionality of many 
committees (Meier, Pardue, and London 2012; Gurung and Tuladhar 2013; Collins 
et al. 2007; Zakus 1998; Iwami and Petchey 2002b; Boulle et al. 2008). Committees 
in Kenya struggled with the tension between local priorities and national health 
indicators: although committees were able to influence some targets and priorities, 
emphasis on national indicators left many local priorities unaddressed in final work 
plans (O’Meara et al. 2011). Goodman et al. (2011) found that while there were 
generally high levels of trust and collaboration between health facility workers and 
committee members, friction occasionally developed around sharing financial 
information and committee efforts to supervise the health care professionals. 
 
At the community or societal level, committees are embedded within the political 
power structures and social norms of their environment, for example making it 
difficult to have genuine representation from women in areas where women are 
marginalized. Links to other community groups or to decentralized local systems of 
government could increase health committee legitimacy. The context of the wider 
health system shapes the space for community participation and specifies the 
committee’s mandate, support, and funding. The levels of transparency in the larger 
system will shape committee effectiveness and transparency. NGOs often play an 
important role in improving health committee training and further the inclusion of 
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marginalized groups (Shukla, Scott, and Kakde 2011; Shepard 2006; Paxman et al. 
2005; S. Singh, Das, and Sharma 2010; Raju, Rao, and Mutatkar 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Health committee roles and activities in LMIC health systems 
 
Village health committees play a wide range of roles in health systems, from specific 
efforts around one project or illness to broader health promotion and health system 
planning and management. In Kyrgyzstan, volunteers from pre-existing village 
health committees tested the iodine content of salt in households, local retailers, and 
wholesale markets. They were able to reach 65% of the households and, over the 
course of seven months, increase coverage of iodinated salt both in households and 
in retail shops by working with shopkeepers to stock only iodinated salt (Schüth et 
al. 2005). Committees have been formed specifically to manage water systems 
through maintaining pumps and collecting user fees (O’Reilly 2006) and managing 
arsenic removal systems (Sarkar et al. 2010). 
 
Many committees manage some of the funds for peripheral health facilities. In a 
number of African countries, this financial management role for health committees 
arose from UNICEF/WHO’s Bamako Initiative, launched in 1987. The initiative 
sought to decentralize health system financing and reduce donor and central 
government funding by instituting user fees and requiring patients to buy medicines 
(Ridde, Yaogo, et al. 2010). Health committees were introduced to manage the 
money brought in through user fees and drug sales, and more broadly oversee 
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primary health centers. In some countries (such as Kenya) user fees have since been 
reduced or replaced with budget transfers to the committees from the central 
government. In Kenya, facility management committees control many aspects of the 
local health budget under the Direct Facility Financing program. The Kenyan 
Ministry of Health transfers US $4500 per year to the committee for them to allocate 
according to local needs. A District Health Management team oversees the 
committee and places some limits on budgetary freedom (Goodman et al. 2011). In 
both Burkina Faso and Benin, village health committees continue to manage profits 
from drug sales and user fees for local operating costs, incentive bonuses to 
governmental health staff, and salaries for community managers of the essential 
drugs (Ridde, Haddad, et al. 2010; Ridde, Yaogo, et al. 2010).  
 
Most health committees have a broad mandate and work across a range of areas 
including monitoring facilities, gathering resources from among the population, and 
promoting behavior change in the community. In Nigeria, Abimbola et al. (2015) 
found that community health committees demonstrated five modes of functioning 
including as a “village square” where people could meet to discuss issues, as 
“government botherers” who lobby the government for support, and as 
“government back ups” who augment public services. Uganda’s health unit 
management committees (HUMC) oversee the running of the health units and 
district hospitals while the public health committees coordinate health issues, 
sensitize people, and gather information for planning (Kapiriri, Norheim, and 
Heggenhougen 2003).  
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Nepal’s Village Development Committees (VDCs) and Health Facility Operation and 
Management Committees (HFOMCs) were developed during decentralization 
reform in the early 1980s (Bishai, Niessen, and Shrestha 2002; Gurung 2009; 
Morrison et al. 2005). VDCs are responsible for convening women’s groups, 
conducting community health education, and providing resources such as 
immunization for polio and tetanus, vitamin A, iron and folic acid, ORS, and family 
planning (Morrison et al. 2011). They are considered the most active political 
institution in rural Nepal and contribute funding to rural health facilities (Bishai, 
Niessen, and Shrestha 2002). Morrison (2005) found that when supported by NGOs, 
pre-existing VDCs could successfully mobilize women’s groups and collaborate to 
monitor all pregnancies and births in a region. Gurung (2009), however, reports 
that the locally formed HFOMCs failed to meaningfully involve women and lower 
caste people. Similarly, Bishai, Niessen and Shrestha (2002) found that only 8% of 
VDC members were female. In addition, committee training tends to focus on 
achieving tangible outputs such as developing infrastructure, hiring staff, and 




2.2.5 Health committees in India 
 
In India, a variety of committees have been constituted or bolstered by NGOs for 
interventions around specific health issues. Kamineni, et al. (2011) discuss working 
with health committees in Odisha state on sensitization and training around 
tuberculosis (TB) control. They report that NGO activities focused on TB issues “re-
energized” the health committees, self-help groups, and local elected governments 
(called panchayats) to identify suspected TB cases and advocate for directly-
observed treatment—short-course (DOTS) at the community level.  
 
A number of leprosy-focused village committees have developed stigma reduction 
organizing committees and leprosy health resource centers across Uttar Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Orissa and Chhattisgarh (Porichha et al. 2011; Raju, Rao, and Mutatkar 
2008; Raju and Rao 2011). The experiences of these leprosy groups were reported 
to have been mixed; overall the committees were active but meeting attendance 
rates fluctuated greatly (Raju, Rao, and Mutatkar 2008). Raju, et al. (2008) reported 
that ongoing NGO support was necessary to organize and sustain the leprosy 
committee activities.  
 
Village water committees have been developed to maintain pumps and collect water 
tariffs from families through internationally-funded projects, such World Bank 
initiatives in Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh states (Stalker 2001) and an Indo-
German water program in Rajasthan (O’Reilly 2006; Goyal 2005). Arsenic removal 
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in West Bengal has been effectively managed for over a decade by village 
committees (Sarkar et al. 2010). In the states of Jharkhand and Orissa, an 
intervention to promote maternal and newborn health through discussion-based 
women’s groups reduced neo-natal mortality by 45% and moderate maternal post-
partum depression by 57% (Rath et al. 2010; Tripathy et al. 2010).  
 
Village health committees have also been established as part of the Local Initiatives 
Program for reproductive and child health services in Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, 
West Bengal and Uttaranchal (Paxman et al. 2005). The initiative established 620 
reproductive and child health committees to stimulate community involvement in 
health care through locally developed work plans and local service delivery 
oversight. Paxman et al. reported that the committees offered local support for the 
initiative as well as vital connections with local government. By working closely 
with local government, committees were able to advocate more effectively for 
improved drug supply and staffing of health centers. In areas where village health 
committees already existed, the implementing NGOs made an intensive effort to 
bring these committees into the program.  The authors note that allowing for 
variation in committee composition across contexts enabled the program to 
respond to the needs and histories of different states: the committees in West 
Bengal were made up of influential community members who were primarily 
businessmen, while in Uttaranchal the committees consisted of local government 
representatives, members of youth and women’s groups, and social workers. In 
Punjab and Himachal Pradesh the committees included local leaders, many who 
 21 
were women. At all sites the committees were responsible for recruiting and 
training volunteers, raising money, and enlisting support of local government and 
religious leaders. NGOs created or re-engaged existing health committees and 
trained members in leadership, management, and basics of reproductive and child 
health (Paxman et al. 2005). Committee functionality varied greatly: Some held 
health events for information dissemination, established clinics, and procured 
medicine and staff for their village clinics through linking with government doctors 
and nurses. However, other committees were less active, less cohesive, and less 
central to achieving project objectives. In these latter instances, the reproductive 
and child health objectives of the Local Initiatives Program were largely met 
through direct NGO efforts.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, decentralization reform in India has encouraged panchayats to 
form standing committees of elected members on social services, including health 
and sanitation. Each state has articulated these reforms differently in their statutes, 
including variation in whether these committees are mandated or merely suggested. 
Research from the state of Tamil Nadu (Bajpai, Dholakia, and Sachs 2008, 36) found 
that although the constitution allows decentralization of the “system of governance 
in health to the multi layered local bodies,” in reality their implementation “leaves 
much to be desired.” Similarly, research in regions of Madhya Pradesh state (Behar 
and Kumar 2002) and Karnataka state (S. K. Ghosh, Patil, and Tiwari 2012) found 
that there were no active or known panchayat standing committees on health. One 
study presented a surprising contrast: research in 2001 in a district of West Bengal 
 22 
found that the panchayat sub-committee members were convening monthly 
meetings in which immunization and family planning were commonly discussed and 
that many committees worked with health center staff to refer patients, arrange 
health camps, and improve environmental health (Barman 2006; Barman 2009). 
West Bengal’s markedly different situation is likely explained by the fact that it, like 
the state of Kerala, has had long periods of rule by leftist parties, which promoted 
public welfare programs and decentralization (World Bank 2000a).  
 
The literature highlights the prominent role that grassroots NGOs have played in 
forming and supporting health committees in India. Many issue-specific committees 
(leprosy, TB, reproductive health care, water) have been directly supported by 
NGOs (Raju, Rao, and Mutatkar 2008; Paxman et al. 2005; Goyal 2005; Kamineni et 
al. 2011). Even in the case of government-initiated committees, NGO efforts to 
strengthen these committees have proven highly successful (Shukla, Scott, and 
Kakde 2011; Stalker 2001; Khanna and Pradhan 2013; FRHS 2011).  
 
Research specific to India’s VHSNCs, as mandated in the National Rural Health 
Mission in the mid-2000s, is discussed in the next chapter (section 3.4).   
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
3.1 Indian economic growth and social indicators 
 
India is the world’s second most populous country, with 1.25 billion people, and is 
considered a global emerging economy, due to the growth of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) by an average of 6% per year since the 1990s (World Bank 2015). 
GDP per capita has risen rapidly, from approximately US $302 in 1985 to US $1590 
in 2015 (World Bank 2015).  However, this massive increase in national wealth has 
been distributed in a strikingly unequal manner. The richest 20% of Indians now 
enjoy over 80% of the country’s national income, while the poorest 20% get less 
than 1% (Credit Suisse 2014). And inequality in India has risen faster than almost 
anywhere else in the world (ibid). India’s Gini coefficient, a common measure of 
income inequality, indicated a reduction and then stagnation in inequality from 
Independence in 1947 to 1990. However, it has tracked an increase in inequality 
since 1991, when the country shifted from socialist-inspired market policy to 
economic liberalization (Sarker 2009).  
 
Basic public entitlements, such as health care, sanitation, and nutrition, remain out 
of reach for many. For instance, nearly half (47%) of all women report that they face 
at least one major barrier in accessing health care, with distance to health center 
being the most common; more than half of all people in India (55%) have no toilet 
facility; and 43% of children under five years of age are underweight (MoHFW India 
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2007). While the most recent official poverty rate is estimated at 22% in 2011, 
down from 37% in 2004 (Government of India 2013), the system of measurement is 
controversial, and others suggest at least 56% of the population lacks the means to 
meet their essential needs (Gupta et al. 2014).   
 
Rural people, who compose 69% of the Indian population, are poorer than 
urbanites, with over a quarter of the rural population falling in the lowest wealth 
quintile, compared to just 3% of urbanites (Ministry of Home Affairs 2011a; MoHFW 
India 2007). Rural people have far lower access to education, sanitation, water, and 
health care than urbanites (Table 1).  
 
The health status of Indians has been steadily improving. Life expectancy at birth 
has risen steadily from 36 years in 1951 to 66 years in 2015 (World Bank 2015). 
The crude death rate declined from 21 per 1,000 people in 1960 to 8 in 2013 and 
the crude birth rate declined from 41 per 1,000 people in 1960 to 20 in 2013 (WHO 
2015b). The infant mortality rate has dropped from 120 per 1,000 live births in the 
1970s to 38 in 2015 (WHO 2015b). In 1960 women had an average fertility rate of 
5.9; by 2012 it was 2.5 (World Bank 2015). Maternal mortality has also declined 
from an early estimate of 580 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 1986 to 




Table 1: Urban–rural inequalities in India 
Indicator Urban  Rural 
Education & access to information   
 Women with no education or less than five years of education  41% 68% 
 Men with no education or less than five years of education 28% 50% 
 Women not regularly exposed to any media 12% 45% 
 Men not regularly exposed to any media 6% 25% 
Water, sanitation & electricity   
 Access to improved drinking water 95% 85% 
 Use sanitary latrine 53% 18% 
 Have some electricity 93% 56% 
Health   
 Received no antenatal care 9% 28% 
 Place of birth   
  Public facility 29% 14% 
  Private facility 38% 14% 
  Home 32% 71% 
 Total fertility rate 2.06 2.98 
 Under five mortality rate (deaths per 1000 live births) 51.7 82.0 
Source: (MoHFW India 2007) 
 
Despite these improving health indicators, India has consistently failed to meet 
national and international health targets, and has exhibited slower health 
improvements than other Asian countries including China, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
(MoHFW India 2007). India continues to have high rates of maternal mortality and 
child death from communicable disease, in addition to poor chronic disease 
management (Hunt 2007; UNFPA and United Nations Population Fund 2007; Vora 
et al. 2009; Reddy et al. 2005; Patel et al. 2011). Despite its remarkable economic 
development, India’s rank in the human development index among 177 countries 




3.2 The health care situation in India 
 
When seeking health care, Indians must choose between unregulated, for-profit 
private providers or under-resourced public clinics. Although there are some world-
class public and private hospitals, the quality of services provided in both public and 
private facilities is often poor, particularly in rural areas. For instance, a stratified 
random sample of public and private health care providers in rural Madhya Pradesh 
found that 67% had no medical qualifications at all (Das et al. 2015). In rural 
Rajasthan, a study found that 41% of private providers calling themselves doctors 
did not have a medical degree, and almost 20% had not completed secondary school 
(Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo 2004). In both studies, the treatment provided across 
these rural public and private health care facilities was frequently “irrational.” 
Injections and drips were almost always administered regardless of symptoms. 
Diagnostic tests were performed in only 3% of visits in the Rajasthan study 
(Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo 2004). Unnecessary or harmful treatment was 
prescribed or dispensed 42% of the time in the Madhya Pradesh study (Das et al. 
2015).  
 
Staff vacancies are a major issue in the public sector; for example, only 27% of 
auxiliary nurse midwife (ANM) positions and 16% of doctor positions are filled 
(MoHFW India 2014a). Health care worker motivation and satisfaction are often 
low, as is the quality of care provided, due to a range of factors including target-
oriented rather than supportive supervision, insufficient training, frequent re-
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assignment to new areas, resource shortages (medicines, equipment and staff), and 
a lack of appropriate incentives (George 2009; Iyer and Jesani 1995; Peters et al. 
2010; MoHFW India 2014a). The public health system’s inadequacy is made clear by 
the fact that even the poorest quintile of the population chose private care for 76% 
of their outpatient medical care and 58% of their inpatient care rather than visiting 
free government health centers (NSSO 2006).  
 
Poor primary health care means vital preventative health care programs at the root 
of much communicable disease are insufficiently implemented, putting the poor at 
greatest disadvantage (Y. Balarajan, Selvaraj, and Subramanian 2011; Kumar et al. 
2011; Patel et al. 2011). For example, national immunization coverage is 44% 
overall, but only 26% among children of mothers with less than five years education 
(Y. Balarajan, Selvaraj, and Subramanian 2011). The poor frequently delay accessing 
care, do not access it at all, or fall further into poverty or debt through spending on 
private care (Mishra et al. 2008; Y. Balarajan, Selvaraj, and Subramanian 2011).  
 
Just over 4% of India’s GDP is spent on health care, comparable to other developing 
countries such as China and Thailand. However, nearly 75% of this expenditure is 
out-of-pocket (Y. Balarajan, Selvaraj, and Subramanian 2011).  With public sector 
spending on health only 1.1% of GDP (World Bank 2015), India is ranked 171 out of 
175 countries in the world in government health expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP (Awofeso and Rammohan 2011).  
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Nonetheless, the public sector continues to play an important, albeit inadequate, 
role in providing health care to the poor, especially immunization, birth control, and 
antenatal care. Half of all institutional deliveries in rural areas occur in public clinics 
(MoHFW India 2007). The county has an extensive network of public facilities and a 
large cadre of public health workers. In addition to health services, the public 
system provides supplementary nutrition and is responsible for ensuring access to 
sanitation and water. 
 
In 2005, the Indian government launched the National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM), which sought to be an “architectural correction” of the rural public health 
care system (MoHFW India 2005a, 3). The NRHM involved a pledge to increase the 
GDP spent on health care from 0.9% to 2-3% between 2005 and 2012 (ibid). The 
key programmatic components of the NRHM were decentralization of health 
planning and management to local elected government bodies, creation of a national 
cadre of female community health workers (called accredited social health activists 
(ASHAs)), upgrading rural health centers, engaging communities, and integrating 
sanitation, hygiene, nutrition, and safe drinking water into health planning.  A major 
mechanism to integrate these sectors, decentralize management, and increase 
community engagement was through the establishment of Village Health, Sanitation 
and Nutrition Committees (VHSNCs) in each village. 
 
By 2012, public expenditure on health care was still only 1.04% and a new pledge 
was made to increase spending to 1.87% by 2017 (Planning Commission 2012). At 
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the end of 2015, public spending is at only 1.1% —far from the original goal of 2-3% 
and extremely unlikely to meet the revised goal of 1.87% (Chowdhury 2015).  
Despite the severe budgetary shortfalls, since its launch in 2005, the NRHM has 
successfully formed the largest cadre of community health workers in the world, 
introduced VHSNCs across the country, and to some extent initiated decentral-
ization, rural health center upgrades, and intersectoral integration (MoHFW India 
2014a).  
 
3.3 Public service structure in rural India  
 
VHSNCs are meant to bring together many key actors in the rural health system and 
coordinate intersectoral activity around nutrition and sanitation. There are a 
number of departments, ministries, programs, and actors relevant to understanding 
VHSNCs (Table 2). Here, I outline the official personnel requirements for public 
services; actual staffing is often far below standard.   
At the village level (blue in Table 2) the VHSNC involves the ASHA community health 
worker, the ward member, who is an elected representative in the panchayat, and 
the anganwadi worker (AWW), who provides preschool and child nutrition services.  
VHSNC meetings are often held in the anganwadi center (AWC); in small villages, the 
AWC is generally the only public building. Village populations vary greatly but 
average about 1200 people.  
Each group of four to six villages is clustered into a political unit called a gram 
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panchayat (green in Table 2), led by an elected leader, called the sarpanch. The ward 
members within the gram panchayat are to represent their village’s interests to the 
sarpanch at political meetings called Gram Sabhas. Most gram panchayats will have 
a health sub center (HSC), which is supposed to be staffed by an auxiliary nurse 
midwife (ANM). Guidelines stipulate that the ANM opens the HSC for part of the day, 
and spends the remainder of her work hours traveling to the villages around the 
gram panchayat offering immunization, antenatal care, and health education. Gram 
panchayats are also to have a multi-purpose worker – male (MPW-M), who works in 
environmental health with a focus on vector control. One or more villages in a gram 
panchayat should also have a public school.   
The next administrative unit is the block (orange in Table 2), composed of about 
300 villages. Each block has several PHCs and one community health center (CHC). 
Guidelines stipulate that there should be one PHC for every six sub-centers. PHCs 
are supposed to have five in-patient beds, function around the clock, and be staffed 
by a doctor (called a medical officer (MO)) plus 14 additional health workers 
(MoHFW India 2012a). CHCs are supposed to function as hospitals, with 30 in-
patient beds and 25 staff, including at least one surgeon, one general physician, one 
gynecologist and one pediatrician. CHCs are run by the Block Chief Medical Officer 
(BCMO), who also oversees all government health care in the block.  
 
Districts (purple in Table 2) have a district hospital and a District Chief Medical 
Officer (DCMO) in charge of the whole district’s government health system. District 
hospitals vary greatly in size from 75 to 500 beds depending on the terrain and 
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population of a district, but an average sized 300 bed hospital is to have 50 doctors, 
200 nurses and paramedical staff, and 50 administrative staff (MoHFW India 
2012b). 
 
Table 2: Public system organization, from village to state level 
 
 
ASHAs and their supervisory hierarchy (facilitators, community mobilizers), ANMs, 
MPW-M, MOs, BCMOs and DCMOs are all functionaries of the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare. The AWWs and their hierarchy (supervisors, development officers, 
program managers) are within the Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS), 
run through the Department of Women and Child Development. ICDS, which began 
in the 1970s, initially focused on nutritional supplementation for children from 
birth to six years (MWCD India 2012). However, over the decades, ICDS has 
expanded to include nutritional support and health education for adolescent girls 


































































































The panchayat system has its own hierarchy from the village to the state level; it is 
to play a role in overseeing the health and nutrition systems and also work closely 
with the civil service hierarchy that manages taxes and land rights. Although 
VHSNCs are not officially mandated to coordinate with the civil services, in reality 
these actors (Patwari, Tehsildar, Sub-Divisional Magistrate and District Collector) 
are very powerful and must be consulted for infrastructure activities related to 
sanitation and water. Furthermore, VHSNCs are mandated to engage the local public 
schools, particularly to check sanitation and the quality of the mid-day meals served 
there, which involves working with teachers, headmasters and block and district 
education officers (BEOs & DEOs) within the Directorate of Education (DoE).  
Finally, to take up water and sanitation projects (e.g. having new wells bored or 
clearing waste) VHSNCs must coordinate with functionaries in the Public Works 
Department (PWD) and Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), such as 
executive engineers (EEs) and assistant engineers (AEs).  
 
3.4 Village Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Committees in India 
 
Following the 2005 launch of the NRHM, the Government of India approved 
guidelines for VHSNCs, stating that they were to play a central role in realizing the 
“community participation and ownership” goals of the NRHM and improving public 
health care accountability, availability, accessibility, and quality (MoHFW India 
2006a, 2). VHSNCs are to develop and implement a village health plan, allocate a 
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yearly untied fund of Rs 10,000 (US $150), and monitor their local health and 
nutrition services. Government guidelines stipulate that the untied fund “is a 
resource for community action at the local level and shall only be used for 
community activities that involve and benefit more than one household” and is to 
support “nutrition, education & sanitation, environmental protection, [and] public 
health measures” (MoHFW India 2006a, 3). The guidelines further state that the 
fund can be used for any of the following activities: 
 
 As a revolving fund from which households could 
draw in times of need to be returned in installments 
thereafter. 
 For any village level public health activity like 
cleanliness drive, sanitation drive, school health 
activities, ICDS, Anganwadi level activities, household 
surveys etc. 
 For the health care needs of a destitute women or 
very poor household (MoHFW India 2006a). 
 
There have been several revisions to the membership guidelines, but VHSNCs have 
consistently been expected to involve at least seven members including the ASHA, 
ward member, AWW, member(s) of women’s self-help groups (loan and savings 
groups), member(s) of the parent-teacher association, and representatives of local 
community based organizations. In addition, the ANM should be a member of the 
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VHSNC for the village in which she lives and at least 50% of the members should be 
female. When VHSNCs were formed in 2007, the ASHA program had just been 
launched and most villages had not yet selected and trained an ASHA. Thus ANMs 
and ward members were the initial joint signatories on the bank account for the 
VHSNC’s untied fund. In 2010, the ASHA was to take over as joint signatory with the 
ward member. As described in Chapter 5 “Contextualizing Participation: Village 
Health Committees in Northern India” this transfer may have been problematic: 
some health system officials told VHSNC members that the untied fund for 2013, 
2014, and 2015 could not be transferred to the joint ASHA and ward member 
accounts because ANMs who spent the untied fund in the late 2000s had not 
provided utilization certificates. 
 
Since the launch of the NRHM in 2005, there have been 18 studies examining 
aspects of VHSNCs in different parts of the country. Fourteen of these studies 
generally assess VHSNC activity and four evaluate specific capacity-building 
interventions led by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 14 general 
studies indicate that VHSCs have begun to function in many states but that most are 
not yet performing in a robust manner.  
 
Two rapid assessments from 2008—one in Orissa (Nandan et al. 2008) and one in 
Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa (PHRN 2008)—noted that many VHSNCs 
had been formed (except in Bihar where no VHSNCs had been formed) but were not 
yet able to access to their untied funds. By 2013, it was clear that VHSNCs in 
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Chhattisgarh were particularly well supported through a pre-existing community 
mobilization structure: Over 75% of villages reported having functional committees 
holding regular meetings and taking local health action (CSHRC 2013). A 
Government of India Planning Commission evaluation of the NRHM in Uttar 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Assam, Jamu & Kashmir and Tamil Nadu (GoI 
Planning Commission 2011) found that while in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh 
over 90% of the panchayat representatives interviewed knew about VHSNCs, in the 
other five states fewer than 8% did. Overall, around half the VHSNCs reported 
holding meetings and making some sort of health plan, but very few kept any 
records.  
 
A study in an unnamed north western state (R. Singh and Purohit 2012) found that 
none of the 17 VHSNCs studied met membership guidelines, largely due to the fact 
that no ASHAs had been trained in most villages. Meetings were “on paper only” and 
no activities were taking place. Similarly, although many of the villages studied by 
Malviya et al. (2013) in Madhya Pradesh, by Raut et al. (2013) in Odisha and Gujarat, 
and by Semwal et al. (2013) in Uttarakhand had VHSNCs, meetings were irregular, 
trainings were insufficient (or had not yet occurred) and panchayat involvement 
was very limited.  
 
Studies from the southern states of Karnataka (KSHSRC 2012) and Tamil Nadu 
(Ganesh et al. 2013) found that most committees had been formed and received 
some training, but meetings were not well attended.  A study in three north eastern 
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states (Nongdrenkhomba et al. 2012) found that VHSNC composition adhered to 
guidelines but that the portion of VHSNCs holding regular meetings ranged from 
36% in Meghalaya to 68% in Tripura to 84% in Manipur. VHSNCs were 
supplementing the untied fund with fund raising through voluntary donations, 
which is unique to this region and likely reflective of the highly devolved nature of 
political and economic processes in the north east.  
 
The studies on the use of the untied fund examined areas of Madhya Pradesh (Dixit 
et al. 2008), Uttar Pradesh (C. M. Singh et al. 2009), Pune (MASUM & SATHI 2005), 
and Odisha and Gujarat (Raut and Sekher 2013). Many found that VHSNC members 
did not know about the existence of the untied fund, or knew of it but did not play a 
role in allocating the money. ANMs often spent the money with no input from the 
VHSNCs because meetings were not occurring regularly and because ANMs were 
told by their superiors how to spend the fund. In Odisha, ANMs struggled to access 
the panchayat representative to get the checks co-signed (Raut and Sekher 2013) 
and in Uttar Pradesh, ANMs reported that panchayat representatives demanded 
kickbacks (C. M. Singh et al. 2009). In Pune, the untied fund was overwhelmingly 
spent on items that should have been purchased through pre-existing budgets, such 
as weighing scales for anganwadi centers (MASUM & SATHI 2005). 
 
The four studies on interventions to strengthen VHSNC functionality all featured 
NGO-led implementation of specific supports (trainings and facilitation) based on 
government requests. Two focused specifically on community-based monitoring 
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(CBM) of public services, a process conducted by VHSNCs and supported by a 
network of NGOs (S. Singh, Das, and Sharma 2010; Khanna and Pradhan 2013). Both 
studies noted that VHSNCs were non-functional or marginally functional at the 
beginning of the intervention and that CBM ignited vibrant community action. 
VHSNCs used score cards to measure public services and reported on violations of 
community health rights through large forums, meetings with stakeholders, and 
media efforts.  
 
The other two publications reported on a capacity building intervention for VHSNCs 
in Gujarat state, conducted by NGOs at the request of the state government (FRHS 
2010; FRHS 2011). The first study (FRHS 2010) reports on a one year training 
program provided for over 3500 VHSNCs. It detailed challenges faced by the 
implementing NGOs, including inconsistencies on government resolutions 
pertaining to the VHSNCs (e.g. it was not clear which people could be co-signatories 
for the untied fund account) and difficulties in recruiting busy health center staff for 
two-day training sessions. The NGOs did receive good cooperation from district and 
PHC health staff and were able to amend VHSNC membership to involve more active 
members. The second study (FRHS 2011) compared 50 VHSNCs that received 
training and 50 VHSNCs that did not receive training. It reports that 96% of the 
VHSNCs that received training organized health events in their villages, compared to 
62% of the VHSNCs that did not receive training. A greater percentage of trained 
VHSNCs had a health plan (38% versus 16%), maintained registers (84% versus 
20%), and had held at least one meeting in the previous year (72% versus 40%).  
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The Ministry’s new VHSNC-guidelines, Guidelines for Community Process, were 
developed in light of the experiences in Gujarat as well as internal consultations 
with officials and civil society organizations from other states (MoHFW India 
2013a). This dissertation draws on data collected during 1.5 years of research in 
which these Guidelines were implemented by an NGO, under a government contract, 
in a north western state.  
 
3.5 The research area 
 
This research took place in one highly marginalized block in northern India. We 
have called the block “Manujpur,” a pseudonym. Naming the state, district, and block 
in which this study took place would enable the implementing NGO and some 
respondents to be identified.  
 
The research block was located within 250 km of Delhi, in a poor rural area with a 
per capita income below Rs. 47,000 (US $702)1. Most people in the area were 
farmers, growing wheat, sorghum, and mustard, and many owned one or more 
buffalo, which provided milk for sale and family consumption. Men frequently 
migrated to the cities to work as drivers or on construction sites, and some whole 
families traveled during the planting or harvest seasons to work as migrant laborers 
on larger farms.  
                                                        
1
 All conversions use the Jan 10, 2016 rupees to US dollar exchange rate of Rs. 67 = US $1 
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The area was over 80% Hindu and approximately 20% Muslim. Among Hindus, 
approximately one third belonged to highly marginalized groups called scheduled 
tribes (STs) and scheduled castes (SCs), and over 40% were in somewhat 
marginalized groups, called ‘other backwards castes’ (OBCs). Child malnourishment 
was high, with 40% of all children stunted and 40% underweight.  
Female literacy was particularly low in this region and over 50% of all women had 
no formal education. Total fertility averaged above three children per woman. 
Freedom of movement, access to finances, and decision-making autonomy were 
severely constrained for most women. Over half were not regularly exposed to any 
media, nearly 70% could not go out alone to markets, health centers, and 
community spaces, and nearly 70% had no role in decisions on issues such as their 
own health care, household purchases, and visiting relatives. The majority of men 
and women agreed that men can be justified in hitting and beating their wives in 
certain circumstances (MoHFW India 2007).  
 
Villages averaged about 1200 people but ranged in size from fewer than 200 to 
above 2500. Figure 2 shows photos of typical villages. Families lived in multi-
generational extended arrangements, with young women from other villages 
marrying in to their in-laws’ household. Homes were made of mud or concrete and 
latrines were very uncommon. Even at local public schools and anganwadi centers, 
latrines were either not available or not maintained. The anganwadi centers were 
operating as infrequent food distribution centers, rather than daily pre-schools.  
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During the monsoon season, dirty water collected around washing areas and in 
muddy pits which at times made the rural roads nearly impassible. About half the 
households had electricity, although power cuts were frequent and long. Almost 
every household had a mobile phone. The region experienced chronic shortages of 
potable water because much of the water available was either saline or high in 
fluoride. Only deep bore-wells could access potable water. In some villages, all the 
wells failed to provide drinking water and people relied on water piped in from 
other areas and stored in tanks.   
 
Figure 2: Photographs from typical villages in the study area 
  
 
The public health system was highly under resourced. The HSCs, PHCs and even the 
CHC were almost always vacant and lacked personnel, medicine and equipment 
(Figure 3).  
 
 41 
Figure 3: Photographs of vacant PHCs in the study area 
 
 
The few ANMs working in the region traveled on foot or by bus to provide 
immunization and antenatal care in catchment areas that were at least double the 
size they were meant to cover, and thus almost never opened the HSCs. Some 
doctors in the region were deputed to the block’s CHC from their PHCs, leaving 
those PHCs completely un-staffed. HSCs and PHCs lacked electricity and indoor 
plumbing. Patients who went to the CHC seeking care were frequently referred to 




CHAPTER 4. METHODS 
 
4.1 Overview of the study 
 
The data for this dissertation are drawn from a larger study, which took place in two 
Indian states, one northern and one southern. This dissertation draws from the 
northern state.  
 
In 2012-13, the Government of India’s National Health Systems Resource Centre 
(NHSRC), which is technical advisor to the Indian Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MoHFW), was in the process of developing a support package for VHSNCs. 
The development of this support package came in response to research indicating 
that community engagement through VHSNCs was hampered by a lack of enabling 
institutional mechanisms and insufficient support and capacity building for VHSNCs 
(GoI Planning Commission 2011). The NHSRC collaborated with the Delhi-based 
Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI), which is a large not-for-profit research 
and teaching organization funded through public and private grants, to seek funding 
for implementation research on this VHSNC-support package. Researchers from 
JHSPH and the Indian research and advocacy organization SOCHARA also joined the 
partnership to develop the research protocol. The World Health Organization’s 
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research funded the study through their 
Implementation Research Platform and additional financial support came through a 
grant from the Government of Canada’s International Development Research 
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Centre. The NHSRC funded the implementing NGO partner, “SEEK” (a pseudonym) 
to run the VHSNC-strengthening program in northern India. 
 
The study ran for two years (2014-2015), with active implementation and research 
for 1.5 years, and had two components: (1) the implementation of a VHSNC support 
package, described in section 4.2, and (2) longitudinal embedded research on the 
implementation process, described in section 4.3.  
 
4.2 The VHSNC-strengthening intervention 
 
The VHSNC strengthening intervention was implemented over a 1.5-year period by 
SEEK, a local NGO. The intervention took place in 50 out of the 200 villages in 
Manujpur block. The 50 villages were selected by SEEK to be in three geographically 
contiguous clusters of 16 or 17 villages each, because the intervention allotted three 
cluster facilitators to manage field visits.  
 
Selection and training of facilitators: In accordance with the VHSNC support 
package design, SEEK hired three facilitators and a program coordinator. Additional 
details about the NGO facilitators are provided in chapter 7.  All were trained for 
three days in the SEEK office by an NHSRC representative and then for one day in 
the NHSRC Delhi office. The first (three-day) training focused on VHSNC 
membership guidelines and developing a strategy to form the VHSNC in 
communities. Although not initially planned, the NHSRC trainer also spent some 
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time explaining the government health system and the NRHM to the facilitators, 
since they had not worked in the health sector before and did not know key 
concepts and terms such as ASHA, PHC, and BCMO. The one-day training at the 
NHSRC focused on reading and discussing the Guidelines for Community Processes 
(MoHFW India 2013a)and the associated Handbook for Trainers (MoHFW India 
2013b). Several facilitators expressed a desire for additional support: they felt the 
training was too short and did not give them enough direction about how to run the 
VHSNC trainings. However, they had to rely on the Guidelines and Handbook rather 
than additional face-to-face training.  
 
Social mobilization & VHSNC expansion: NGO facilitators conducted social 
mobilization in each of the 50 intervention villages at the beginning of the project 
and halfway through. Mobilization exercises involved first gathering as many people 
as possible at a central location, such as a school or panchayat hall, then speaking to 
attendees about the VHSNC and the government services that should be available. 
The NGO facilitators explained what the VHSNC was, the activities it could take up, 
and member roles. Latter mobilization also involved street theater, displaying 
colorful posters about the VHSNC (Figure 4), and health awareness activities in 




Figure 4: Materials for social mobilization and training 
    
 
During the mobilization sessions, the NGO facilitators asked villagers to indicate 
their interest in joining the committee and to suggest names of others in the village 
who might be good additions. Everyone in the community who expressed interest 
was allowed to join. NGO facilitators followed up additional nominations. The 
facilitators prompted additional suggestions from the villagers to fulfill the guideline 
requirements: at least 15 members, half female, and inclusion of representatives 
from all caste and religious groups in each village.  
 
VHSNC member training: After reconstituting the VHSNCs, committee members 
were invited to a series of training sessions in the main town, Manujpur. These 
trainings were conducted by the NGO project director, program coordinator and 
three NGO facilitators, with some additional support from other SEEK staff involved 
in different projects. The NGO trained nearly 300 VHSNC members in groups of 45-
60, over a series of six sessions. These trainings were spread over a year to provide 
several refresher trainings, to train newly elected ward members after state 
panchayat elections, and to avoid the harvesting season when most villagers would 
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be unavailable. Training contents included: the importance of community 
participation, information on health rights, the roles and responsibilities of VHSNC 
members, how to undertake local health planning and monitoring, and how to 
allocate and account for the untied fund. In latter trainings, VHSNC members were 
also encouraged to share their experiences and problem solve together.  
 
The trainings involved both didactic lecturing by SEEK staff and discussion based 
activities. For example, the first training began with SEEK staff standing at the front 
of the room, while VHSNC members sat on the ground. The SEEK staff used colored 
posters (Figure 4) to explain the NRHM to participants and to explain key aspects of 
village-level health, nutrition, and sanitation. They then conducted an activity where 
participants worked in small groups to draw an image of a healthy person and then 
presented their picture to the larger group. These presentations engaged 
participants in conversation about what health means to them, and what factors 
make people healthy and unhealthy.   
 
Support for monthly VHSNC meetings: After VHSNC expansion and the first 
training session, NGO facilitators began convening and supporting monthly village 
VHSNC meetings. Dates and times for monthly VHSNC meetings were set by VHSNCs 
in coordination with their SEEK facilitator to ensure the facilitator could attend. 
Since there were 16-17 VHSNCs for each facilitator, the facilitators supported one or 
two meetings most working days.  In the days leading up to each VHSNC meeting, 
the facilitator would try to phone members. Sometimes they would also drop in to a 
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village to remind key VHSNC members in person. For each meeting, the NGO 
facilitator would walk around to the homes of members, calling them for the 
meeting. The facilitator would then convene the meeting by going over the minutes 
from the previous meeting, initiating discussions on health issues, and helping the 
group strategize about how to solve local issues. As the project period went on, the 
facilitators encouraged the ASHAs to take a greater role in convening meetings. 
They also asked literate members to take minutes. During later training sessions 
and at VHSNC meetings, SEEK staff emphasized that the intervention was going to 
end soon and that VHSNC members would have to continue without them.  
However, even at the end of the intervention, VHSNC members still relied heavily on 
the facilitator to gather people and generally run the meetings.  
 
Cluster-level VHSNC meetings: SEEK convened cluster level meetings 
approximately every three months. Members from each of the 16-17 VHSNCs in a 
cluster were invited to gather in a central location and block level health system 
staff (ASHA supervisors and the BCMO) were invited as guest attendees. These 
cluster meetings allowed VHSNC members to share their experiences with other 
VHSNCs, learn strategies and struggles in other villages, and work together to 
address problems affecting all of them.  
 
Support for VHSNC activities: Whenever possible, the NGO facilitators would try to 
support VHSNC activities beyond the VHSNC and cluster meetings. Generally, the 
most they could do was help deliver petitions written by VHSNCs to various 
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government offices and occasionally follow up in person or by telephone with 
administrative officials about actions requested by VHSNCs.  
 
 
4.3 Study design 
 
4.3.1 Site selection  
 
This in-depth qualitative study took place over the course of 1.5 years in 2014-2015, 
concurrent with the intervention. The study sought to understand the relationship 
between the context, mechanisms, and outcomes of the intervention to inform scale 
up. To this end, the research team (described in detail in section 4.3.3), focused our 
qualitative research on a sub-set of four villages, which we called case study sites. 
Case study enables deep exploration of contemporary phenomenon within a real life 
context, where the researcher has little control over events (Yin 2009). Case studies 
engage a wide range of research methods, such as observation, interviews, focus 
group discussions, and document review, to access as many perspectives and 
sources of information as possible for rich and detailed understanding (ibid). 
 
Selecting our case study sites was guided by the principle of purposeful sampling 
(Patton 1990) to ensure that we captured the experience of both typical and more 
marginalized villages as determined by geographic remoteness and social group 
(Figure 5). We also sought two villages from the 31 villages where SEEK had worked 
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before and two villages from the 19 villages where SEEK had not previously worked, 
to explore the possibility that prior engagement may have affected the intervention.  
 
Figure 5: Research site selection 
 
 
We chose two villages that were quite far (about 16 kilometers) from the town and 
closest quasi-functional health facility (the Community Health Center in Manujpur) 
and two that were mid-way (about eight kilometers), since we wanted to study 
VHSNC functionality in villages with low and typical geographic remoteness and 
proximity to health care. We also sought two villages that were more socially 
marginalized (composed of a larger than average proportion of scheduled caste, 
scheduled tribe and Muslim people) and two that were more typically mixed.  
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4.3.2 Respondents and data collection  
 
We developed separate in-depth interview (IDI) and focus group discussion (FGD) 
guides for VHSNC members, non-VHSNC community members, health system 
functionaries, and NGO staff (sample guides are in annexure 1). Our sampling for 
VHSNC members was purposive, to include VHSNC members who participated 
actively and those who dropped out or attended meetings very irregularly. We were 
able to interview all engaged VHSNC members in all the villages, because the 
number of active members remained fairly low (fewer than eight people). We also 
returned to some key respondents for additional interviews, discussed below. For 
non-VHSNC members, we sought to identify respondents with different perspectives 
on the VHSNC, including people who refused to join or dropped out and non-
members who were influential in the village or had a recent salient experience with 
health, sanitation, or nutrition. We engaged in exhaustive sampling for non-village 
stakeholders by interviewing all NGO staff working on the VHSNC-strengthening 
initiative and all block-level health system functionaries who we were able to reach 
(ANMs, ASHA supervisors, and the BCMO).  
 
We conducted 74 in-depth interviews (Table 3). Interviews sought to elicit 
perspectives and stories related to: village context (anganwadi center, sanitation, 
health care, community relationships, prior collective action), knowledge and 
opinions about the VHSNC, personal experiences with VHSNC involvement, benefits 
and challenges associated with membership, information on other VHSNC members 
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(e.g., relationships between members, reasons some are more engaged than others), 
and information on VHSNC formation, training, meetings, and activities.  
 
Table 3: Number of in-depth interviews and respondents by classification and 
gender 
Respondent classification # interviews (# respondents) 
 Male Female Total 
VHSNC    
 General community  21 (13) 11 (8) 32 (21) 
 ASHA 0 8 (5) 8 (5) 
 Anganwadi staff 0 12 (9) 12 (9) 
 Ward member 3 2 5 
Total interviews with VHSNC members 24 (16) 33 (24) 57 (40) 
Non-VHSNC    
 General community 4 1 5 
 ANM 0 3 3 
 ASHA supervisor 1 1 2 
 Block Chief Medical Officer 1 0 1 
 NGO staff 3 (2) 3 6 (5) 
Total interviews with non-VHSNC members 9 (8) 8 17 (16) 
Total interviews 33 (24) 41 (32) 74 (56) 
 
Ten respondents were interviewed twice over the research period and four were 
interviewed three times. The remaining 42 respondents were each interviewed 
once. We chose to return to respondents for a second or third interview for three 
main reasons: (1) we felt an earlier interview lacked depth because the respondent 
was not comfortable (generally because of time constraints) or because other 
people joined the interview so the interviewer ended it early; (2) the respondent 
was involved in any specific activity or event after the first interview, which we 
wanted to learn more about through a second interview; and (3) a respondent was 
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particularly unique and insightful and we wanted to understand their evolving 
perspectives.  
 
We conducted 18 focus group discussions (Table 4) to explore social norms (for 
example on gender relations and social cohesion) and areas of agreement or dissent 
on key research topics (for example on the VHSNC’s prospects, why some people 
participate and others do not, and what actions are required to improve health, 
sanitation and nutrition). While the domains for focus group discussions were 
similar to those for in-depth interviews, the questions focused on exploring how 
groups of people discussed these issues, using facilitation skills such as “I’m hearing 
a lot of people agree with [statement]. Would you say this is common to everyone? 
Who might disagree?” We conducted more focus group discussions with women 
than with men because male perspectives dominated in public events that we 
observed, including in VHSNC meetings. Some focus group discussions included 
VHSNC members and non-VHSNC members because it was socially unacceptable to 
ask people to leave. Moreover, in many cases VHSNC membership was fluid, with 
people dropping out, joining, or even not knowing that they were listed as members.  
 
Table 4: Focus group discussions by respondent classification and gender 
Respondent type # discussions  
 Male Female Total 
VHSNC members 4 8 12 
General community, includes some VHSNC members 3 3 6 
Total focus group discussions 7 11 18 
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We observed 54 VHSNC related activities (Table 5), to better understand the context 
and dynamics of the committees. The observations sought to understand what 
topics were discussed and how, as well as amenities (equipment, cleanliness, toilets, 
water) and human organization (Who attends? Who is missing? Who talks? Who 
listens? How are people segregated? Who sits? Who stands?).  
 
Table 5: Observations by activities 
Activities observed N 
Selection of NGO facilitators 1 
Training of NGO facilitators 2 
NGO meetings, planning sessions, and activities 9 
Community mobilization & VHSNC expansion 6 
VHSNC member training 8 
VHSNC meetings 15 
Cluster meetings 9 
General observation in communities & health centers 4 
Total observations 54 
 
We also collected a number of documents to gain additional perspectives on the 
VHSNC processes, especially to understand SEEK’s formal outputs. These documents 
included: 
 Letters from the SEEK project head to NHSRC detailing early progress and 
challenges 
 Newspaper clippings of the advertisement for facilitator recruitment 
 Photographs of the community mobilization materials, which were a 
series of about 15 colourful posters developed from the NHSRC’s 
Guidelines for Community Processes, and included the following topics: 
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who the VHSNC members are; health issues in rural areas; functions of 
the VHSNC; functions of the anganwadi; role of ASHA 
 Colourful pamphlet on VHSNC functioning, role, and membership, which 
was distributed to all VHSNC members  
 Photographs of several letters written by VHSNCs to various government 
offices asking for service improvements  
 Newspaper coverage of a village’s efforts to improve their access to water  
 SEEK’s monthly progress reports  
 Photocopies of minutes and attendance registers for all VHSNC meetings 
in the intervention area 




The data were collected by a three person team: a male research assistant 
(Gupteswar Patel), female research associate2 (Shinjini Mondal), and female 
research coordinator (me, Kerry Scott). Gupteswar is from the state of Odisha and 
lived in Manujpur during the research period. Shinjini is based in Delhi, where she 
was born and raised. I am Canadian, based in Bangalore. Both Shinjini and I visited 
Manujpur frequently. All three of us had master’s degrees in public health. The team 
had a week long orientation and training in Delhi, which I guided. 
 
                                                        
2
 Associates have more research experience and take on greater responsibility for achieving project goals 
than assistants; both are overseen by the research coordinator 
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This team debriefed after most interviews, focus group discussions, and observation 
events, either in person or by phone. During these debriefs, we discussed logistic 
challenges, such as how to ensure privacy, how to probe more effectively, the best 
times and places for data collection, and how to plan focus group discussions so that 
invited participants were able to attend but additional people were discouraged 
from attending. We also discussed emerging findings on our topics of interest, 
surprising elements, strategies to explore additional themes, and sampling (i.e. 
which respondents to approach next). For example, during a focus group discussion 
with female VHSNC members in one case study village, the group spoke of the 
VHSNC as non functional. However an earlier focus group discussion with men 
indicated that the VHSNC was taking up a number of activities. We discussed these 
alternative perspectives and examined our observation notes from the VHSNC 
meetings. We decided to try to reconcile the different experiences of VHSNC 
participation reported by women and men with additional focus group discussions 
later in the research period.  
 
4.3.4 Reflections on data collection 
 
Gender dynamics during data collection: Despite a social prohibition which 
discouraged women from speaking to men in their communities, women were able 
to speak openly with the male researcher (Gupteswar). However women could not 
be indoors alone with him. To avoid having a male family member seated nearby 
throughout the interview, Gupteswar conducted the interviews in clear view of 
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several people, such as under a tree or in an open courtyard, but far enough away 
from others so as to assure privacy. If men dropped by during focus group 
discussions with women, the women would not speak. We had to find polite and 
socially acceptable ways to ask the men to leave. One strategy that worked was to 
have the male researcher (Gupteswar) take the men to another area for an informal 
conversation, while Shinjini, a female researcher, continued the focus group 
discussion. As respondents became familiar with the researchers, this type of 
curiosity and interest in participating reduced significantly.  
 
Seasonality: Seasonal events, particularly harvesting, labor migration, and festivals, 
played a major role in community life and made many people unavailable for 
interviews, focus groups and VHSNC activities for long periods of time. The research 
assistant was occasionally frustrated by frequent no-shows for interviews but 
during our meetings we developed flexible data collection timelines. We also 
reflected that it was a positive indicator that respondents were comfortable enough 
with the researcher to prioritize their more pressing engagements. State and 
panchayat elections occurred during the data collection period. The government 
imposes a code of conduct (achaar sanhita) upon announcing the election schedule, 
which meant government offices suspended activities and group meetings had to 
receive advance permission from police (Election Commission of India 2013). 
Achaar sanhita is enacted to avert communal (religious) clashes and corruption 
during election time. Our research team considered the period leading up to 
elections to be highly sensitive, when, Shinjini explained “small issues can lead to big 
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clashes.” To avoid raising any concerns in the villages, we did not collect data during 
the several weeks of achaar sanhita.  
 
Reflecting on respondent-researcher dynamics: The researchers were educated and 
more affluent outsiders. Community members often looked to us for solutions to 
local problems, as a source of ideas on what to do next, or as people who might be 
able to convey their problems to government officials. It was an ongoing process to 
build understanding among respondents that we were not able to help directly solve 
their problems. This process consisted of repeated discussions, initiated by 
respondents asking us to help them, in which we explained that we were here to 
learn about the VHSNC process and report our findings to others, but that we were 
not able to provide any resources. Our outsider identities had some advantages too. 
Gupteswar often reminded respondents that he was from another state and asked 
them to more fully explain concepts or words they used, which encouraged 
respondents to articulate underlying issues.  
 
During his introduction to the villages, several male community members asked 
Gupteswar which caste and sub-caste he belonged to. Gupteswar’s caste group (the 
Patels) is very large, and has different status in different states in India. So in some 
states Patels are Brahmins (highest caste), while in others they position slightly 
lower in the caste hierarchy. Gupteswar truthfully told those who questioned him 
that he did not know how his caste was positioned in the local caste hierarchy—but 
community members would likely have assumed he was from higher caste group. 
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He made an effort to sit with people from all castes and share food and water with 
everyone.  
 
It is difficult to speculate about how Gupteswar’s caste identity may have affected 
the research. Many people from all castes insisted there was no caste discrimination 
in the villages, although some higher caste people expressed negative sentiments 
about lower caste people to Gupteswar and some lower caste people openly spoke 
about discrimination. Gupteswar speculates that even if he had been from a lower 
caste and reported this to community members, he may not have experienced 
discrimination, in part because he was always considered a non-local, and thus not 
subject to local norms and customs (illustrated most clearly by the fact that women 
could speak directly to him but not to local men), and in part because his class 
position, as an educated person with a salaried professional job, would have 
modified any caste-based discrimination. Gupteswar’s individual character, 
particularly his respect for the respondents, shown for example by his politeness, 
his ready understanding of their other time commitments, and how carefully and 
non-judgmentally he listened to them, also influenced his relationships with 
respondents.  
 
Shinjini was asked twice about her caste, also at the beginning of the research 
period: once by a young girl and once by a woman in one of the villages. Shinjini felt 
that her status as an educated woman from Delhi working for a professional 
organization set her so far apart from the female respondents that everyone 
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assumed she was higher caste (which she is) and deserving of great respect. She 
emphasized that caste was intricately combined with the other aspects of status 
(education, profession, urban/rural, linguistic, and financial) and that its influence 
on researcher-respondent dynamics cannot be discussed in isolation.  
 
My status as a Caucasian outsider brought additional attention to the intervention 
and may have generated higher expectations. Some respondents recalled VHSNC 
formation events as the time I came to the village and created the committees, 
although I had not spoken and the NGO facilitators had done all the work. 
Nonetheless, excitement quickly reduced and the discussions and interviews that I 
attended did not seem different from those I did not attend.  
 
Many community members did not initially understand the difference between the 
NGO staff and the researchers. After initial orientation with help from the NGO staff, 
researchers made repeated efforts to orient themselves as separate from the NGO 
by visiting the villages without NGO accompaniment. This was easier once the 
research assistant got his own motorcycle. Generally these efforts were successful, 
although even at the end of the intervention several people still saw the researcher 
as another NGO staff member. Respondents were nonetheless forthcoming about 
negative aspects of the VHSNC. Some community members also thought the 
research assistant may have been supervising the NGO facilitators, since he was 
always watching them with a notebook. Fortunately, the community members were 
comfortable enough with the researcher to ask him about this, so he could explain 
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that he was not evaluating or supervising but instead trying to document strategies 
and challenges to inform scale up.  
 
Reflections on researcher relationship with implementing NGO: We were occasionally 
concerned that the implementing NGO misunderstood the researchers’ role. At 
times Gupteswar felt that the implementing NGO sought his help as an additional 
support staff to improve the intervention, when he wanted to remain an observer. 
At other times, he detected concern among NGO staff that he was evaluating them. 
He repeatedly explained that he was not an evaluator and instead wanted to 
understand challenges and limitations facing the NGO, so that future scale up could 
more accurately account for field realities. Sometimes the presence of the 
researcher may have been used as a management tool by higher level NGO staff, 
who, for example, reprimanded NGO facilitators after a poorly attended VHSNC 
training event, saying “you should beg the researcher not to report back how bad 
that event was.” Over time, when the NGO staff realized that researcher curiosity 
about challenges was not linked to funding and did not bring trouble to the NGO, the 
NGO staff became increasingly eager to share their feedback on issues they faced 




4.3.5 Translation  
 
We worked with a pool of six translators. All were bachelor’s degree holders from 
English medium educational institutions, and several were master’s level social 
scientists, including one linguist.  We asked the translators to listen to the audio in 
Hindi and type the best possible English translation on a sentence by sentence basis, 
including “umhum” and other audible non-verbal components of the recording.  
 
The translators were hired on open contracts, which enabled our team to offer 
transcription and translation work on a file-by-file basis, as and when we chose, and 
enabled the translators to accept or reject the work offered, according to their time 
availability. This way, we could simply stop offering work to translators with whom 
we did not want to continue working, and translators had the flexibility to take up 
work only when they were able, since many were also working elsewhere or 
running a household.  
 
We worked hard to assure high quality translations. For each new translator, we 
explained our translation expectations and offered them an example of a high 
quality translation. The research associate or research assistant checked each 
transcript in its entirety, by listening to the audio while reading the translation. I 
then read the English transcript again to clarify any phrases that were unclear to my 
western understanding of English. We offered extensive feedback to the translators. 
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We asked them to resubmit any transcripts that contained errors or missed content 
and we rechecked these transcripts.   
 
We had a number of challenges at the beginning. Several translators who made it 
through our recruitment process were later dropped because their work did not 
meet our standards. Common issues were: (1) translators summarizing content 
rather than translating on a sentence-by-sentence basis, (2) translators who lacked 
the English language skills to adequately express the Hindi content in English; (3) 
translators who were competent in English and Hindi but could not handle the 
regional variation of Hindi spoken in the research area; and (4) lack of attention to 
detail. We gave translators feedback the first time we encountered any issues but if 
quality did not improve we stopped offering them future work.   
 
During coding and analysis, I frequently returned to the research assistant and 
research associate to check important and nuanced passages. They listened to the 
audio again and confirmed that the English translation adequately represented the 
respondent’s statements or made appropriate corrections.   
 
 
4.4. Data management and analysis 
 
4.4.1 Ensuring high quality research 
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Qualitative social research is premised on the understanding that there are multiple 
realities and truths, depending on the culture, identity, and assumptions of the 
researcher (Creswell 1997). It is thus problematic to assess research along the lines 
of validity and reliability, which assume the presence of a single true interpretation 
of the world (validity) and the importance of stable findings, regardless of who 
conducts the research (reliability). But if there are multiple ‘true’ ways to 
understand the world, what makes good research? Although debate continues about 
how the concepts of reliability and validity translate into qualitative research 
paradigms, there are now widely accepted principles of rigor in qualitative research, 
against which studies can be judged (Morse et al. 2002; Sandelowski 1986; 1993; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln 1995). Table 6 presents key principles of quality for 
the research process, as summarized by Gilson et al. (2011), and outlines how this 
study applied them.  
 
Table 6: Principles of quality (Gilson et al. 2011) and applications to this research 
Principle Explanation Application  
1. Prolonged 
engagement  
More time spent with 
study subjects and in 
the study site enables 
unplanned 
interactions that may 
reveal subtle or rare 
social dynamics and 
experiences. 
Research spread over 1.5 years. 
One embedded researcher, two others made repeated 
visits. 
Informal engagement, repeated interviews, repeated 
observations over seasons. 
Many initial challenges in respondent-researcher relations 
(e.g. respondents concerned that they cannot speak frankly 
about within-community friction) reduced through 
prolonged engagement. 
2. Use of 
theory 
Using theory to guide 
sample selection, 
data collection and 
analysis ensures 
research follows 
underlying logic and 
matches the research 
question. 
Case selection guided by theory of relevant supports and 
barriers, as well as components of marginalization. 
Analysis linked to theories of contextual spheres affecting 
VHSNCs, theories of power, and community participation.  
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Table 6: Principles of quality (Gilson et al. 2011) and applications to this research 




to allow prior theory 
and initial 
assumptions to be 
tested or to examine 
‘‘average’’ or unusual 
experience 
Since the purpose of the broader study was to generate 
lessons for scale up, the study location was selected in a 
part of north India that shares many socio-economic 
features across the other large north Indian states. The 
four villages were selected for typical and more 
marginalized sites, guided by our interest in how both 




Overall goal is not to 
seek consensus but 
understand multiple 
ways of seeing the 
data. Denzin (1978) 
and Patton (1999) 





Triangulation by methods (FGDs, IDIs, documents, 
observation, informal discussions) and sources (different 
points of time, range of locations and range of 
respondents) enabled us to check the consistency of 
findings from different methods and explore 
complementary, alternative, and conflicting perspectives.  
Triangulation by analyst: The broader research team was 
engaged throughout, which exposed my interpretations to 
other perspectives and highlighted blind spots.   
Triangulation by theory/perspective: The papers present 
an examination of the data through a variety of lenses 
including programmatic, political economy, feminist and 
post-modern focuses. Other analysts on the team brought 
additional theoretical perspectives, for instance the 
principal investigator Kabir Sheikh brought many years of 
experience with health systems and policy perspectives.  
5. Negative 
case analysis 
Looking for evidence 
that contradicts my 
explanations and 
theory, and refining 
them in response to 
this evidence 
As I was developing the findings, I questioned my 
interpretations and sought alternative explanations. For 
example, I found myself assuming that women would not 
be able to attend VHSNC training and that men would 
block women from participating in the VHSNC or deny the 
importance of them participating. These assumptions 
likely arose from my tendency to sympathize with 
women’s struggles, my sense that men in the villages were 
generally unsupportive of women’s rights, and women’s 
own discussion of the limitations placed on their 
movement.  However, when I interrogated these 
assumptions I found that they were incorrect: while it may 
have been difficult for women to attend meetings in 
Manujpur, female attendance was about 50%. Moreover, 
when SEEK held a training for newly-elected ward 
members, husbands of female ward members attended the 
training with their wives, which enabled the women to 
participate.  Also, male VHSNC members (at lease verbally) 
endorsed the involvement of women in the committee.  
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Table 6: Principles of quality (Gilson et al. 2011) and applications to this research 




Review findings with 
other researchers on 
a continuous basis to 
seek diverse opinion 
and insight. 
Larger team reviewed the findings. Team members, 
particularly the research assistant and research associate 
felt the papers I developed resonated with their 
understanding of the data. 
7. Audit trail Keep detailed record 
of data collection and 
analysis. 
Provide full account 
of how methods and 
case selection 
evolved 
Extensive memo writing to document thought process, 
purposive sampling rationale, etc. All data filed carefully to 
enable return to the original source (i.e. audio/observation 
note) in case of questions.   
Coded outputs show which text segments were classified 
under which code. 
Extended findings report available to those interested in 
understanding the entire breadth of the data. 
 
4.4.2 Ethics  
 
The study received ethical approval from PHFI’s Institutional Ethics Committee 
(TRC-IEC-178/13) and the World Health Organization’s Research Ethics Review 
Committee (RPC581). The Institutional Review Board of the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health determined that it did not need to review the 
study in light of prior approval from the PHFI and WHO ethics committees. 
 
The decision not to name the north Indian state where this study took place was 
made in order to ensure anonymity of the NGO-staff respondents, the block chief 
medical officer (BCMO) and other block-level health system functionaries. The NGO 
worked in only a few locations, and in only one state. It thus would be possible to 




CHAPTER 5. CONTEXTUALIZING PARTICIPATION: VILLAGE HEALTH 




Background: Health committees are a popular strategy for facilitating community 
participation in health, particularly in low and middle income countries. Their 
potential effects are mediated by a number of factors including the contextual 
environment in which they function. George et al. (2015) developed a framework 
that identifies four porous and interconnected spheres of context most relevant to 
health committees: community, health facility, administration and societal. We 
apply this framework to a contextual analysis of an intervention to strengthen 
Village Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Committees (VHSNCs) in rural north India, 
examining features in each sphere that influenced VHSNC outcomes. 
 
Methods: Over the course of 1.5 years, 50 marginalized villages in a north Indian 
state received a government-designed VHSNC support package, which included 
social mobilization, expanding VHSNC membership, training, and ongoing 
facilitation for committee meetings and activities. Qualitative research through 
interviews (n=74), focus groups (n=18) and observation (n=54) explored the 
contextual features that facilitated or hindered intensified community engagement 
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by VHSNCs. Thematic content analysis enabled the identification and grouping of 
themes, and detailed exploration of sub-themes. 
 
Results: Within the community contextual sphere, VHSNCs were challenged by social 
hierarchies that prevented people from speaking out about local issues, particularly 
gender norms that curtailed women’s active participation. In addition, communities 
exhibited deep mistrust of government institutions, which made people wary of 
investing in the VHSNC. Within the health facility sphere, VHSNCs were hindered by 
the severely under-resourced health system and the need for increased support to 
enable frontline health workers to facilitate VHSNC functionality.  
 
Within the administration contextual sphere, we found that community members 
prioritized improved water access above all else, but VHSNCs could not engage in 
the large-scale infrastructure projects required to address this problem. Beyond this 
issue, block level health system functionaries often lacked the power to respond to 
other VHSNC requests, especially for hiring nurses and doctors to fill vacancies. 
VHSNCs were then left unsure of how to advocate for much-needed change. The 
chain of responsibility for aspects of VHSNC administration was opaque, which, for 
example, made it difficult for VHSNCs to identify why their Rs. 10,000 (US $150) 
yearly fund was not released throughout the 1.5-year period. Furthermore, despite 
VHSNCs’ intersectoral nature, working on health, sanitation, and nutrition, they 
struggled to involve diverse government services and only received official support 
from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.  
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In the societal sphere, although decentralization reforms empowered the locally 
elected system of government (called the panchayat), many VHSNCs were still 
unable to engage the powerful elected representative (called the sarpanch), and 
instead worked with the lowest level elected representative (called ward panch), 
who they considered ineffective. The prevalence of market solutions to fill gaps in 
government service provision (such as private health care, schools, and wells) 
reduced the willingness of some people to work on VHSNC activities, since they 
were already paying for private services.  
 
Conclusions: The VHSNC-support intervention succeeded in its core elements of 
expanding committee membership through a participatory process, training VHSNC 
members, facilitating monthly meetings, and helping VHSNCs take some actions to 
improve local health. However contextual barriers, particularly at the health facility, 
administration, and societal levels proved formidable and severely limited VHSNC 
capacity to succeed in improving local health services. Contextual features that 
would provide essential support for VHSNCs include: basic staff and resources for 
government health services; clear pathways of accountability for public services so 
that VHSNC members would know where to go to seek change; improved 
intersectoral coordination at higher levels of government; and extended 
decentralization of power.  
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Keywords: health committee; context; health facility; health administration; 
decentralization; gender; India; community 
 
Key messages 
 The capacity of village health committees to function as institutions for community 
participation in health is highly contingent upon an enabling context 
 In rural north India, contextual features at the community, health facility, 
administration, and societal level were often at odds with health committee 
functionality 
 Contextual barriers at the community level were not insurmountable, but barriers at 
the health facility, administration, and societal level severely constrained VHSNC 
functionality and success  




5.2.1 Health committees in context 
 
Health committees are increasingly identified as a mechanism for facilitating 
community participation in health, particularly in low and middle income countries 
(LMICs) (McCoy, Hall, and Ridge 2011). These committees have been theorized to 
contribute to a range of health systems goals, including improved accountability in 
peripheral health services, participatory health planning, expanded community 
support for health workers, local management of facilities, improved reach of health 
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services and health messages, and local resource mobilization to bolster resource-
strapped health systems (Goodman et al. 2011; Molyneux et al. 2012; Shukla, Scott, 
and Kakde 2011; Mortier and Arpagaus 2005; Bishai, Niessen, and Shrestha 2002; 
Iwami and Petchey 2002a; McCoy, Hall, and Ridge 2011). Highly functional health 
committees in Uganda are documented to have brought about beneficial health 
outcomes, including reductions in infant mortality by 33% (90% confidence 
interval: 8%-64%)(Bjorkman and Svensson 2009).   
 
Health committees vary greatly in membership, support, resources, and mandate; 
they also operate in different health system, social, cultural, and political contexts 
(McCoy, Hall, and Ridge 2011). This diversity makes health committees highly 
variable in terms of functionality and effectiveness, with positive outcomes by no 
means guaranteed. Committees have been hampered by a lack of formal mandate 
and authority (Glattstein-Young and London 2010), at times linked to broader 
bureaucratic resistance to decentralization (Israr and Islam 2006; Zakus and Lysack 
1998; Mosquera et al. 2001). The functionality of the broader health system has a 
major effect on how health committees operate; in weak health systems, health staff 
cannot respond to committee demands and health committees can develop strained 
relations with health center staff (Goodman et al. 2011). Unjust social structures are 
often replicated in health committees, with some failing to include women (Foley 
2001) or other marginalized social groups (Loewenson 2000b; Bishai, Niessen, and 
Shrestha 2002).  
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The fields of health behavior and social psychology have long grappled with the 
question of how context, particularly issues of socio-economic inequality and 
injustice, is mediated at the community and individual levels to determine health 
and wellbeing (Bandura 2001; Rappaport 1987; Cornish 2004). In the field of health 
behavior change, Tawil, Verster and O’Reilly (1995) introduced the concept of 
enabling environments, highlighting the need to alter the economic and political 
contexts in which people live to facilitate healthy behavior—rather than merely 
seeking individual behavior change. This concept can be extended to health 
interventions, by asking what environments enable interventions such as health 
committees to function effectively. In health policy analysis, consideration of 
context, rather than simply policy content, illuminates the “messiness” and political 
nature of policy design, adoption and implementation (Walt and Gilson 1994; 
Collins, Green, and Hunter 1999). This “messiness” refers to the fact that policies are 
not simply rational solutions to health systems problems, but instead involve 
inconsistencies and contradictions, as well as implicit and explicit components, 
which arise from broader structures and processes that do not always align with the 
purpose of health policy (i.e. improving the health of populations) (Collins, Green, & 
Hunter, 1999). 
 
Attention to the ways in which context mediates the outcomes of health 
interventions enables better understanding of how effects are produced. For 
example, contextual analysis is being increasingly applied in the field of social 
accountability (Flores, Guerzovich, and Rosenzweig 2014) and to explain why 
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policies have differing effects in different locations. Belaid and Ridde’s (2014) 
contextual analysis of the implementation of childbirth subsidies in public health 
facilities in Burkina Faso found that facility births immediately increased in health 
centers where health workers conducted outreach, users had positive perceptions 
of quality of care, and female staff arrived, while the policy had no effect in facilities 
that lacked these attributes (Belaid and Ridde 2014).  Contextual analysis can help 
improve specific interventions, either by identifying aspects of the environment that 
can be altered to better support the intervention, or aspects of the intervention that 
can be adjusted to better suit the context. In addition, greater understanding of 
context, and how context interacts with an intervention, can generate transferrable 
knowledge to inform interventions elsewhere. However, this contextual knowledge 
must always be reinterpreted and adapted to other settings rather than applied in a 
formulaic or linear way to intervention design and implementation (Rifkin 1996). 
Growing understanding of the need for contextual adaptation is reflected in the 
movement away from “best practice” reforms to those that “best-fit” specific 
contexts (Bukenya and King 2012).  
 
5.2.2 Conceptual framework 
 
In a recent review of contextual factors that influence health committees, George et 
al. (2015) emphasized the dynamic relationships and linkages between features of 
context and the phenomena of interest: the health committee both influences and is 
influenced by its context. This paper applies the framework to a case study of an 
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intervention to strengthen the functionality of village health, sanitation and 
nutrition committees (VHSNCs) in rural north India.  
 
We organize our examination of context using George et al.’s framework, which 
seeks to focus attention on the features most relevant to the functionality and 
effectiveness of health committees in LMICs (Figure 6). The framework identified 
four interconnected spheres: community, health facility, health administration and 
society. For each sphere, we sought to determine aspects that enabled and hindered 
VHSNC functionality and effectiveness as an institution for meaningful community 
participation in health.  
 
Figure 6. George et al.’s conceptual framework on contextual spheres 





5.3.1 Study setting 
 
VHSNC policy in India: VHSNCs are envisioned by the Indian Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MoHFW) as a key institution to support the “community 
participation and ownership” goals of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) 
(MoHFW India 2005a, 2). These committees began being formed at the village level 
across India in the mid-2000s. They are mandated to bring together many key 
actors in the rural health system including: community health workers (called 
Accredited Social Health Activists or ASHAs), anganwadi workers (AWWs), Auxiliary 
Nurse Midwives (ANMs), members of the local elected government, and other 
interested citizens. Anganwadi workers are the frontline functionaries in the 
Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) under the Department of Women and 
Child Development, which seeks to provide supplementary nutrition and child 
development services through designated buildings (anganwadi centers) in each 
village.  
 
VHSNCs are to convene monthly meetings, conduct local level health planning, and 
monitor the anganwadi system and government health services. They are also to 
receive a yearly “untied fund” of Rs. 10,000 (US $150) to spend on local public 
health needs as they see fit.  
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VHSNC ground realities: Officially, over 500,000 VHSNCs have been formed since 
their inception in the mid-2000s (MoHFW India 2013a). Many committees, 
however, have been found to be largely inactive. VHSNC members have been found 
to know little or nothing about their roles and responsibilities, lack training and 
guidance on monitoring and preparing village health plans, and received insufficient 
support from higher level health system functionaries (Malviya et al. 2013; Nandan 
et al. 2008; Semwal et al. 2013; R. Singh and Purohit 2012).  
 
VHSNC strengthening intervention: New guidelines, called Guidelines for 
Community Processes, released in 2013 (MoHFW India 2013a), clarify VHSNC 
objectives, activities, and outcomes. They recommend that VHSNC membership be 
expanded from seven to 15 people, and outline the training, capacity building, and 
support that VHSNCs should receive. The National Health Systems Resource Center 
(NHSRC) (technical advisor to the MoHFW) collaborated with the Public Health 
Foundation of India to conduct implementation research on the small scale 
application of these new guidelines (discussed next) to derive lessons for scale up.  
 
The study: For 1.5 years (2014-2015) “SEEK3,” a small NGO, implemented the 
VHSNC strengthening intervention in 50 villages, while a core team of three 
researchers conducted an embedded, longitudinal study to understand the contexts, 
pathways and mechanisms that impeded or facilitated intensified community 
engagement by VHSNCs.  
                                                        
3
 We use pseudonyms for the NGO’s name, the research block, all respondents, and all local locations  
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Study area: The intervention and research took place within “Manujpur” block, an 
impoverished area within 250 km from New Delhi. According to the 2011 census, 
the block has a population of about 300,000 and is 96% rural. A large portion of the 
population is especially marginalized: 18% scheduled caste (SC), 12% scheduled 
tribe (ST) and 20% Muslim. Literacy is 80% for men and 50% for women.  
 
Most people in the region are farmers, growing mustard, sorghum, and wheat, and 
raising buffalo for milk. While some families own large irrigated plots of land, 
motorcycles and tractors, the majority have only small plots, no motorized vehicles 
and describe themselves as very poor. Many men migrate to find farm labor or jobs 
as drivers; in some villages whole families migrate seasonally for work.  
 
Most villages range in size from about 500 to 2000 people, living in households of 
extended families, with young women from other villages marrying into their in-
laws’ homes. Houses are small mud or concrete one-story buildings, usually 
containing simple wooden beds (charpoys), a few plastic chairs, bundles of clothes 
and blankets, a small TV, and cooking ware, with no indoor plumbing and irregular 
electricity. Stagnant dirty water and piles of garbage are an issue in all the villages, 
and toilets are uncommon. Many villages are accessible only by poor quality roads 
that become almost impassable due to mud and flooding in the monsoon season.  
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5.3.2 Study design 
 
The study focused on understanding how the VHSNC-strengthening intervention 
played out in four case study villages to enable deep understanding of the social, 
political and financial dynamics of VHSNC participation and action at the village 
level.  At the outset we selected these four villages (which we call Jhorkibas, 
Sojjanpur, Shadeeka, and Hanwari) out of 50 villages receiving the intervention, to 
enable us to follow them longitudinally over the 1.5 years. 
 
We selected villages that were more and less geographically removed from the main 
community health center and which had populations that were primarily composed 
of marginalized social groups (Muslim, SC and ST) and that were a mix of caste and 
religious groups (more ‘other backwards caste’ (OBC), a caste group considered less 
marginalized than SC and more marginalized than ‘general’ caste). Table 7, below, 
presents a general overview of the four case study villages.  
 
Table 7. General overview of case study villages 




Far from CHC (16 
km) 
Less marginalized 
Midway from CHC (8 
km) 
Highly marginalized 
Far from CHC (17 
km) 
Less marginalized 


















OBC: 18%  
General: 1% 
Literacy 54% 50% 55% 86% 




While we focused on these four villages, we were able to gain additional insights 
into the entire intervention area of 50 villages throughout our study. This was 
possible because the NGO staff, ANMs, ASHA supervisors, and BCMO who we 
interviewed reported events and experiences beyond our four case study sites. In 
addition, NGO activities, VHSNC trainings, and cluster level meetings that we 
observed included VHSNC members from across the 50 villages. We alsp conducted 
focus groups in several non-case study villages while exploring the area before 
selecting our case study sites. Furthermore, an exceptional experience was reported 
to us in a non-case study village within the 50 villages receiving the intervention. 
Accordingly, we visited this village (“Garijwara”) to document the unique activities 
that took place there, discussed in section 5.4.4 on media.  
 
 
5.3.3 Data collection 
 
The research involved 74 in-depth interviews, 18 focus groups (Table 8), and 54 
observations of key activities (Table 9). We purposively selected respondents to 
ensure perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders, including community 
members, NGO staff, ANMs, and block level health functionaries. Among community 
members, we spoke to people who joined the VHSNC, who were placed on the 
committee by virtue of their role as ASHA, AWW or ward member, and who did not 
join the VHSNC. Among VHSNC members, we interviewed those who participated 
actively, those who only attended a few VHSNC meetings and trainings, and those 
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who joined the committee but did not participate at all. For all selections, we sought 
respondents representing different gender, caste, and religious groups. Initially, the 
NGO facilitators helped the researchers gather focus group participants and identify 
respondents. After the primary data collector (GP) became acquainted with the 
villages, he approached respondents directly. NGO facilitators attended the first four 
focus group discussions but were not present during in-depth interviews or 
subsequent focus group discussions. 
 
Table 8. Data overview by respondent characteristics 
Respondent type Gender 
In-depth interviews # of interviews 
VHSNC Male Female Total 
 General community  21 11 32 
 ASHA 0 8 8 
 Anganwadi worker  0 12 12 
 Ward member 3 2 5 
Non-VHSNC    
 General community 4 1 5 
 ANM 0 3 3 
 ASHA supervisor 1 1 2 
 Block Chief Medical Officer 1 0 1 
 NGO staff 3 3 6 
Total in depth interviews 33 41 74 
    
Focus group discussion # of focus groups 
VHSNC members 4 8 12 
General community, includes some VHSNC members 3 3 6 
Total focus group discussions 7 11 18 
 
In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were audio recorded with the 
respondents’ permission and were then translated from Hindi and transcribed into 
English. One respondent, an SC woman who joined the VHSNC, refused to be 
recorded, so SM took detailed notes during her interview. Another person (an 
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anganwadi worker) refused to be interviewed because she was extremely shy. An 
additional respondent (male VHSNC member) did not show up at a pre-arranged 
meeting time because of unanticipated work responsibilities and could not find time 
for re-scheduling. A doctor and ANM were not accessible for interviews because 
they were outside the block for several months.  
 
Table 9. Observations by activities 
Activities observed n 
Selection of NGO facilitators 1 
Training of NGO facilitators 2 
NGO meetings, planning sessions and activities 9 
Community mobilization & expansion of VHSNC  6 
VHSNC member training 8 
VHSNC meetings 15 
Cluster meetings 9 
General observation in communities & health centers 4 
Total observations 54 
 
Interviews and focus groups yielded extensive information on the local context, 
including respondent experiences with government services (particularly the health 
system and anganwadi system), how communities in the village interact with one 
another, and earlier local collective action. As VHSNCs became active over the 
course of the intervention, we explored respondent experiences participating in the 
VHSNC, VHSNC activities and functionality, engagement with government, and other 
factors that were facilitating and hindering VHSNC functionality.  
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5.3.4 Data analysis 
 
The themes presented in this paper, on the contextual features that influenced 
VHSNC functionality, are a subset of all the themes examined in a broader research 
study. Our analysis was guided by thematic content analysis, whereby we developed 
a coding frame inductively and deductively. It was first based on the theoretical 
interests guiding the research and later modified based on salient issues that arose 
from the data itself (Attride-Stirling 2001). After initial modification by two 
researchers (KES and SM), this coding framework was applied, supported by the 
qualitative software ATLAS.ti v 1.0.4, to enable us to group text segments into topics. 
The first author (Kerry Scott) then read and re-read the data outputs as they were 
presented for each code and extracted the salient, common, and significant basic 
themes. Basic themes were grouped into organizing themes, which are presented in 
the four contextual spheres from the George, et al. framework.  
 
The study received ethical approval from the Public Health Foundation of India’s 
(PHFI) Institutional Ethics Committee (TRC-IEC-178/13) and the World Health 




5.4.1 Overview of intervention  
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Table 10 below summarizes the intervention that SEEK applied, based on the 2013 
MoHFW Guidelines for Community Processes.  
 





 Two rounds of social mobilization in each village 
 NGO facilitators provide information about the VHSNC and public health 
services 




 VHSNC members invited to six one- or two-day training sessions, spread 
over a year  
 Training contents include the importance of community participation, 
information on health rights, the roles and responsibilities of VHSNC 
members, capacity building for health planning, monitoring, using the 
untied fund, and documenting meetings 
 Trainings involve a mix of didactic teaching by NGO staff, group discussions, 





 NGO facilitators convene and support monthly village VHSNC meetings 
 Facilitators remind VHSNC members before the meetings, gather members 
on meeting day 
 Facilitators lead meetings, which involve reviewing minutes book from 
previous meeting, discussing health issues, and strategizing on how to try to 
solve local issues 
 Over course of intervention, facilitators attempt to transition convening 




 Every three months, the NGO convenes cluster level meetings bringing 
together members from 16-17 VHSNCs  




 Whenever possible, the NGO facilitators seek to support VHSNC activities 
beyond the VHSNC and cluster meetings (e.g. by delivering petitions written 
by VHSNCs to government offices) 
 
5.4.2 Overview of VHSNC functionality, activity & outcomes in study villages 
 
The outcomes of interest were community engagement in the VHSNC (meeting 
attendance, membership, and VHSNC discussions) and improvements in village level 
health, sanitation, and nutrition (such as improved environmental health and better 
access to health services). Table 11 (below) summarizes these outcomes.  
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Table 11. VHSNC functionality, activities, and outcomes 




11/12 meetings held, 
average 7.4 attendees, 
range 6-14 
9/12 meetings held, 
average 8.9 attendees, 
range 7-12 
11/12 meetings held, 
average 8.2 attendees, 
range 7-12 
5/12 meetings held, 

















Muslim:  22% v. 57% 
OBC: 38% v. 30% 
SC: 49% v. 13% 
Muslim: 43% v. 76% 
SC: 57% v. 21% 
OBC: 0% v. 2% 
 
OBC: 91% v. 79% 
SBC: 5% v. 20% 
SC: 5% v. 1% 
ST: 88% v. 62% 
SC: 12% v. 19% 
OBC:  0% v. 18% 





1) Sought improved 
drinking water  




2) Sought to enroll 
two orphans in 
support program 
3) Checked midday 
meal quality  
4) Tried to get 
medicines for ASHA, 
IFA tablets 
5) Tried to help 
woman get JSY 
6) Monitored AWC & 
school 
1) Concerned about 
irregular 
immunization/ANM 
visits (& her poor 
behavior) 
2) Tried to get doctor 
at PHC 
3) Cleaned PHC 
building 
4) Tried to get 
medicine in PHC 
 
 
1) Sought improved 
drinking water 




2) Tried to get ASHA 
trained 
2) Used monitoring 
tool at anganwadi 








quality at school 
5) Tested midday 
meal at school  
1) Sought improved 
drinking water  







- Successfully enrolled 
orphans for monthly 
government financial 
support 
- ANM removed (but 
not by VHSNC) 
- Doctor re-appointed 
to PHC 
- Received an ANM for 
short period of time 










What is the point 
when there is no 
solution to the 
problems? (male, OBC 
Hindu, IDI_VHC_44) 
 
The information given 
in the meetings helps 
us to think about 
different issues (male, 
VHC member, 
IDI_COM_06). 
Yes, have seen 
changes.  ANM is 
transferred… [But] 





We are been made 
aware of health 
related issues (male, 
Muslim, IDI_VHC_34) 
This committee has 
not done anything. 
Once a nurse was 
appointed but after 
some days she also 
left. (female, 
FGD_VHC_05) 
Nobody makes an 
effort… Nobody cares 
for us, we had a 
budget of mere 10,000 
Rs which has not 
come up till now. We 
have been trying since 
two months now, but 
nothing has happened. 
Whole village is 
saying that there are 
no facilities here. 
(male, FGD_VHC_09) 
People have gained 
knowledge… [But] I 
don’t see any major 
changes. There have 
not been many 
services, by which 
people can feel (male,  
ST Hindu, 
IDI_VHC_54). 
* ANM attended three meetings before being transferred away. She is not counted in these calculations.  
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As shown in Table 11, the VHSNCs managed to hold between five and 11 meetings 
over the course of 12 months. Average attendance was eight people, lower than the 
15 stipulated in the MoHFW’s guidelines. Hanwari’s VHSNC struggled the most, with 
many meetings cancelled because no one showed up. There was no clear trend in 
VHSNC meeting attendance over the 12 months, nor was there a clear pattern for 
the month(s) in which missed meetings occurred, but we acknowledge that we are 
examining a very small data set. When meetings took place, the number of people in 
attendance ranged from a low of four in Hanwari and six or seven in the other 
villages to highs around 12. Participation achieved at least 50% women and 
included representatives from all the caste and religious communities. We noted 
that there was a core group of the same VHSNC members who attended the 
meetings regularly in all four case study villages. 
 
VHSNCs attempted to improve a range of areas including access to drinking water, 
health services (by asking the health system to provide nurses, doctors, and 
medicine), the village school, and the anganwadi center. Most action took the form 
of writing appeals to various government officials. Some VHSNCs achieved concrete 
improvements and many people appreciated learning about health topics and health 
rights. But over our 1.5-year research period, we documented extensive 
disappointment and frustration. Member enthusiasm levels varied over time with 
some positive moments, especially in Sojjanpur where the VHSNC had temporary 
success in getting their PHC doctor re-instated. However most appeals to the 
government did not receive a response during our research period, and village-level 
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health planning and monitoring was limited. None of the attempts to get equipment 
or medicine were successful during our research period. Since the untied fund never 
arrived in any of the 50 villages, there was no health budgeting. Overall, VHSNCs 
met fairly regularly, identified a wide range of issues that required improvement, 
and sought to address them largely by appealing to government officials. In one 
year, the success of the four case study VHSNCs was modest, and although VHSNC 
members appreciated some aspects of the intervention there was significant 
disappointment. While there were some enthusiastic and optimistic VHSNC 
members who planned to keep meeting each month, most NGO facilitators and 
VHSNC members were not confident that regular meetings would continue after the 
NGO intervention finished.   
 
 
We now discuss contextual features across the four spheres (community, health 
facility, administration, and societal) that contributed to VHSNC functionality, 
activities, and outcomes.  
 
5.4.3 Contextual sphere I: Community  
 
 Social hierarchies prevented people from speaking out  
 
Committee members were prevented from speaking openly in two principal ways. 
First, committee members were unable to speak openly about some village-level 
problems, particularly the sub-par functioning of anganwadi centers, because 
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politically dominant families monopolized key positions. Criticizing them risked 
disturbing village harmony and in some cases inviting personal harm (e.g. an SC 
VHSNC member in Hasanpur was concerned that speaking out would result in 
verbal harassment, discussed below). Second, patriarchal gender norms silenced 
many female VHSNC members.  
 
The anganwadi centers in each village were operating far below standard: instead of 
opening every day, providing preschool services and hot meals for children, they 
were operating only as occasional supplementary food distribution centers, open for 
a few hours a week to give out packets of panjiri, a nutrient dense snack. The 
common perception among respondents was that anganwadi workers were forced 
to pay kickbacks to their supervisors and that they kept some of the remaining food 
for their own families and to feed to their buffalo. Although respondents were 
forthcoming about these issues in interviews, VHSNC members did not speak 
frankly about them in meetings and avoided monitoring the anganwadi center.  
 
The positions of ASHA, anganwadi worker, and ward member tended to be held by 
people from politically influential families who could not speak out against one 
another. For example, in Sojjanpur the ASHA was married to the sarpanch’s son and 
was related by marriage to the anganwadi staff. She was thus unwilling to criticize 
the anganwadi worker and anganwadi helper, neither of whom were performing 
their duties. “As we belong to the same caste and same family,” she said, “I cannot 
point fingers at them… Whatever work they wish to do, they do it. If they don’t, they 
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don’t” (Sojjanpur, female, SC, ASHA IDI_VHC_04). In another village, Shadeeka, an 
elderly man explained that he and many of the other health committee members 
were related to the anganwadi worker’s family, which made it very uncomfortable 
to speak out against problematic behavior: 
 
Respondent: You don’t know the anganwadi. Do they ever 
distribute the full amount of supplementary nutrition? They 
do not. They save it for themselves. This is happening in the 
entire world. Wherever you go, whosoever you ask, they 
keep it for themselves.  
 
Interviewer: So if they keep it for themselves, then can 
members of the health committee do anything? 
 
Respondent: They feel embarrassed with each other. They 
cannot say anything because they are relatives… We are five-
seven4 brothers of one family and if one is doing such deeds 
then the others cannot say. They find it embarrassing 
because we are relatives. (Shadeeka, male, OBC Hindu, 
IDI_VHC_41) 
 
                                                        
4
 In the regional vernacular, this means five to seven 
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VHSNC members not related to the frontline health and nutrition workers were also 
constrained, since they were hesitant to speak out against dominant families. 
VHSNC members from lower caste or Muslim families were particularly concerned 
about speaking out. An SC woman in the Shadeeka VHSNC explained that in VHSNC 
meetings: “no one speaks because [it] would create conflict” but that her situation is 
particularly precarious: “That is why they don’t say anything. I have only one house 
of my caste. I remain afraid because everyone attacks on me” (Shadeeka, female, SC, 
Hindu, IDI_VHC_46).   
 
Despite these concerns, VHSNCs engaged in some local action and monitoring 
primarily through mediation and leadership from the NGO facilitators. Community 
members spoke to the facilitators outside the VHSNC meetings to highlight issues 
that could not be brought up openly in meetings. NGO facilitators sometimes led 
anganwadi center monitoring as part of the VHSNC meeting, which enabled the 
committee to signal to frontline service providers that lapses had been noted 
without any single VHSNC member speaking out. Unfortunately, without any 
support from upstream functionaries who oversaw the anganwadi system, 
combined with the relative power of the anganwadi workers’ families, these 
monitoring exercises had very limited impact on services.   
 
The second principal deterrent focuses on women’s participation. Women struggled 
to participate actively in the VHSNC because patriarchal social norms prohibited 
them both from speaking to men in their communities and discouraged travel 
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outside the village. (Gendered aspects of VHSNC participation are discussed in detail 
in chapter 6.) Meetings generally consisted of women sitting together in silence 
while men spoke, and many male VHSNC members were unable to name the women 
on the committees: “since they remain behind the veil it is difficult to know every 
woman. And they do not speak much” (Shadeeka, male, SBC Hindu, IDI_VHC_26).  
 
Several respondents told us that it was difficult for women to travel to locations 
beyond the village, where VHSNC trainings and cluster level meetings took place, 
because of gender expectations that women stay home and because of their heavy 
burden of domestic work. An elderly respondent stressed that “it doesn't look nice, 
this roaming around” (Shadeeka, female, dai, OBC Hindu, IDI_VHC_08).  
 
Despite women’s silence during VHSNC meetings, women defended their right to be 
on the committee and occupied their spaces on the VHSNC, consistently comprising 
the majority of meeting attendees. Women also found some avenues to be heard in 
the VHSNC by speaking to their NGO facilitator about issues before or after meetings 
and by having the most vocal female member (usually the ASHA) present an opinion 
from the women during meetings.  
 
 Mistrust of indifferent government institutions made people wary of 
investing in the VHSNC 
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Respondents overwhelmingly experienced the government to be uncaring, unfair, 
and inaccessible. This sentiment was applied to ‘government’ generally, including 
the local panchayat system and the various state- and national-level departments 
and ministries. Community members recounted numerous failed efforts to engage 
with government departments, such as the Education Department, Public Works 
Department, and Public Distribution System (PDS). For example, residents of 
Shadeeka submitted a complaint about the poor quality of teaching in the public 
school and the fact that no facility was available to teach 10th standard. Despite 
assurances from the department, their complaint never resulted in any action, 
apparently because no one in the village would pay a bribe of Rs. 10,000 (US $150) 
to move the file forward. An elderly man in Hanwari who was considering becoming 
involved in the VHSNC listed all the government failures and questioned how this 
activity would result in improved service provision:  
 
There is no ANM in this village… there are no health services 
available in this village. The school is also a government 
school, and the students have to go to Manujpur and [major 
city] for better schooling… Even the water system here is not 
maintained by the government.  Even roads are also not that 
good… I have seen that no leaders of any political parties 
come here... Then how will they come for this developmental 
activity? (Hanwari village, male, ST Hindu, IDI_VHC_10) 
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Although he did go on to join the VHSNC and send a number of requests for service 
improvements to the panchayat and several government departments, no political 
leaders took notice and after a year of effort he saw no positive outcome.  
 
In Hanwari, at most four members attended meetings regularly. Others, who were 
listed as members but who attended irregularly or not at all, positioned their 
reluctance to participate within the context of past failed efforts to improve the 
village through engaging with government agencies. Community members recalled 
writing an application to the district collector5 to get their ration shop’s hours 
increased. They delivered it in a group of 15 people and the collector said the matter 
would be addressed. However no action took place because the contractor for the 
PDS center was politically connected. When we asked the male Hanwari VHSNC 
members why they were not actively engaging with the committee, they replied in 
annoyance that they had already tried to take action and that the VHSNC did not 
give them any additional power to make another attempt worthwhile: 
 
You tell us, what to do now? Shall we consult with the 
collector again? Nobody is listening to us because that ration 
dealer has some direct contact with political leaders. As we 
have this [VHSNC] committee, shall we try through this 
committee? Do we have any other power to utilize for 
improvement in functionality of that ration shop? (M3, 
                                                        
5
  A high-ranking Indian Administrative Service officer in charge of revenue collection and administration 
of a district in India. 
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Hanwari, men, FGD_VHC_06) 
 
 Emphasis on caste & religious unity but evidence of discord 
 
Respondents in all four villages emphasized unity despite differences in caste and 
religion. The following quotation was typical: 
 
The great thing here is there is peace and harmony amongst 
the people. Here, there are no fights based on caste, or on 
religion… everyone remains together, maintaining 
brotherhood. In one another's functions, social activities, 
people participate. And, however much each other's help can 
be done, we try and help each other out. (Jhorkibas, male, 
OBC Hindu, IDI_VHC_17)  
 
Despite this initial emphasis on unity, which was common among Muslims and 
Hindus, and people of all castes, we observed and heard indications of separation 
and some discord, especially in relation to negative views of Muslim communities 
and discrimination towards people belonging to lower castes. Different castes and 
Muslims lived in separate areas of the villages and some respondents noted that 
they did not even enter other castes’ areas. Muslim families were derided by 
anganwadi workers, ASHAs, and ANMs for resisting immunization and sterilization, 
with exaggerated claims of fertility: “even if they have 10 children they don’t go for 
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[sterilization] operation” (Jhorkibas, female, SC Hindu, AWW, IDI_VHC_30). A male 
respondent in Hanwari (ST Hindu, IDI_COM_03) said that the caste communities got 
along well but that they do not share hookah or sit on the same cot together. Lower 
caste people would not enter into higher caste homes and higher caste people would 
not eat food served at lower caste weddings and funerals.  
 
Discord was particularly pronounced in Shadeeka. While people in Shadeeka spoke 
of general camaraderie between the two main higher caste groups (Rajput and 
Saini), the one low caste (SC) family experienced extreme discrimination. At a focus 
group discussion, the higher caste anganwadi worker refused chai brought by a SC 
man. The SC woman explained that the two main caste groups “hate us” and feel the 
“lower caste should not progress… it’s their mindset. It is from the beginning” 
(Shadeeka, female, SC, IDI_VHC_46). The discrimination against this family was 
overt; for example, men openly discussed the fact that the SC family could only 
collect water from one of the three water taps in the village: 
 
Interviewer: But why? Can’t they take water from your taps? 
Respondent 1: No, they can’t. 
Respondent 2: They will have to face the crowd. 
Respondent 1: When they will face the crowd of Rajputs and 
Sainis. They will not be able to withdraw water from the tap. 
(Shadeeka, men, FGD_VHC_09) 
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The SC woman had to wait until all others filled their buckets, and then ask someone 
to fill hers. When there was a water shortage she said the women would complain 
about having to fill her bucket and threaten to leave her without water saying, “Our 
needs are not fulfilled; how do we fulfill your needs?” (female, SC Hindu, 
IDI_VHC_46). 
 
VHSNCs replicated this contradictory mix. Although camaraderie prevailed among 
members, particularly in Jhorkibas, Sojjanpur and Hanwari, and between the main 
caste groups in Shadeeka, social inequities were reenacted within VHSNC 
functioning. Members affirmed that the committees were representative and that 
there was no caste-discrimination. Some spoke of the value of inclusiveness:  
 
If people from every community would be in the committee 
then we can all be in one group. Otherwise if you will take 
people from a single community than we all would be divided 
in many groups. […] Because of this, we all can stay together 
and work together for our village. Nobody will think that this 
is because of them or that is because of them, like that.  
(Jhorkibas, male, FGD_VHC_08) 
 
Attendance of committee meetings generally included representatives from each 
community (see Table 11).  However, in the two villages with Muslim populations 
(Jhorkibas and Sojjanpur), Muslims were under-represented on the VHSNC.  
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Muslim-Hindu divisions affected VHSNC action.  A Hindu VHSNC member in 
Sojjanpur explained that “there is less talking with each other” and blamed the 
Muslims for not caring about health issues: “They do not pay much attention 
towards all these things” (female, SC, Hindu, Sojjanpur, IDI_VHC_25). Muslims were 
also blamed for supporting the Sojjanpur PHC doctor, who was himself Muslim, 
when he refused to live in the village at the PHC.  
 
In Shadeeka, VHSNC members actively tried to exclude the SC female member by 
not notifying her of meetings. She attended only three of the 11 meetings that took 
place during the research period and said that if the NGO stopped facilitating the 
meetings she would surely be cut out of the committee. When she came to meetings, 
she squatted beside the rug that the other VHSNC members sat upon.  
 
Communities can thus be understood to have a deep investment in the idea of caste 
and religious harmony, even if lived experiences are more complex and fraught. 
Despite community divisions and social exclusions, VHSNC members generally 
collaborated and agreed on the key village priorities.  
 
 Pre-existing local institutions for collective action   
 
VHSNCs were introduced in village contexts shaped by many pre-existing local 
institutions. These earlier committees and groups inculcated a number of habits, 
norms, and expectations that influenced the VHSNCs. The three most commonly 
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discussed committees in the villages were loan groups, school management 
committees, and indigenous conflict management groups. 
 
Loan groups, called self-help groups, were primarily designed to enable women to 
access loans and save money. Savings groups for men were also occasionally 
discussed.  These groups were generally initiated by a representative linked to a 
bank or government program who would help the group open an account and 
organize them to receive the loan or pool their savings for rotating within-group 
lending, or both. While loan groups imparted some bookkeeping skills that could 
facilitate VHSNC functioning, they also conditioned community members to see 
meetings and committees as worthwhile when there was a clear individual financial 
benefit. Women in Shadeeka explained that “due to money people get together” 
(Shadeeka, women, FGD_COM_03). An NGO facilitator articulated how this 
expectation of financial gain hindered community willingness to engage in the 
VHSNCs.  
 
[Earlier] it was related to money: they used to deposit their 
savings and get a loan. So their association must have been 
due to money... No one had to be called for a meeting. They 
used to come on their own at the said time and place. In [this] 
project we are talking about rights and there is nothing 
related to money… People are taking this thing negatively 
and people are not able to get connected with this project. 
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(male, Muslim, IDI_NGO_04) 
 
School management committees were sanctioned by the government to oversee 
public schools, just as VHSNCs are sanctioned by the health system to oversee public 
health services. They began in 2000 and received a yearly government grant that the 
committee could spend under the leadership of the school’s headmaster. While 
some respondents in all four villages recalled the school management committee 
taking some action, many reported that the committee had achieved little, that much 
of the money had been stolen, that the Education Department was unresponsive, 
and that the school management committee had long ago stopped working. School 
management committees shaped the context into which VHSNCs were introduced 
by inculcating many of the same skills and processes required for the VHSNC. 
Community members met regularly, developed and executed strategies on how to 
spend a government-provided fund, and followed up with government servants. 
Some saw positive outcomes such as the construction of additional buildings at the 
school and improvement in student attendance and teacher performance. However 
the overall assessment was of disappointment, which may have increased 
community resistance of VHSNCs.  
 
Indigenous male conflict management groups were described as being groups of 
senior and respected men from each caste and religious community who came 
together to make decisions around the “dos and don’ts of one’s clan and its tradition 
and rituals” (Sojjanpur, male IDI_VHC_20) or to deal with conflicts. The groups were 
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convened only in extreme situations, as infrequently as once every few years. This 
local institution reflected the high value placed on including representatives from all 
communities in the village when dealing with major issues—and the low value 
placed on involving women. While these groups played a role as “guardians of 
tradition,” (Sen 1999) they were most commonly framed as institutions to solve 
community conflicts.  Several of the elderly men who would participate in these 
conflict management groups were nominated to the VHSNC by the community and 
agreed to join. Their involvement indicated community acceptance of the VHSNC, 
but also meant that young women’s participation was particularly limited. 
 
No one in the villages recalled any prior collective action around health. 
Furthermore, people tended to collaborate for specific periods of time to achieve 
utilitarian outcomes (such as accessing money or managing an immediate conflict). 
None of the earlier community institutions for collective action involved the type of 
volunteer-driven ongoing collective action envisioned by the VHSNC policy 
documents, which suggested that VHSNC members engage in village cleaning 
initiatives or health education campaigns.   
 
Prior collective initiatives created a local context that in some ways supported and 
in other ways challenged VHSNCs. Loan and school management groups imparted 
some formal administrative and organizational skills to community members who 
went on to join the VHSNC. The female savings groups helped normalize the idea of 
women engaging in formal collectives outside the home, albeit women-only groups.  
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However, challenges are seen as follows. School management groups contributed to 
an expectation that collective effort is unlikely to yield meaningful results. Both loan 
groups and male indigenous conflict management groups focused on utilitarian 
functions through meetings (accessing money or managing a conflict), which may 
have made the VHSNC’s open agenda and lack of clear pathways to change feel 
particularly vague and unnecessary. 
 
 
5.4.4 Contextual sphere II: Health facility context 
 
 Severely under-resourced health facilities 
 
The severely under-resourced health facility context curtailed VHSNC functionality. 
Most directly, VHSNCs were unable to build collaborative relationships with health 
professionals because there were so few health professionals in the region. While 
MoHFW guidelines stipulate one health sub-center (HSC) staffed by a resident ANM 
for every five villages (MoHFW India 2006b), in reality few HSCs are operational. 
Many HSCs are empty concrete rooms, without electricity, water, supplies, or staff. 
PHCs, which are supposed to provide 24 hour services staffed by one doctor and 12 
additional staff (MoHFW India 2012a), often operate for only a few hours per day 
with one doctor and two other staff. Some, including the PHC in Sojjanpur, had no 
staff or supplies for most of our research period (the doctor visited a few times 
towards the end of the intervention but returned to Manujpur town, explaining that 
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without medicine or any support staff, there was little reason for him to open the 
PHC in Sojjanpur). Considering the lack of services, most people—even the very 
poor—reported that they sought emergency medical care from the private sector.  
 
As shown in Table 12, health services for the four case study villages were severely 
lacking. Two did not have ANMs assigned to cover them, none had functional health 
centers, and two did not have active ASHAs. Anganwadi centers had one or two 
female staff (an anganwadi worker and helper), but many lacked toilets, electricity, 
and water, and opened only occasionally to distribute supplementary nutrition 
(called panjiri), rather than daily to provide cooked meals and preschool services.  
 
Table 12. Health facility context 
Village Jhorkibas Sojjanpur Shadeeka Hanwari 
HSC or PHC in 
village? 
No PHC in village but 
non-functional 









Vacant (MPW* from 
neighboring area 
comes occasionally) 
Vacant (ANM from 
neighboring area 
comes once a month) 
ASHA ASHA New ASHA, not yet 
functioning as an 
ASHA  
Untrained ASHA, not 
yet functioning as an 
ASHA 
ASHA  
Anganwadi 2 AWCs staffed by 
2 AWWs  
Opened daily to 
distribute panjiri 
but no hot meals 
or preschool 
services 
1 AWC staffed by 
AWW 
Opened two or three 
times per week to 
distribute panjiri 
No hot meals or 
preschool services 
1 AWC staffed by 
AWW & AW Helper 
Opened two or three 
times per week to 
distribute panjiri 
No hot meals or 
preschool services 
1 AWC staffed by 
AWW & AW Helper 
Usually closed and 
non-functional 
*Multi-purpose worker, a male frontline health worker who is supposed to focus on vector control and infectious 
disease 
 
ANMs were to be members of the VHSNC in the village where they resided and were 
to serve as “special invitees” in the other VHSNCs within their catchment (MoHFW 
India 2013a, 39). However, ANMs were covering double, triple, or even more than 
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their standard catchment area because of vacancies, making it impossible for them 
to visit all villages regularly.  
 
We have ten sub centers. Out of these only three sub centers 
are filled. The remaining seven are vacant. So how is work 
done there? So they say that Behenji [sister, i.e. ANM] doesn’t 
come there. (ASHA supervisor, male, SC Hindu, IDI_HS_07) 
 
Since the HSCs and PHCs lacked residential quarters, ANMs commuted to the 
villages from the city and were too busy travelling between villages to attend 
meetings.  The ANM who covered Shadeeka for a short period of time explained: “I 
have to look after eight villages. All of them are about 10 to 12 kilometers from here. 
There is no transport available to reach these places. Because of this it is not 
possible always to get in contact with these villages” (Shadeeka, female, ANM, 
IDI_HS_03).  
 
ASHAs were to play a central role in convening VHSNC meetings. Yet many villages 
had no active ASHA; out of the 50 intervention villages, the implementing NGO 
found that 20 had no ASHA as of February 2014. The ASHA in Sojjanpur had been 
selected in 2009 but by 2015 still had not received any training. No one in the 
community thought of her as a health resource person and she had no sense of 
identity or capacity through her position. The ASHA in Shadeeka had submitted her 
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forms in 2009 but never received any training or follow up, making it very difficult 
for her to serve the community in any way:  
 
There has been no response from them… I don’t know about 
anything. I have not received any training … I have still not 
been posted, then why should I go [to speak to community 
members]? Then people will laugh at me. I feel shy.  I can go 
when my duty is decided. How I can go now? I have only sub-
mitted the form. (female, ASHA, IDI_VHC_28).   
 
The anganwadi centers had many infrastructure and environmental health issues 
such as garbage and stagnant water surrounding the anganwadi buildings, broken 
walls, leaking roofs, and a lack of supplies. One anganwadi worker explained not just 
the infrastructure issues, but also the lack of clarity around whose responsibility it 
was to improve the faculties:  
 
Sir, my purpose of holding a meeting [FGD] here is to show 
you the dirt spread around the anganwadi center. The 
sarpanch and other ward members don’t do anything about 
it. The building is broken and unused. During the rainy 
season there is complete leakage in this center… The ICDS 
department provides Rs. 200 [US $3] per month as a rent, 
which is not sufficient... Sir, please solve my problem. The 
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village community doesn’t listen to me. They usually say that 
this doesn’t fall under the panchayat… They are not 
providing anything like chairs, tables, dari [rugs] etc. … They 
say that the government is not providing any budget to us so 
how can we give anything to you… We don’t even have a box 
to keep the records safe. Rats are eating the records…. There 
is a lot of dirtiness around, causing health problems. Who 
will send their children to this dirty and bad anganwadi 
center? (anganwadi worker, FGD_VHC_04) 
 
Community members questioned the value of joining the VHSNC when there was so 
little being offered from the government. A male VHSNC member in Jhorkibas 
explained that without basic health facilities, the entire concept of a health 
committee seemed illogical. In meetings when they spoke about the health system’s 
shortcomings “all people say, what is a health committee if there are no facilities?” 
(Jhorkibas, male, SC Hindu, IDI_VHC_44).  
 
 Need for sustained support for frontline health workers to facilitate 
VHSNC functionality 
 
ASHAs were in charge of maintaining the VHSNC registers and received Rs. 150 (US 
$2.25) for showing a signed attendance register each month. In turn, ASHA 
supervisors checked the VHSNC meeting registers, but did not have time to be 
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present for most meetings. An ASHA supervisor explained that he oversees 32 
ASHAs, “And in one month, it isn’t possible to visit 32 places” (male, ASHA 
Supervisor, IDI_HS_07). He was already busy keeping other records about the 
ASHA’s work in immunization and maternal health. The ASHA supervisors had not 
yet been given any training about supporting the VHSNC and were not held 
responsible for ensuring genuine VHSNC functionality. Prior to the intervention, 
falsifying meeting attendance registers was a common practice that ASHA 
supervisors were in no position to correct. 
 
During the NGO-led intervention to support VHSNCs, meetings did in fact occur in 
most of the 50 intervention villages and were generally attended by an NGO 
facilitator. ASHAs were thus often able to access their reimbursement legitimately. 
When meetings did not take place, ASHAs were discouraged from showing a falsely 
completed register by the NGO staff. ASHA supervisors felt that they were too 
overstretched to take on this role and hoped the NGO would remain involved.  
 
5.4.5 Contextual sphere III: Administration context 
 
 Mismatch between VHSNC capabilities and local needs 
 
An urgent need for improved access to clean water was the single most pressing 
issue for all villages. However, VHSNCs were positioned by the MoHFW guidelines 
as mechanisms for addressing small, village level issues (such as cleaning, local 
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record keeping, local service monitoring, and health education) or following up with 
the health system about service gaps. The following discussion with men in 
Jhorkibas was typical across our research sites:  
 
Respondent 1: We don’t want anything, don’t need a single 
rupee or tea but only do something on water and give us 
drinking water… 
 
Respondent 2: Drinking water is a major problem for us. 
 
Respondent 1: Apart from that, we don’t need anything. (men, 
Jhorkibas, FGD_COM_08) 
 
VHSNCs could not engage in the large scale infrastructure projects required to 
address this problem, such as installing water treatment facilities, piping water from 
other regions, or digging new bore wells. All the solutions to the villages’ water 
problems required investments far beyond the Rs. 10,000 (US $150) untied fund, 
and required inputs from the panchayat, public health engineering department, 
water supply department, and public works department. An NGO facilitator 
explained:  
 
Almost ninety percent of the problems are related to water 
supply. It is a big problem and not possible for VHC. It may 
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require a budget of crore rupees [Rs. 10,000,000 = US 
$145,900]. VHCs cannot work on these issues. (male, Muslim, 
IDI_NGO_04) 
 
Nonetheless water was discussed constantly in all four case study sites, at almost all 
the VHSNC meetings. VHSNC members in Jhorkibas and Hanwari appealed to their 
panchayat leaders to assist them, but knew these requests were highly unlikely to 
change anything. Some complained that the panchayat candidates did not care and 
just gave empty promises to fix the water issue in order to get elected. Others 
pointed out that solving the problem was too complex for the panchayat, and that 
political and financial inputs would be required from a member of parliament to 
bring about a solution. Overall, the VHSNC’s incapacity to bring about improved 
water access was seen to be a major indicator of the committee’s limited utility.  
 
Women in Sojjanpur explained that to solve the problem “the water supply 
department can construct a big tank in the village” and that the public health 
engineering department needed to take up the issue—but they did not see the 
VHSNC as a mechanism to bring about change. They said that if there were anything 
they could do to solve their water problem “within five minutes 50 to 100 women 
will come” as “everybody is suffering because of that drinking water” (woman 1). 
But there was no point in discussing the water crisis anymore at VHSNC meetings 
“because we can’t see any success” (woman 2) and “because we can’t see any 
solution for water” (ASHA).  
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 Block level health system functionaries lacked capacity to respond to 
VHSNC’s complaints 
 
VHSNC members sought accountability from block level health system actors for 
personnel issues and clinic management. However, the health system functionaries 
lacked the power to address most issues. At several cluster meetings, the BCMO 
explained to community members that he did not have the power to hire more staff 
and requested that communities put pressure on politicians to solve the personnel 
shortages:  
 
Although I am the head of this CHC, some aspects, including 
the appointment of doctors, are in the hands of politicians. I 
am not authorized to appoint doctors. The only thing I can do 
is move doctors from one institution to another within the 
CHC area. We have to keep on demanding services so that 
politicians become aware of the problem and pressure the 
concerned ministries to solve those issues. (Observation 
note, cluster meeting, OBS_VHC_26) 
 
He explained that the Manujpur CHC was supposed to have 11 doctors but only had 
one, who was actually a dentist. To manage, he re-assigned three PHC doctors in the 
block to the CHC, but was now being pressured by the VHSNCs to return the doctors 
to the village PHCs. An ASHA supervisor explained that when a problem was “up to 
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their level,” (i.e. within the medical officer or supervisor’s control) they responded, 
but that they could not fix problems beyond them (ASHA supervisor, IDI_HS_07) 
 
However there was ongoing confusion about responsibility for failures. While the 
BCMO eventually made it clear that he could not hire new staff, it was not clear to 
VHSNCs whether he was responsible for other issues, such as medicine availability, 
ambulance services, and ANM performance. The BCMO also reprimanded the 
VHSNCs for not making greater efforts to address staffing issues themselves but was 
not clear about the mechanism through which VHSNCs were to seek political 
solutions to their health personnel shortages.  
  
 Unclear chain of responsibility for VHSNC 
 
While the ASHA’s responsibility for VHSNC functioning at the village level was clear, 
responsibility for VHSNC functionality at higher levels of government was not. This 
apparent absence of higher-level responsibility for supporting VHSNCs emerged 
most starkly around the question of why no villages in the intervention area were 
able to access their VHSNC untied funds. Over the course of the 1.5-year research 
period, the VHSNCs never received their Rs. 10,000 (US $150) yearly untied fund. 
Despite extensive efforts made by VHSNC members and NGO staff, no one at the 
block or village level was able to identify specific people or positions in government 
who were responsible for delivering the untied fund. At various times, VHSNC 
members and NGO staff were told by the BCMO, ASHA supervisors, the sub-
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divisional magistrate, and a district program manager that the untied fund was 
being held at the state level, district level, and block level. They were also told at 
various times that that the money was coming soon, that the money was not being 
released to the VHSNCs because the VHSNCs had not asked for it, and that the 
money was not being released because the prior expenditure from many years ago 
had not been accounted for with a utilization certificate.  
 
Utilization certificates are documents submitted by those spending government 
funds to explain exactly what was done with the money. NGO staff speculated that 
the ANM spent the VHSNC’s untied fund between 2007, when VHSNCs were formed, 
and 2010, when ASHAs were told to open new VHSNC bank accounts and replace 
the ANMs as joint signatory (alongside the ward member). ASHAs recalled opening 
these bank accounts but never receiving any money. The ASHAs explained that their 
supervisors told them that they had to open this bank account in order to continue 
receiving reimbursement for their work. Since the banks demanded an opening 
balance of Rs. 1000 (US $15) be deposited in the account, the ASHAs used their own 
money, assuming they could withdraw the Rs. 1000 once the VHSNC untied fund 
arrived. The ASHAs also noted that they spent additional money travelling several 
times to and from Manujpur to open these accounts.  
 
The failure of the untied fund to arrive hindered VHSNC functionality for several 
reasons: (1) it constrained village action because of money shortages; (2) it 
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increased community skepticism of the VHSNC; and (3) it was seen as indicative of a 
lack of concern from higher levels: 
 
Man 1: It is the same way like in farming we put so many 
efforts, but if no crop comes, then what is the use of doing so 
much work? Similarly, when no funds have come, no 
development has taken place, and then everyone is of the 
opinion that this is useless. 
 
Man 2: Nobody believes in the committee… 
 
Man 1: Yes, they always say that Rs. 10,000 fund was sup-
posed to come for development work in village. Where is the 
money? Why has it not come? When we say [to our peers] 
that officers above us will send the fund soon, they [our 
peers] say it is not coming; you guys [VHSNC members] are 
just wasting time. (Shadeeka, men, FGD_VHC_09) 
 
While VHSNCs and the implementing NGO attempted to draw attention to issues at 
the bottom, there appeared to be no one in higher levels of the health administration 
accountable for or invested in VHSNC success. The entire weight of VHSNC 
functionality was borne at the village and NGO level.   
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 Fragmented government systems & unclear mandate beyond health 
 
VHSNCs were expected to bring together diverse actors but were only officially 
mandated by the MoHFW. The VHSNC guidelines state: “The mandate of the VHSNC 
encompasses Health, Sanitation and Nutrition as well as the Education, particularly 
in the context of the programs like Mid Day Meal, and most importantly Department 
of Woman and Child Development” (MoHFW India 2013a, 49). Figure 7 presents 
how the MoHFW’s VHSNC guidelines depict multiple departments working hand-in-
hand; the VHSNC is to coordinate. 
 




Source: MoHFW (2011) p. 49.  
 
The VHSNC is to provide “oversight and monitoring” and to “take action on social 
determinants of health” for the following:  
 Subsidized food rations from public distribution system 
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 Access to work under MNREGA (employment guarantee program) 
 Mid day meals 
 Anganwadi services 
 Safe drinking water 
 Access to toilets 
 Female literacy 
 Women and child health 
 
These services and programs are managed by at least seven different departments 
and ministries at different levels of government but the VHSNC did not receive 
formal support or endorsement from any of them. For example, VHSNCs struggled 
to involve anganwadi workers (who fall under the Ministry of Women and Child 
Development). Anganwadi workers were expected to play a key role on the VHSNC 
yet were at times forbidden by their supervisors from participating in VHSNC 
activities. When the NGO staff asked them to attend trainings, the anganwadi 
workers reported that their supervisors refused to relieve them from their duties at 
the anganwadi center, even though anganwadi centers were frequently shut for 
other reasons, and told them not to show the VHSNC their record books. NGO staff 
speculated that the anganwadi supervisors were uncomfortable with the VHSNC’s 
efforts to monitor anganwadi records on the distribution of nutritional 
supplementation, since there was widespread corruption in the system. VHSNC 
efforts to work with the anganwadi system would have been bolstered by a clear 
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mandate from the Department of Women and Child Development, which oversees 
ICDS. The NGO director explained: 
 
The problem faced at this time is that the ICDS department or 
health department does not support [the VHSNCs]. Then 
what would VHNSC members do alone? They don’t have 
power, nor do they have support. When their supporting 
system is ready, then progress can be seen (NGO director, 
female, general caste, IDI_NGO_07) 
 
5.4.4 Contextual sphere IV: Society 
 
 Fractional decentralization  
 
Decentralization is at the heart of the Indian 73rd constitutional amendment and the 
National Rural Health Mission, where VHSNCs are to serve as a key mechanism for 
“Decentralizing Health Planning” (MoHFW India 2013a, 37). VHSNCs were designed 
to access formal authority through the gram panchayat system.  Each gram 
panchayat is led by a sarpanch and composed of between four and 10 villages 
(Figure 8). Each village has one or more elected ward panch, depending on the 
village’s size, who are to advocate for village needs and certify that the sarpanch is 
spending the budget properly. VHSNCs are supposed to automatically include the 
ward representative as a VHSNC member.  
 114 
 





However, the VHSNC members found that their linkage to the panchayat system did 
not enable them to mobilize funds or services to address village needs, largely 
because the ward panch was seen to be powerless. The sarpanch was said to funnel 
whatever benefits he could to his own village, such as road improvements, new 
wells, employment through MNREGA, and subsidies for building toilets, and to show 
no concern for the other villages in the gram panchayat except when seeking votes. 
The ward members did not have their own budgets for their villages and could only 
request assistance for their villages from the sarpanch. In addition, it was difficult 
for many VHSNCs to engage the sarpanch, several of whom outright refused to join 
the committee, citing other more pressing commitments. 
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VHSNCs thus experienced decentralization of responsibility for improving local 
health, sanitation, and nutrition, without the associated decentralization of financial 
power and authority. As an NGO facilitator explained: 
 
…The members of VHNC should have the authority and rights 
to exercise power to fix things that are out of place in the 
village. Still, they have not been given any authority. So we 
are not able to explain this or what will happen in the future. 
(Male, facilitator, IDI_NG0_04) 
 
Whenever VHSNCs identified village problems they were told to take responsibility 
for solving them, without recognition of their limited capacity to do so. For example, 
VHSNCs were unable to access the panchayat system’s authority and finances to 
improve drainage, dig wells, or clear waste, despite identifying these as pressing 
local needs.   
 
 Private sector markets 
 
Community members relied on the public sector as much as possible to access 
subsidized food and free (or at least lower cost, since unofficial payments were 
common) education, water, and health care. However even the poorest villagers 
reported that they turned to market solutions when desperate, particularly for 
emergency health care. Respondents explained that they sought immunization, 
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antenatal care, and treatment for minor illnesses from public facilities as much as 
possible. But for emergencies, such as injuries, high fevers, and abnormal childbirth, 
they went straight to the main city for private sector care.  
 
A few wealthier community members in our research area also turned to the market 
for private schooling and water (by paying to dig bore wells on their property or 
paying to bring water from other areas by tanker).  In Hanwari, the comparatively 
affluent village, the NGO facilitator explained the community’s reluctance to 
participate in the VHSNC partially because of their wealthier status, suggesting that 
these families were more able to opt out of the public sector.  
 
However in all the villages, including Hanwari, most respondents still saw the 
government as their main hope for water, schools, and sanitation since private 
sector solutions were expensive and piecemeal. For example, wealthier people with 
tractors could drive to other villages at their own expense and fetch water during 
droughts, but still sought a long term solution through government investment in 
improved water technologies and infrastructure.  Desire for improved government 
services was unanimous, even as people expressed disappointment in the 
government’s failure to provide them. Therefore, community members broadly 
agreed with the VHSNC’s focus on strengthening the public sector, while also 
doubting whether this was possible and, in many cases, being reluctant to 





Several forms of media were common across the village: many homes had 
televisions and men (but not women) were often seen reading the newspaper while 
gathered in groups; billboards and wall paintings advertised commercial products 
and promoted government messages. No one in the four case study villages engaged 
with the media to try to solve their problems. However in a non-case study village 
the media emerged as a strategy that could be engaged if other mechanisms for 
change failed. As discussed in our methods section, above, we collected data in a 
village, “Garijwara,” that received the intervention but was not one of our four case 
study sites.  
 
People in Garijwara received assistance from a local newspaper when demanding 
improved water. Garijwara had such poor water quality that no one would allow 
their daughters to marry into the village and some families were locking their 
homes and leaving. Women traveled 1.5 kilometers on foot to fetch water from a 
well that provided potable water. Although it is not possible for us to attribute the 
village’s action directly or exclusively to the VHSNC, we noted that the village 
enacted a specific plan immediately after VHSNC members attended their first 
training. At the training, the NGO facilitator had suggested that the VHSNC file a 
complaint to the sub-divisional magistrate (SDM), which it did. Shortly after filing 
this complaint, all the men in the village staged several day-long protests in front of 
the SDM’s office in the nearby city.  
 118 
 
The sarpanch, a resident of Garijwara, had told the local journalists that they should 
highlight the village’s water issue, pointing out that he frequently buys 
advertisements in their newspapers. Several local journalists based in Manujpur 
covered the protests and visited Garijwara. Women proudly told us that they spoke 
to the journalists and even allowed their names and photographs to be used—which 
was considered exceptionally bold—because, they explained, “whatever happens we 
need to get water to our village” (OBS_VHC_02).  Several other, larger, papers also 
wrote about the plight of the village and the community’s efforts to seek 
improvements. Many of the articles mentioned the VHSNC as a player, although the 
VHSNC did not play a featured role. One of the local papers featured Garijwara’s 
efforts for 12 straight days, with the journalist himself even following up with the 
government officials. Community members in Garijwara felt that this ongoing 
coverage ultimately created enough pressure for the SDM to take action. Within two 
weeks, a piped water system was installed in Garijwara.     
 
Although this triumph in Garijwara occurred during the first quarter of the 
intervention, and was discussed at many VHSNC trainings and cluster meetings, 
none of the other 50 villages engaged similar media processes. The particularly 
stark nature of Garijwara’s plight and the Garijwara sarpanch’s clout at the local 
papers may have been the unique ingredients that encouraged the media to engage 
with this village and not others. It should also be noted that this was the sarpanch’s 





Three major themes arise from this contextual analysis. First, on a practical level, 
this analysis illuminates the fact that there are many contextual challenges limiting 
VHSNC functionality. Our analysis further enables us to identify how an alternative, 
supportive, context would look. In Table 13, below, we summarize these challenges 
(along with some opportunities) and identify aspects of a corresponding VHSNC-
enabling context.  
 
Second, the porous nature of these contextual spheres, emphasized by George et al., 
is striking. Our classification of issues into particular spheres is suggestive, rather 
than definitive, since many features affect multiple spheres. For instance, challenges 
at the health facility, administrative, and societal levels all played out in everyday 
struggles facing communities. While George et al. noted the potential for virtuous 
cycles across spheres, whereby small health committee successes can invigorate 
members and lead to greater action and improvement at the community and health 
facility level, this study also revealed the power of negative cycles. For example, the 
failure of health administration to release the untied fund reinforced community-
level skepticism and eroded VHSNC member enthusiasm. The money had a 
disproportionately negative effect on VHSNC functionality because it was seen to 
further indicate government callousness and the VHSNC’s low status and power. 
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Table 13. Contextual challenges & opportunities and features of a VHSNC-enabling context 
Contextual 
sphere 
Contextual challenges (-) and opportunities (+) identified  Features of a VHSNC-enabling context 
Community  Social hierarchies limited VHSNC member willingness to 
monitor village services 
 Women’s voice restricted by patriarchal social norms 
 Prior failed attempts to engage government and sense that 
government was uncaring caused reluctance to participate  
 Some division by caste and religious groups 
 Other local institutions for collective action emphasized 
collaboration for immediate gain (such as receiving loans or 
solving a local conflict) 
 Nevertheless there was general cross-community agreement 
on priority issues and willingness to collaborate 
 Other local institutions for collective action inculcated some 
VHSNC-relevant skills (e.g. book-keeping learned from 
savings groups)  
 Ongoing facilitation: The NGO facilitators played a 
crucial role in enabling women to participate and express 
themselves and in bringing up local issues without 
causing village-level conflict. NGOs also worked hard to 
overcome community reluctance and help VHSNCs 
develop strategies to appeal for improved health, 
sanitation, and nutrition services 
 Gender sensitive VHSNC support: Further strategies 
can be developed to ensure women can participate in 
socially acceptable ways and to help men adjust to 
women’s engagement 
 
Health facilities  Severely under-resourced health facility undermined almost 
all VHSNC efforts (e.g. there was often no health worker with 
whom the VHSNC could build a collaborative relationship) 
 Existing health care staff and officials lacked the resources 
and incentives to support VHSNCs 
 Adequate resources: VHSNCs need to interact with 
minimally functional health services; high vacancy rates 
make it impossible for VHSNCs to have productive 
engagement with health system functionaries  
 Support for supporters: Health system functionaries 
need training, support, and incentives to work with 
VHSNCs 
 121 
Table 13. Contextual challenges & opportunities and features of a VHSNC-enabling context 
Contextual 
sphere 
Contextual challenges (-) and opportunities (+) identified  Features of a VHSNC-enabling context 
Administration  Block level health system functionaries lacked capacity to 
respond to VHSNC complaints 
 Unclear chain of responsibility for VHSNC 
 Mismatch between VHSNC capabilities and local priorities  
 Fragmented government systems undermined VHSNC’s 
intersectoral mandate 
 Clear pathways of accountability: The hierarchy of 
responsibility for services must be conveyed to VHSNCs, 
so block level functionaries are not unfairly blamed for 
lapses beyond their control, and so the VHSNCs can 
engage with decision-makers 
 Designated top down responsibility for VHSNCs: Make 
VHSNC funds and support a top-down responsibility, 
rather than a bottom up battle 
 Intersectoral coordination: Health administration must 
ensure the support of all social sectors that VHSNCs are 
mandated to engage 
Society  Decentralization remained one level beyond most villages: 
the local sarpanch was considered powerful and tended to 
help his/her village but the other villages could only access 
the ward member, who was considered powerless 
 Many people turned to private market solutions to fill public 
sector gaps, making the comparatively wealthier community 
members less interested in working for improved public 
services through the VHSNC 
 Nevertheless, communities desired improved government 
services so that they would not have to spend money on 
private sector substitutes 
 A robust print media supported some grassroots action 
 Deep decentralization: Decentralization to gram 
panchayats is a major victory for citizen engagement. 
However, power remained one step beyond the reach of 
most villages, concentrated with the sarpanch. VHSNCs 
would have greater scope if the ward member had 
greater access to political and financial power and if the 
sarpanch was responsive to the VHSNCs within his/her 
panchayat 
 Continued public investment in the social sector: 
Community participation can help guide and strengthen 
government health, sanitation, and nutrition programs 
and services, but without adequate investment the poor 
will need to pay for private substitutes or suffer without 
basic services 
 Media engagement: Develop strategies to engage media 
to increase VHSNC voice, enable others to learn about 
VHSNC actions, and generate pressure on government 
services to respond to VHSNC requests 
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The dynamic interaction between various spheres is particularly clear when 
examining the role of the NGO’s support. NGO support worked to surmount some 
barriers at the community level, but was unable to address challenges in other 
contextual spheres. Their support proved critical to developing VHSNC capacity and 
functionality (as is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7, and summarized here). 
In the villages, NGO staff played a vital role in facilitating dialogue on the VHSNC 
across social hierarchies. They tried to ensure lower caste VHSNC members 
participated and increased women’s voice on the committee. They supported ASHAs 
to take on greater roles as conveners. As outsiders, they were also able to introduce 
some anganwadi monitoring exercises without making VHSNC members vulnerable 
to social sanctions. The NGO enabled community members to speak to government 
actors in order to express community needs and to facilitate greater communication 
and understanding. For instance, villagers learned that the BCMO was unable—
rather than unwilling—to hire additional staff to fill health facility vacancies.  
Overall, the NGO enabled VHSNCs to overcome many of the contextual challenges in 
the community sphere, but were unable to address major barriers in the other 
contextual spheres. These barriers eroded community interest in sustaining the 
VHSNC without the NGO’s involvement. NGO facilitation is thus a valuable feature of 
a VHSNC-enabling context, but must be supported by changes at the health facility 
and administrative levels.  
 
Third, as Collins et al. (1999) noted, contextual analysis reveals the “messiness” of 
policy development: our analysis suggests that improving the coherence of policies 
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and programming associated with VHSNCs will be vital for long term committee 
success. Specifically, the development of enabling environments (Tawil, Verster, and 
O’Reilly 1995) in which VHSNCs can not just increase community participation in 
trainings and meetings but actually bring about improvements in their health, 
sanitation, and nutrition, requires greater policy coherence from the national to 
block levels. Although the MoHFW’s National Rural Health Mission policy officially 
promotes community participation in the public system, and although the MoHFW 
has developed the Guidelines for Community Processes (MoHFW India 2013a) to help 
strengthen VHSNCs, the lower level health workers and officials lack the power, 
resources, and incentives to support VHSNCs and respond to many community 
needs. Furthermore, the intersectoral nature of VHSNCs reflects an ideal that must 
be backed up by collaboration across government ministries and departments at the 
higher levels of government.   
 
The VHSNC program, the National Rural Health Mission, and entire public service 
sector must be positioned within a larger context of insufficient investment in the 
public sector (OECD 2011). Public expenditure on social services has been 
consistently below minimum recommended levels to meet basic public needs (OECD 
2011; Planning Commission 2012). In 2014, the central Ministry of Finance further 
reduced health expenditure (Menghaney 2015; J. Ghosh 2015). There appears to be 
a fundamental discord between the MoHFW’s goals (rapidly improving health 
outcomes for the poor and engaging communities) (Planning Commission and HLEG 
2011) and the government’s health expenditure, which remains around 1% of the 
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GDP (Planning Commission 2012)—far below the NRHM’s goal of 2-3% (MoHFW 
India 2005a). The severely under-resourced public sector undermined VHSNCs in 
many ways, for example inviting communities to participate in a system that lacked 
many key staff with whom to engage. While the VHSNC is envisioned to partially fill 
service gaps through voluntary social service (such as working to clean the village), 
achieving national health goals such as reduced maternal mortality and improved 
child nutrition requires far more than grassroots volunteerism.  
 
5.6 Limitations and opportunities for future research  
 
This paper presents findings from in-depth research into four case study villages, 
rather than all 50 villages that received the intervention. Nonetheless, the four case-
study villages were fairly typical of the larger intervention area. As previously 
mentioned, we gained understanding of the broader area through extensive 
discussions with NGO facilitators who covered all 50 villages, observations of cluster 
meetings that involved VHSNC meetings from all 50 villages, and our examination of 
NGO documentation from across the villages.  
 
Walt and Gilson (1994) argued that policy analysis has tended to focus too much on 
the content of reforms, rather than processes, actors, and contexts. This analysis 
highlights the powerful effects of contextual barriers and enabled us to develop an 
understanding of the key elements of a VHSNC enabling context. Future research 
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can now focus on identifying the processes and actors that must be engaged to move 




This intervention focused on creating or reconstituting VHSNCs and building the 
capacity of members to make improvements themselves at the village-level and 
demand improvements in the public sector at higher levels. It succeeded in its core 
elements of expanding committee membership through a participatory process, 
training VHSNC members, facilitating monthly meetings, and helping VHSNCs take 
some local actions for health. However, the broader system did not change. 
Contextual barriers played a major role in limiting VHSNC capacity to improve local 
health, sanitation, and nutrition services. Technical inputs that build community 
capacity are necessary but not sufficient. In order for VHSNCs to be sustainable and 
effective mechanisms for community participation in health, they need to operate 
within more supportive contexts that go beyond the technical inputs.  
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CHAPTER 6. SOCIAL COSTS AND OPPORTUNITIES: PARTICIPATION IN 






Participatory community health programs can have broad social benefits, such as 
enabling marginalized groups to gain greater say in decision-making and increasing 
a community’s sense of collective agency. However, these beneficial outcomes are by 
no means guaranteed, and the empowering potential of participatory processes are 
often limited by gender norms that curtail women’s involvement and by the 
concentration of program control in the hands of outside actors (i.e. government 
officials, policymakers). This paper contributes to the literature on empowerment 
through participation, examining how community participation in health 
committees can enable and hinder the renegotiation of power relations, both within 
communities, and between communities and outsider stakeholders. We examine 
social costs and opportunities experienced by Village Health, Nutrition and 
Sanitation Committee (VHSNC) participants in a marginalized area of rural north 
India. We apply the conceptual lens of “social spaces” to explore how stakeholders 
engage with one another and, more broadly, how power is mediated through these 




Over a 1.5-year period, we conducted 74 interviews and 18 focus group discussions 
with VHSNC members (including female community health workers and elected 
members of local government), non-VHSNC community members, NGO staff, and 
higher-level health system functionaries.  We also observed 54 health committee 
activities, including trainings and meetings. After initial thematic analysis, the data 
were interpreted through the psychosocial theoretical lens of “social spaces” to 
identify how power relationships were enacted in health committees to produce 
social costs and opportunities.  
 
6.1.3 Results 
The intervention took place in a context where gender norms limit women’s voice 
and control over key decisions in their lives and where male and female community 
members tend to describe a negative collective identity, seeing the community as 
unlikely to work together to solve local problems. VHSNCs created some 
opportunities for participants to re-negotiate power inequalities within the 
community, particularly around gender, through inviting gendered co-occupation of 
space, enabling some women to speak in front of men, and creating space for 
women to perform previously masculine roles. However, those who violated social 




Power inequalities between the community and outside stakeholders were 
mediated by the health committee through an ongoing struggle around a “discourse 
of responsibility”. Government policy, enacted by NGO staff, presented a dominant 
discourse portraying VHSNC members as collectively responsible for village level 
environmental health and for improving the delivery of much-needed public 
services. Some VHSNC members accepted this discourse, and in turn blamed their 
peers for failing to take action, re-entrenching a negative collective identity where 
participation was futile because no one would work for the greater good.  Others 
rejected the discourse and argued that the VHSNC was not responsible for taking 
any action, explaining that government agents must intervene to help them. This 
counter-narrative also positioned participation in the VHSNC as futile.  
 
6.1.4 Conclusions 
Interventions to strengthen community participation must support social 
transformation inside communities and also enable communities to broker greater 
power and control in relation to broader political discourses.  
 
6.1.5 Keywords 







Despite generating much optimism in health policy circles, village health 
committees often fall short of achieving the sustained and inclusive participation 
that is theorized to improve health outcomes and, more broadly, to empower 
marginalized people to gain greater control over their lives. There is little 
understanding of the costs and opportunities that participants assume through their 
engagement in these interventions. This paper explores how power inequalities play 
a key role in limiting community benefit from these committees and how 
participants actively engage with and push back against these inequalities. Our 
study is framed by the concept of social spaces, which illuminates the processes 
through which participation in health committees can create space for marginalized 
people to challenge inequalities and renegotiate social norms for greater 
empowerment. For the purposes of this study, participation is understood as the act 
of engaging in collective activities, such as meetings, while empowerment is 
understood as the attainment of increased control over decisions and resources that 
affect one’s life and wellbeing (Rappaport 1987).  
 
Health committees are a commonly promoted mechanism for community 
participation in health (McCoy, Hall, and Ridge 2011). There is some evidence that 
they can improve the functionality and accountability of health facilities (Iwami and 
Petchey 2002a; Sohani 2005; Molyneux et al. 2012; Shukla, Scott, and Kakde 2011) 
and increase community use of health services (Paxman et al. 2005; Loewenson, 
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Rusike, and Zulu 2004a). In addition to directly improving health systems and 
health-related behavior, participation through health committees is envisioned to 
play a broader emancipatory role in society as part of a dynamic and ongoing 
process of community empowerment, seen as a valuable end in itself (Rifkin 2014; 
Rifkin 1996; Zakus 1998).  However, committee functionality and effectiveness is 
very uneven (La Forgia 1985; Mubyazi, Mushi, Kamugisha, et al. 2007; Ngulube et al. 
2004), with many committees failing to achieve inclusive and sustained community 
engagement (Wijngaarden, Scholten, and Wijk 2012; Kasaje, Sempebwa, and 
Spencer 1987; Loewenson, Rusike, and Zulu 2004a).  
 
Researchers suggest that many of the disappointing outcomes of participatory 
development programs can be explained by failure to manage power inequalities, 
both within communities and between communities and outside stakeholders such 
as policymakers (Rifkin 2014; Arnstein 1969; Naimoli et al. 2012). Within 
communities, power inequalities can prevent marginalized groups from benefiting 
from the participatory programs seeking to help them (Guijt and Kaul Shah 1998; 
Adhikari and Lovett 2006; A. Dasgupta and Beard 2007; Mosse 1994; Cornwall 
2002). Some participatory programs have particularly failed to manage gender 
inequalities, excluding women from decision making and then expecting them to 
lend their time and energy to interventions that they did not design (Meinzen-Dick 
and Zwarteveen 1998). Power inequalities between communities and outsiders 
have been identified as another major issue, with elites (i.e. government 
policymakers, officials, program implementers) accused of using community 
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participation initiatives to overburden communities with unreasonable 
responsibilities and more broadly legitimize failures in public service provision 
(Rifkin 1983; Zakus and Lysack 1998; Collins 1989; Mosse 2001; Nichter 2008).  
 
Despite the well-established importance of examining power in participation, and a 
robust literature documenting the exclusion of less powerful community members 
from health committees (La Forgia 1985; Sepehri and Pettigrew 1996; Iwami and 
Petchey 2002a; Ramiro et al. 2001), there remains much to be learned about how 
health committees contribute to renegotiating community power relations, 
particularly in terms of gender norms and collective agency. This paper contributes 
to filling this gap by examining the social costs and opportunities of participation 
incurred by health committee members and their communities more broadly. It 
examines how power inequalities are mediated through village health, sanitation, 
and nutrition committees (VHSNCs) in rural north India to influence social dynamics 
across the community, particularly in relation to gender roles and the community’s 
conceptualization of their collective potential.  
 
6.2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
This paper is framed by the concept of “social spaces” (Lefebvre 1991) to map out 
the mechanisms through which power works within health committees to create 
opportunities and costs for participants. Thinking about the health committee as a 
social space through which power relations operate provides a fruitful lens into how 
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participatory programs can better create opportunities for communities to 
construct more health enabling social identities (Cornwall and Coelho 2006). Social 
spaces are interactive moments in space and time, constructed through 
relationships between diverse groups, which create contexts for new social 
representations and identities to emerge (Mead 1934; Moscovici 2000).  
 
Producing a new space, such as a health committee, creates a momentary disruption 
of established rules and possibilities, into which unfamiliar rules and alternative 
possibilities can be ascribed (Kesby 2005b). What happens within a social space 
affects the broader society when participants experience incongruence between the 
norms within the space (such as “all voices are equal”) and the norms governing 
interactions in regular life (“male voices are more valued”), leading them to question 
and challenge established ways of being and interacting (Jones and SPEECH 2001). 
 
Inherent to the concept of social spaces is a post-modern understanding of power, 
as developed by social theorist Michel Foucault. Foucault proposed that power is 
inseparable from the development of accepted knowledge systems and that 
power/knowledge is continually resisted, thereby operating as a creative and 
constructive force (Kesby 2005b; Cornwall 2002; Foucault 1980).  
 
Social spaces, like all realms of human interaction, are governed by discursive 
norms, which shape and limit what is said and done, what is say-able and do-able, 
and ultimately what is considered truth or knowledge (Foucault 1980; Foucault 
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1990). Stakeholders seek to further agendas and gain resources by establishing 
these discursive norms, which enable particular types of communication and action 
(Cornwall 2002; Lefebvre 1991). For instance, a participatory space may be 
constructed by elite actors to bound possibilities for discussion and community 
control, limiting what is at stake and what participants are entitled to know or 
decide (Mosse 1994). Yet, Foucault notes that power is complex and unstable; every 
site where power is expressed contains the potential for resistance (Foucault 1980).  
 
Discourse is thus not only “an instrument and an effect” of power, but is also “a 
stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” 
(Foucault 1988, 100–101). Participatory spaces are frequently resisted by those 
with “alternative visions” about how best to “transform their possibilities” 
(Cornwall 2002, 9). For example, Mosse (2005) explores the ways in which targeted 
communities may outwardly agree to stakeholder agendas, but then exercise “quiet 
power” (Campbell 2014, 52) to manipulate programs to suit their own needs, 
displaying agency in ways not predicted by funders.  
 
What opportunities does the health committee present for the renegotiation of 
accepted forms of power/knowledge for marginalized people within communities 
and for communities in general? What costs do participants and communities more 
broadly bear as a result of engaging in these “alternative spaces”? And ultimately, 
how can health committees better generate social opportunities for renegotiating 
power inequalities and minimize social costs to ensure sustainable and inclusive 
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social spaces that further collective empowerment? These questions guide our 
study.  
 
6.2.2 Context of study 
 
Over 500,000 VHSNCs have been officially formed across India since the mid-2000s 
(MoHFW India 2013a). These committees are designed to involve general 
community members including members of savings groups, school management 
groups, and youth groups, as well as auxiliary nurse midwives (ANMs), accredited 
social health activists (ASHAs), anganwadi workers, and elected members of the 
local government, called ward members. ASHAs are female community health 
workers, selected and trained in each village as part of the National Rural Health 
Mission, launched in 2005. Anganwadi workers are female nutrition and pre-school 
workers, who run anganwadi centers in each village. The anganwadi program is part 
of the Integrated Childhood Development Scheme, launched in 1975 by the Ministry 
of Women and Child Development. It focuses on providing pre-school care and 
nutritional supplementation through anganwadi centers in each village staffed by 
female anganwadi workers (AWWs) and helpers (AWHs).  Ward members are the 
lowest elected member of the local governance system (called the panchayat) and 
are to represent their ward (i.e. village or sub-village) to the local leader (sarpanch) 
at political forums (gram sabhas).  
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The VHSNC is to convene monthly meetings, develop local health plans, take action 
to improve environmental health, monitor and seek improvements in public 
services, and allocate a yearly ‘untied fund’ of Rs. 10,000 (US $150). The untied fund 
is a grant for the VHSNC to spend on community action, as a source of revolving 
emergency loans, or to help destitute families meet their health care needs.  Since 
the launch across India in the mid-2000s, committee functionality in most parts of 
India has remained low (R. Singh and Purohit 2012; C. M. Singh et al. 2009). 
Members often do not know their roles, VHSNC composition rarely adheres to 
guidelines, meetings are often irregular or do not take place at all, and there is often 
negligible community participation in budgeting, monitoring, or developing village 
health plans (Bajpai, Sachs, and Dholakia 2009; PHRN 2008; R. Singh and Purohit 
2012).  
 
The power dynamics of VHSNCs have been under-explored. For instance, VHSNCs 
are mandated to have 50% female members, and several studies have noted that 
most do (Nandan et al. 2008; PHRN 2008; R. Singh and Purohit 2012). But little is 
known about whether the women speak or have decision-making power within the 
committee, and more broadly how the committee may influence wider gender 
norms. In addition, no previous study has examined how VHSNC members feel 
about their mandate of improving local health, sanitation, and nutrition services.  
 
In 2013, the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) developed a 
VHSNC support package called Guidelines for Community Processes (MoHFW India 
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2013a). This support package involved: village-level social mobilization to increase 
community knowledge of VHSNCs, expanding VHSNC membership from seven to 15 
people, training members, and facilitating monthly village meetings and quarterly 
cluster meetings. Before scaling up the support package nationally, the National 
Health Systems Resource Center, technical advisor to the MoHFW, collaborated with 
the Public Health Foundation of India and other research partners to conduct in-
depth implementation research at the block (i.e. sub-district) level in northern India. 
The findings reported here emerged from that research. 
 
The study took place in “Manujpur”6 block (sub-district level), a rural area with an 
approximate population of 300,000 people living in 200 villages and one main town 
(Ministry of Home Affairs 2011b). The area is located within 250 km of New Delhi 
and most people work as farmers and daily wage laborers. The literacy rate is 80% 
for men and 50% for women (Ministry of Home Affairs 2011b).  
 
Area residents struggle to access sufficient potable water and experience many 
shortcomings in public services. Roads often become impassible in the rainy season, 
there is little public transportation, public schools are widely considered to be of 
low academic and physical quality (many have no water or toilets), and government 
health centers are severely understaffed. For example, Primary Health Centers 
(PHCs) are to have one Medical Officer (MO), three ANMs and 10 other support staff 
(MoHFW India 2012a); several PHCs in our research area had just one ANM 
                                                        
6 We are using pseudonyms for the study area, implementing NGO, and all respondents to protect 
anonymity 
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assigned to them. While anganwadi centers are envisioned as pre-schools that 
provide daily childcare and hot meals, in our research area most were opened for 





6.3.1 Study design 
 
Over the course of 1.5 years (2014-2015), a local non-governmental organization 
(NGO), “SEEK,” implemented the MoHFW’s VHSNC support package in 50 of the 200 
villages.  From among those 50 villages, we selected four case study villages in 
which to carry out longitudinal qualitative research. Our research included in-depth 
interviews (IDIs), focus group discussions (FGDs) and observation of VHSNC 
activities, such as VHSNC formation, member trainings, and meetings. We chose 
villages that varied by remoteness and social marginalization. The two remote 
villages were located about 16 kilometers from the main town; the two closer 
villages about nine kilometers away. The two less marginalized villages were 
composed of a typical mix of caste and religious groups; the other two were 
predominantly scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST) and/or Muslim—all 
extremely marginalized groups. 
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6.3.2 Data collection 
 
We conducted a total of 74 in-depth interviews and 18 focus group discussions with 
community members and other stakeholders at the block and village level (Table 
14). Fourteen respondents were interviewed multiple times over the research 
period to better understand evolving perspectives on the VHSNC and to follow up 
after specific events.  
 
Table 14: Interviews and focus groups by respondent type and gender 
In-depth interviews by group 
# interviews (# respondents) 
 Male Female Total 
VHSNC    
 General community  21 (13) 11 (8) 32 (21) 
 ASHA 0 8 (5) 8 (5) 
 Anganwadi staff 0 12 (9) 12 (9) 
 Ward member 3 2 5 
Total interviews with VHSNC members 24 (16) 33 (24) 57 (40) 
Non-VHSNC    
 General community 4 1 5 
 ANM 0 3 3 
 ASHA supervisor 1 1 2 
 Block Chief Medical Officer 1 0 1 
 NGO staff 3 (2) 3 6 (5) 
Total interviews with non-VHSNC members 9 (8) 8 17 (16) 
Total in-depth interviews 33 (24) 41 (32) 74 (56) 
  
Focus group discussions # of groups 
 Male Female Total 
VHSNC (general community, ASHA, AWW, ward) 4 8 12 
Non-VHSNC (general community) 3 3 6 




While Table 14 presents the data divided into the categories of VHSNC member and 
non-VHSNC community members, the village-level reality complicated this 
distinction. Some people officially listed as VHSNC members were unaware that they 
were on the committee; some agreed to join and attended a few meetings but then 
stopped participating. AWWs were supposed to be VHSNC members by default, 
according to MoHFW guidelines, but some did not consider themselves members. 
ANMs were supposed to be included as a member of the VHSNC in the village they 
resided in, however in our research area no ANMs lived in the villages so no ANMs 
were members of VHSNCs. All commuted long distances from the nearby city, 
largely because none of the health sub-centers (in which they are supposed to 
reside) had electricity, water, or residential quarters.  
 
Our focus group discussions with general community members frequently included 
VHSNC members, although these members were often inactive. Similarly, non-
VHSNC members often joined VHSNC focus group discussions. It was socially 
impolite to insist on excluding people who appeared and we decided it would have 
been more detrimental to our research to enforce exclusivity, especially when 
VHSNC and non-VHSNC identities were themselves fluid.  
 
We observed 54 key VHSNC activities over the course of the intervention, including 
NGO staff trainings and meetings, village level mobilization about the VHSNC, 
monthly village level VHSNC meetings, and quarterly cluster level meetings (which 
involved two to three representatives from each VHSNC in a cluster of 17 villages). 
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Each observation session was documented based on our observation guides, which 
sought to assess features such as participation (e.g. how many people, gender, caste) 
and group dynamics (e.g. who spoke, who was silent, where people sat).  
 
The interviews and focus groups were conducted in Hindi, primarily by GP (a co-
author), an Indian male researcher who resided in Manujpur for the research 
period. Data collection was closely supported by SM (a co-author), a female Indian 
researcher, and KES (first author), a female Canadian research coordinator. All 
researchers had master’s degrees in public health or social science subjects and 
were trained in qualitative research methodology. The three on-the-ground 
researchers (GP, SM and KES) debriefed after almost all data collection and 
maintained extensive research diaries. 
 
Interview and focus group topic guides focused on: the village context (gender and 
caste relations, prior collective action, engagement with government services), 
VHSNC embeddedness and inclusiveness (reasons for participation and drop out, 
support or lack of support for participation, how others in the village respond to 
VHSNC members), VHSNC activities (experiences in VHSNC meetings and trainings, 
issues discussed, which members speak more and less, how the committee manages 
administrative processes) and public system responsiveness (how authorities 
respond to the committee, committee successes or frustrations when seeking 
change). Interviews and focus group discussions were audio recorded with the 
participants’ signed consent and translated and transcribed into English by several 
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translators. All translations were checked closely by SM and GP then approved by 
KES.  
 
6.3.3 Data analysis 
 
Analysis of the data was informed by thematic content analysis (Attride-Stirling 
2001). We began with a close reading of all the transcripts, observation notes, and 
memos. We then developed a coding framework based first on a priori research 
interests in VHSNC embeddedness (e.g. VHSNC member dialogue with community), 
inclusiveness (e.g. democratic selection of members) and activities (e.g. meetings 
attendance, barriers to attending, motivations to attend). This framework was 
expanded to capture emergent content by selecting three rich transcripts (one focus 
group discussion and two in-depth interviews) and adding emergent codes 
whenever no a priori code was appropriate. For example, we created the code 
“speaking up” to capture discussion on who speaks, who is silent, and why certain 
people cannot speak at meetings. Emergent codes were selected through open 
coding (Yin 2016) on a concept-by-concept basis. The expanded framework (i.e. a 
priori codes plus emergent codes) was applied to two additional transcripts by KES 
and SM, who then discussed how to clarify and adjust codes further. This framework 
was then applied to all the transcripts by KES and SM, assisted by the qualitative 
data management software ATLAS.ti.  
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After coding, we generated outputs that enabled us to read all the quotations as 
clustered by code, so that higher level “organizing themes” could be identified (such 
as “female perspectives being heard in the VHSNC”). These organizing themes were 
developed and substantiated with example quotations in a long form report. For this 
paper, to explore how power inequalities were mediated through the VHSNC, with 
the social costs and opportunities resulting from participation, the long-form report 
was re-examined using the conceptual lens of social spaces. As a theory emerged on 
how the social space of the VHSNC generated possibilities for identity and discourse, 
KES re-read the coded outputs and organizing themes specific to gender and notions 
of responsibility for social services. This re-reading ensured that counter-narratives 
and alternative explanations were considered and reconciled into the overarching 
argument of the paper.  
  
6.4 Findings  
 
We first examine how participation in the VHSNC interacted with social inequalities 
within the community, focusing on gender. We identify opportunities for women to 
construct more empowered identities but also consider social costs associated with 
struggling against norms. Second, we explore a key tension between the community 
and outside stakeholders in relation to the construction of a dominant discourse of 
local responsibility.  
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6.4.2 Mediating power inequalities within the community  
 
 Overview of power inequalities in the village 
 
Pre-existing gender norms in the region perpetuated a patriarchal system that 
disproportionately limited women’s decision-making power in the household, 
access to education, freedom to move around the village, and even access to food 
(and have been documented extensively by others, cf. Balarajan, Selvaraj, & 
Subramanian (2011), J. Dasgupta, (2011), Jeffery & Jeffery (2010), Jeffery (2014), 
Nagar (2000), O’Reilly (2007; 2006)). Women reported that men had much more 
leisure time while women managed all domestic work, childcare, and care for 
animals, in addition to working alongside men in the fields. An anganwadi worker 
pointed out that women (even those in her own family) were not excused from any 
work when pregnant, and were not able to receive the recommended nutrition:  
 
In farming, pregnant women don’t get rest as prescribed in 
newspapers and media. They also don’t get the nutrition 
prescribed to keep mother and baby healthy. In the village 
they are just supposed to work, if they don’t work there are 
fights. (Shadeeka, female, AWW, OBC Hindu, IDI_VHC_43) 
 
Girls were reportedly fed less than boys and pulled out of school at a younger age, 
although some respondents claimed these practices were prevalent among others in 
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their village, particularly among Muslims, and were not practiced in their own 
family.  
 
Sir, this is a Muslim area. They do not educate girls. They 
discriminate a lot against girls. They think a girl would not 
make them happy, but a boy would… They give less food to 
the girl. If the child asks for food, they are told to have a little 
bit because it is not necessary to feed the girl (ASHA, female, 
Sojjanpur, IDI_VHC_04,) 
 
Violence, gambling and alcohol consumption were an issue for some women: 
 
They [men] drink and gamble. If they win in gambling then 
they drink. And if not, then they beat us [women]. This is the 
story of all households in the village. (ASHA, female, MO 
village, FGD_VHC_04) 
 
Women in all the case study villages went to great lengths to ensure that men in 
their village did not hear them speak and did not directly look at their faces (called 
purdah). Women—both Muslim and Hindu—remained silent in the presence of male 
community members, covered their faces with a shawl (called ghungat) and 
lowered their heads or turned towards a wall whenever a male relative was nearby. 
This norm was described to us by men and women as signifying female respect or 
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shyness towards male community members. Even within families, women 
communicated with male relatives by asking children to serve as go-betweens.  
 
Respondent (male): We have purdah system here. Women feel 
shy in the presence of men and they don’t say anything.  
 
Interviewer (male): They don’t speak to any men in the 
village? 
 
R: No. [I: Ok.] Wives of men younger than us don’t speak at all 
in front of us… They feel shy and don’t speak and observe 
purdah system. Even at home, they don’t speak directly to us. 
They ask children to convey messages, like ‘Tell your uncle to 
do this.’ (Jhorkibas, male, Muslim, IDI_VHC_50) 
 
Women always sat on a lower surface than men, generally squatting on the ground 
while men sat on chairs because “it doesn’t look proper” for men and women to sit 
on the same surface. These practices were not performed in interactions with 
outsiders, such as the male researcher GP and male NGO staff (who were from 
nearby villages) women sat on chairs across from them, and could speak directly to 
them without a shawl covering their faces.  
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Women, and particularly younger women marrying into their husband’s family, had 
very limited power both within the family and within local governance. The local 
elected system of government (the panchayat) reserved one-third of all positions for 
women. However, men and women openly reported that whenever an area had to 
elect a female candidate, the names of women would be placed on the ballot as a 
proxy for their male relative, who performed all government functions in place of 
the elected woman.  
 
While gender was a more obvious shaper of identity, family wealth, caste status, and 
religious group (Hindu or Muslim) also affected identity performance. These aspects 
of identity were expressed in innumerable ways, including: the people with whom 
you could speak, which parts of the village you could enter, whose foods you could 
eat, and the community roles for which you were eligible. For instance, higher caste 
people would not eat food or drink tea served by lower caste people and in some 
instances, when a group was seated together on the ground, higher caste people 
would sit on a rug while lower caste people sat on the bare floor. Furthermore, the 
intersectionality between gender and these other features of identity was visible in 
these villages. Lower caste women in some villages had to ask higher caste women 
to fill their water vessels for them, since lower caste people could not touch the tap. 
Higher caste women in some villages had greater limits placed on their movement 
as they were expected to move only within the sphere of their family’s home and 
land and to avoid the lower caste areas of the village. In contrast, lower caste 
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women often travelled more freely around the village and fields because they had to 
take on more work outside the home.   
 
 Occupying the physical space of the VHSNC  
 
As an “alternative social space,” the VHSNC proposed new physical configurations, 
particularly with respect to inviting both genders to occupy a public sphere. While 
the idea of having participants from all caste and religious communities come 
together for local problem solving resonated with pre-existing indigenous conflict 
management structures, bringing together both genders was largely unprecedented.  
 
Women explained that attending meetings was often very difficult because they had 
endless domestic responsibilities and “complete responsibility for the house” (ANM, 
IDI_HS_03). It is striking then that women nonetheless occupied their physical space 
on the VHSNC, consistently composing over 50% of the meeting attendees, even if 
some female members rarely or never spoke. Men and women stated their support 
of women’s membership, with men invoking the government’s guideline that 
membership had to be at least 50% female as justification for including women:  
 




Respondent 1 (male): Women would tell their problems. And 
it is in the guideline to keep 50 percent women and 50 
percent men. 
 
Respondent 2 (male):  If the government has prepared norms, 
then 50 percent women have to be in the committee. 
(Sojjanpur, men, FGD_VHC_12) 
 
Physical presence during participatory activities is only a crude measure of 
participation (Mosse 1994), but in this context, building new norms of gender 
inclusiveness was already a drastic variation from established ways of organizing 
gender in physical space.  
 
While women’s right to attend meetings was uncontested, the physical presence of a 
lower caste woman in one village, Shadeeka, was dependent on her tenacity and the 
presence of the NGO facilitator. The village was composed of two main caste groups 
and only one SC (highly marginalized) household. Of the 50 villages, seven had 
similar compositions, i.e. just one or two SC households. The adult female member 
of the SC household in Shadeeka was included in the VHSNC by the NGO facilitator 
without the approval of others in the village, who openly mocked and discriminated 
against her. Other female VHSNC members said that the SC woman was allowed to 




Interviewer (male): But then people must have agreed [to 
include the SC woman in the VHSNC]? 
 
Respondent (female): No agreement. But then no one said 
anything at that time…  What does it matter if it’s written?... 
It’s not like anyone is getting a salary for this. (Shadeeka, 
female, OBC Hindu, IDI_VHC_25) 
 
The SC woman pursued VHSNC membership because she hoped that it would lead 
to a job as cleaner at the school. She reported that the other VHSNC members tried 
to exclude her from VHSNC meetings by not telling her about them; even when the 
NGO facilitator sent someone to call her, she reported that the VHSNC members told 
the NGO facilitator that she was not at home. She only attended when the NGO 
facilitator called her directly or if she noticed a meeting taking place. The VHSNC 
program was unable to effectively challenge this caste relationship over the course 
of the intervention. At times the VHSNC may have even reinforced discrimination, 
such as when the SC woman in Shadeeka reported that male VHSNC members 
discussed installing a separate water storage tank for her SC household, to avoid 
cross-caste sharing (female, SC, IDI_VHC_46).  
 
In the other three case study sites, VHSNC members endorsed the need for VHSNCs 
to include representatives from all caste and religious communities, and attendance 
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at meetings met this inclusion principle, with strong representation from all 
marginalized groups. In these villages, our research team did not detect overt 
discrimination between higher and lower caste members or between Muslim and 
Hindu members at VHSNC activities. For example, VHSNC members shared the same 
rug during meetings, shared food during training sessions, and spoke together about 
health issues without distinguishing between issues by caste groups—at least to an 
extent that we could detect. However, we recognize the subtlety of caste 
discrimination and note that this area requires additional exploration. The NGO staff 
modeled non-discrimination in key ways: the team included a Muslim facilitator and 
facilitators from non-marginalized castes who created norms of inclusiveness. For 
example, the NGO staff pro-actively invited all members to sit on the rug together, 
sought inputs from all members, and distributed food at the trainings without any 
segregation. In one instance, a higher caste VHSNC member suggested to a higher 
caste NGO staff member that separate water containers for higher and lower caste 
people be used during a training. The NGO staff member replied that that everyone 
who comes to the NGO’s office or training center, including himself, shares the same 
water container. The VHSNC member accepted this response and shortly after took 
water from the communal vessel.  
 
The opportunity created by the VHSNC for expanding women’s ability to occupy 
public space alongside men was somewhat diminished by the normative 
justifications given for this policy. This co-occupation of participatory space was 
integrated into pre-existing gender norms that valued women for raising children 
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and valued men for assertiveness. Men and women explained that women belonged 
on the VHSNC because they were responsible for children’s health and birth control:  
 
[The VHSNC] is also about immunization of children. Ladies 
know more about it. Gents usually work in fields… So I think, 
if the preference is there, it is beneficial. (Hanwari, elderly 
male, ST Hindu, IDI_VHC_54)  
 
Women are the ones who consider everything. ‘Health 
Committee’ means it should look after health and women are 
the ones who face the most health problems. Whatever is 
there, whether it is delivery, sterilization, immunization, 
whatever it be, health related work is more in women. (ANM, 
Shadeeka, IDI_HS_03) 
 
Similarly, male VHSNC membership was grounded in male gender expectations of 
assertiveness and access to spaces outside the village. Whereas women could not 
speak up, men could go out and demand change: “Men at least know that, sir, if 
something doesn't happen, then, ‘We can make some noise.’ That is the thing.” 
(Sojjanpur, male, IDI_VHC_21). The AWW in Hanwari (IDI_VHC_12) noted that male 
members would help the committee function, because they could go outside the 
community and “voice our concerns.” Similarly, women in a focus group discussion 
explained that men could talk to others, whereas no one would listen to women:  
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Woman 5: Gents should also be there [in the VHSNC].  
 
Woman 6: Who will listen to the ladies? We need some 
support from men. Only the men can talk with men and other 
people. (Shadeeka, women, FGD_COM_03)   
 
Thus the VHSNC created at least some limited opportunity to challenge gender 
norms that segregated men and women and excluded women from physically 
attending public discussions. However the underlying gender norms that limited 
women’s scope beyond a domestic role and excluded men from taking up 
reproductive health issues were left unchallenged in many cases. 
 
 Some opportunities to re-negotiate gender norms through action  
 
While justification for both genders to be involved in the VHSNC reinforced 
entrenched gender norms, as discussed above, VHSNC policy and some VHSNC 
members’ behavior also challenged these norms.  
 
MoHFW guidelines designated the role of VHSNC secretary to the (female) ASHA, 
which demanded capacities unrelated to a domestic or maternal identity: public 
speaking, leadership, literacy and numeracy, and calling all the members together 
for meetings. Many ASHAs struggled with this role, particularly because they could 
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not speak to the men to call them for meetings or lead the meetings. For example, an 
ASHA initially said that the VHSNC would not function without support from her 
village’s NGO facilitator:  
 
Because when he [NGO facilitator] calls, two-three men 
gather. If I go to call people only two-three women come, 
they are illiterate. So in this way it cannot work. Most of them 
don’t come if I call them (Jhorkibas, female, ASHA, OBC, 
IDI_VHC_29) 
 
However the NGO’s support and training enabled some ASHAs to envision 
themselves taking a more active role. Six months after the ASHA just quoted above 
explained that she could never convene the VHSNC meetings without the NGO 
facilitator, her confidence had grown and she envisioned herself performing the 
NGO facilitator’s role: 
 
Interviewer (male): Okay, like you were saying that [NGO 
facilitator] does all the talking and writing work. If he doesn’t 
come; who will do it? 
 
ASHA: ASHA will do it. 
 
I: You will do it! Okay. But see, you don’t talk with men then 
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how will it be possible? 
 
ASHA: Then we will do it. I am saying then we will do it. Right 
now we can see that he is doing it. When we have to, we will 
do it. We will have to do the meeting and we will have to 
raise the issues. (Jhorkibas, female, ASHA, OBC, IDI_VHC_48) 
 
While this growth in self-assessed capacity is striking, additional research is 
required to follow up on how the ASHAs managed after the NGO facilitators stopped 
coming. This research could explore not only the extent to which ASHAs gained the 
capacity to take on these leadership functions, but also how the communities 
accepted the ASHAs’ performance of these roles.  
 
Beyond policy stipulations on the ASHAs’ role, we also found that female VHSNC 
members began taking action outside the VHSNC on issues beyond reproductive and 
child health. In particular, following the first round of VHSNC training, some female 
VHSNC members worked to improve the village schools, which were staffed by male 
teachers from outside the community. In one village, female members of a VHSNC 
demanded that girls be admitted to the local school through a government 
scholarship program designed to help girls access secondary education. In another 
village, a female VHSNC member demanded that the male headmaster release the 
government’s grant money to enable her daughter and other girls to buy bicycles:  
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VHSNC member Rashmi’s daughter had not received money 
for her bicycle. Rashmi followed up with the headmaster 
several times so eventually he said to Rashmi, ‘Tell me your 
daughter’s name and take her cheque but don’t disclose this 
to anybody.’ Rashmi said to headmaster, ‘I have 22 daughters 
studying here in this school. So you have to give their 
respective money to all.’ After three days, the headmaster 
gave the bicycle money to all the girls. (Observation of 
VHSNC cluster meeting in Sojjanpur, respondent from 
neighboring village, OBS_VHC_15) 
 
Rashmi refused to accept the headmaster’s offer of assistance for her daughter 
alone, instead advocating for all the girls in the school. By presenting herself as 
“mother” of all the 22 girls in the school, she may have gained persuasive power 
from the dominant discourse that valued women primarily through their maternal 
role. At the same time she took up a very public, non-domestic, position and 
successfully advocated for all the girls at the school.   
 
Another female VHSNC member in Sojjanpur village discussed women’s capacity to 
challenge the teachers for “lazing around” and “playing cards” in the day.  She 
explained that because of the VHSNC, teachers are aware that women may come and 
demand better behavior: 
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It is because of these meetings that we can move forward… 
Otherwise we can’t even climb up to the gates of the school… So 
teachers also get to know sometimes that if any ladies come, they 
feel we can also be in control. Because of this we participate. 
(Sojjanpur, female, Muslim, IDI_VHC_38) 
 
Male VHSNC members tended to take action within accepted masculine spheres, 
primarily by raising requests to government agents for a range of issues. They 
focused most attention on improving access to potable water, an issue prioritized by 
men and women, but also sought improved primary health services, which tended 
to be most important to women.  
 
Several men took interest in monitoring anganwadi services, a traditionally 
feminine domain. Male VHSNC members reported that they checked the center to 
see if food was being provided to children. However, their monitoring was solely 
visual, since they could not converse with the (female) anganwadi staff: 
 
Interviewer (male): Ok. So when you reached there, what did 
you tell them? Did you talk to the anganwadi worker?  
 
Respondent (male): No, sir, there was no conversation.  It was 
just seen that she was making children eat khichdi [soft 
cooked rice]. There were small children. They [anganwadi 
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workers] can’t speak. So I just saw that everything was all 
right and left... I can’t stay there. You know the women of the 
village feel shy. They do ghungat [covering the face with cloth 
in front of men]. So I don’t stay there.  (Jhorkibas, male, SC 
Hindu, IDI_VHC_44) 
 
The VHSNC thus provided both men and women with some opportunities to expand 
the acceptable male and female spheres of action.  
 
 Claiming voice in the VHSNC 
 
NGO staff made efforts to move beyond female attendance, to actually including 
women’s voices in the VHSNC. In VHSNC meetings and trainings, female members 
sat clustered together, often whispering among themselves quietly. NGO staff 
encouraged women to present their views by directly asking them questions and 
sometimes teasing them with comments such as, “We have female chief ministers in 
India and yet you won’t talk?” Although seemingly innocuous, the NGO staff’s 
demands for female participation had both transformative and dangerous potential. 
By suggesting that female participation in front of men may be normal and expected, 
the VHSNC space could be a site of renegotiating gender norms for greater female 
influence. It also could have enabled women who wanted to speak up to do so, under 
the guise of having been forced by the NGO facilitators. However, the NGO staff’s 
efforts to make women speak also pushed women to violate norms, which could 
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have negative consequences for women upon leaving the “alternative space” of the 
VHSNC.  
 
Women managed this risk in several ways. Sometimes, women offered quiet one-
word replies to deflect attention without overtly ignoring the NGO facilitator’s 
request. But often the group of women (including the ASHA) discussed issues 
amongst themselves and then the ASHA presented their opinion. Male VHSNC 
members appeared to accept this micro-violation of gender norms, perhaps because 
men recognized that the NGO facilitator had forced the point, rather than the 
women themselves having exhibited boldness and a desire to be heard, which would 
have been unacceptable. In addition, it was accepted as appropriate and necessary 
that ASHAs occasionally spoke up in front of men because AHSAs held government 
positions as health workers.  
 
ASHAs were seen as uniquely able to perform this role because it was expected of 
them as a part of socially valued (governmental, salaried) work, and thus acceptable. 
Some were credited with having unique traits that further enabled them to speak in 
front of men, such as greater intelligence, wider experience beyond the village or 
origins in difference parts of the state: 
 
Respondent (woman): Uma… she speaks in front of 
everybody. I can’t do it. Everybody here is her elder too, like 
her father-in-law…. But she speaks, even from inside the veil. 
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Interviewer (male): How does she manage speaking then? 
 
R: She is originally from a different area and so she is 
smarter, so she speaks. I cannot do it. 
 
I: Are you afraid? 
 
R: No, not afraid, But we have never spoken in front of them. 
Like right now I am speaking…. If my father-in-law, who is 
asleep now, if he was here, how could I have spoken? In 
meetings, some of my elders are present… So she speaks out, 
I can’t. Even when there are heated arguments she speaks 
out, I feel hesitant to do like this. We are not this open. 
(Shadeeka, female, OBC Hindu, AWW, IDI_VHC_43)  
 
We also witnessed very occasional “slippages” in gender performance (Butler 1988), 
when female VHSNC members who were not ASHAs interjected in meetings. For 
example, in a meeting a female VHSNC member told a story about a woman in labor 
who delivered a dead baby boy while waiting for the ambulance to reach the village 
(Sojjanpur, OBS_VHC_29).  As the possibilities of gender are “necessarily constrained 
by available historical conventions,” (Butler 1988, 521), these instances where 
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female participants failed to re-enact aspects of expected gender behavior pressed 
the boundaries of acceptable performance.  
 
Challenging dominant gender norms within the alternative space of the VHSNC did 
not protect women from experiencing consequences outside the space when they 
returned to everyday life.  Informal social processes, enacted by both men and 
women, police gender performance to maintain the status quo. An NGO facilitator 
(female, general Hindu, IDI_OTHER_05) explained that in one village, women were 
scolded at home for speaking up about their water problem in a meeting. She felt 
that Muslim women were particularly constrained and added that they were no 
longer allowed to participate at all:  
 
The Muslim women were coming for the meetings and at 
times they even went for training… [But] if they put forward 
some viewpoint of their own, at times it so happens that they 
get scolding back home for saying such things… They [family 
members at home] said ‘now no one will want to marry the 
girls in our family. We will have a bad name in the village.’ 
Now the women are not allowed to come for any meetings 
(female, NGO facilitator, IDI_OTHER_05). 
 
Another facilitator (female, OBC Hindu, IDI_OTHER_06) said that women were 
afraid to speak “because they think that after meeting the men can say that you were 
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speaking too much.” In one instance, men openly expressed their discomfort with 
subtle challenges to gender relationships within the VHSNC. When NGO staff made 
an additional effort to encourage women to attend trainings, men laughed at the 
prospect of women taking leadership roles, seeking to reinforce the absurdity of the 
concept: “Women will take the training, will work as officers in the committee, and 
we will be their peons. [All laughing]” (M5, Hanwari, men, FGD_VHC_06). Further 
research should be conducted to assess the extent of this problem, by more 
comprehensively tracking how frequently women faced reprimands or other 
negative consequences as a result of participating in the VHSNC.   
 
While participatory spaces such as the VHSNC are just another arena to perform in, 
they can provide a place for people to “rehearse for reality” through exploring 
alternative social interactions (Kesby 2005b, 2039 in; Welbourn 1998). The 
transformative potential of VHSNCs to serve as “other spaces” where new identities 
are rehearsed is constrained by the limited time in which participants enter the 
space and the participants’ acute awareness that they have to return to their 
everyday power relations as soon as the meetings end.  
 
Gender roles were re-constructed beyond the VHSNC’s physical space, when female 
members asserted community rights at the local school and male members took an 
interest in the anganwadi, indicating that a social identity as “VHSNC member” 
enabled new interactions with government institutions but did not radically 
redefine gender interaction among community members. Nonetheless, the process 
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of social change is primarily a series of micro-transgressions of norms, each of 
which presses the boundaries of acceptable performance and all of which, over time, 
add up to alternative norms. The VHSNC created such opportunities for change as 
female, and occasionally male, VHSNC members re-interpreted their social roles.  
 
 
6.4.3 Mediating power inequalities between the community and outside actors  
 
Power inequality between the community and outside actors manifested most 
starkly in a struggle to construct a “discourse of responsibility” for improving 
health, sanitation, and nutrition in the villages. According to Foucault (1980), power 
works in society through discourse and practice—domination is achieved through 
making ideas and practices that benefit the elite “common sense”, true and self-
reinforcing thus making power and knowledge inseparable. The more normalized a 
discourse becomes, the more effective the power system (Kesby 2005b).  
 
This section first explores how the VHSNC served as a social space that outside elites 
constructed, replete with a dominant discourse that limited possibility in a way that 
benefited the outside actors. We then describe the ways in which community 
members resisted this discourse, manifested in refusals to occupy the VHSNC space. 
Third, we discuss the high social cost of accepting the discourse, which led VHSNC 
members to construct their peers as selfish and their village as fundamentally 
lacking the positive attributes that would enable residents to live up to their 
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responsibility. We suggest that the power inequality between community and 
government actors around the VHSNC limited the VHSNC’s opportunities to 
construct an empowering alternative discourse.  
 
 The dominant discourse  
 
The VHSNC strengthening intervention hinged on the government constructing a 
discourse of local responsibility, which was conveyed to the communities through 
SEEK, the NGO contracted to implement the intervention. The MoHFW guidelines, 
the NGO staff, and the block level system functionaries sought to present the VHSNC 
as a viable participatory body by framing VHSNC members as actors responsible for 
and capable of affecting local change. If community members were not responsible 
for solving local problems, there would be little reason for local people to 
participate.  
 
The MoHFW VHSNC guidelines suggested that the VHSNC focus on household and 
village level health action, recommending that members “gather and clean the 
village” and “organize teams for source reduction work” to stop mosquito breeding.  
It also positioned the VHSNC as capable of acting to improve local health through 
“informing local authorities” so that “health care delivery and public services are 
improved upon” (MoHFW India 2013a, 42). VHSNC members experienced many 
interactions with health staff that reinforced local responsibility. For example, the 
 164 
Block Chief Medical Officer (BCMO) told VHSNC members that they were 
responsible for overseeing the ANM: 
 
BCMO: At the sub center you have the responsibility of asking 
the ANM where she is working, the status of medicines and 
the care given to pregnant women and children. It is also the 
VHSNC members’ responsibility to be aware of the services 
available at your sub center. For the example sub center 
should be open from 9 am to 11 am and in this time period 
sick people can go to the center and gain health services. 
(Observation note, VHSNC cluster meeting, OBS_VHC_24) 
 
SEEK staff suggested the VHSNC could take responsibility for checking the 
functionality of the Manujpur hospital and for having health worker vacancies filled:  
 
SEEK director (female):  Here decentralization has the 
advantage that people or committee members have the 
authority to monitor these local institutions. For example, in 
the Manujpur CHC, the government is providing Rs. 30,000 
[US $550] for cleanliness. But can you see the outcome of that 
money? That CHC is always dirty. Here it would be your 
responsibility to check that the hospital is functioning the 
way it should be.   
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SEEK field manager (male): There are many problems in the 
health sub-centers, such as whether an ANM is appointed or 
not. If an ANM is not appointed, it the responsibility of the 
committee is to write a proposal to the government for ANM 
appointment. (observation note, VHSNC cluster meeting, 
OBS_VHC_31) 
 
Most meetings, led by the NGO facilitators, focused on identifying service gaps and 
writing requests to the authorities to address these gaps. Whenever VHSNC 
members were able to speak to government agents, members made requests for a 
range of village level service improvements, such as for health workers, medicine 
and equipment at health centers, and improved water, drainage, roads, and waste 
management.  Overwhelmingly the government response focused responsibility 
back on the VHSNC by telling members to write additional requests to higher level 
government agents, to follow up with departments, or to solve the problem 
themselves. For example, male VHSNC members said that they have reached out to 
officials about sanitation issues “many times” but that they are always told to fix 
their own problems: “they say that the place belongs to you so why don’t you 
remove it [waste and stagnant water] by yourself?” (Sojjanpur, men, FGD_VHC_12).  
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 Resisting the discourse 
 
Many VHSNC members, particularly male members who stopped participating, 
resisted dominant claims of local responsibility. VHSNC members provided 
numerous examples of upstream problems that VHSNC membership had no capacity 
to solve. They explained that the VHSNC brought no new political power for local 
people to demand change from the government and no new financial capacity for 
local people to fix problems themselves. They rejected the idea that any village 
problem could be solved by village residents taking responsibility, noting that 
improved water access required expensive development beyond the village’s means, 
that stagnant water gathered because of poor drainage infrastructure, and that 
improved waste management required the public works department to clear large 
open air garbage piles.   
 
For instance, in a focus group discussion with men who refused to attend VHSNC 
meetings, the group derided the notion of lending their time and energy to direct 
civic maintenance, asking: “What to do on sanitation? Shall we take brooms 
individually and make the village clean or what?” (Hanwari, male, FGD_VHC_06). In 
a meeting, a VHSNC member explained that they had exhausted the avenues 




Male VHSNC member: Nothing is going to happen. We have 
been waiting for six years in our village, but ANM 
recruitment still has not been done. The CMO [Chief Medical 
Officer] clearly said recruitment will only be done with the 
help of politicians. So whom should we consult with? We 
don’t have money to go to [state capital] or Delhi. 
(Observation note, VHSNC meeting, Shadeeka, OBS_VHC_24) 
 
Another group of male VHSNC members explained that they needed departmental 
support, and pointed out that the administration avoids responsibility by telling 
villagers that the community must take up the work: “the administration gets away 
with inaction by saying that this is your work” (Sojjanpur, male, FGD_VHC_12). The 
men spoke at length about the need for greater government engagement in the 
VHSNC:  
 
M3: The truth is one person cannot do anything. Our 
committee cannot do anything. The village is also with us but 




M3: If the department is with the committee, then there will 
be a solution. But neither PHED [Public Health Engineering 
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Department] is with us, nor the PWD [Public Works 
Department] nor the Health Department is with us. 
(Sojjanpur, men, FGD_VHC_12) 
 
The extent of this resistance among men was significant, going beyond a few 
disillusioned individuals, although never reaching a majority opinion. It remained 
more common for people to accept the discourse of responsibility, but blame their 
peers (discussed next), or to generally say they were reluctant to participate 
because the VHSNC’s discussions had not resulted in any changes, without 
identifying precisely why. Some respondents also presented several of these 
perspectives over the course of one interview.  
 
 Accepting the discourse had high social costs for the community    
 
Many VHSNC members felt that the discourse of local responsibility resonated with 
their worldview. As such, they placed enormous blame on their community for the 
fact that local problems had not been solved by the VHSNC. Many agreed that if only 
the village had sufficient “social feeling” and initiative (male, ST Hindu, Hanwari, 
IDI_VHC_54), then a great amount could be achieved through the VHSNC.  
 
The fact that the VHSNC were perceived to have achieved very little was thus 
blamed on the “stinginess” (Jhorkibas, male, Muslim, IDI_VHC_50) of people in the 
village, who were only willing to work if there was money involved and dropped out 
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of the VHSNC when they “realized that they will not get anything” (Jhorkibas, ASHA, 
IDI_VHC_29). A male VHSNC member blamed the community’s “lack of initiative” for 
the fact that the untied fund was never released for their use, although the VHSNC 
wrote numerous requests and asked a number of government agents about the 
money:  
 
In the meeting we were informed about the fund, but the 
members do not take initiative or responsibility to know 
whether the money has been transferred or not, and how to 
use the same. (Sojjanpur, male, SC, IDI_COM_06) 
 
Accepting the dominant discourse of local responsibility was reconciled with 
disappointing progress by reproducing a negative local identity. In other words, 
those who accepted local responsibility for improving village health, sanitation, and 
nutrition had to find ways to explain why so few improvements occurred. They did 
so by blaming their peers for lacking the positive attributes necessary to fulfill this 
responsibility. Respondents blamed their peers for being “backwards” and not 
caring about social progress: “[people] do not pay much attention towards all these 
things” because “this is a village, this is not some city. People speak like this only in 
the village” (female, SC, Hindu, Sojjanpur, IDI_VHC_25). One VHSNC member 
maintained that the committee had achieved “nothing,” because “the villagers, they 
want to remain backwards, so they stay backwards. However much you bring them 
forward, they don’t progress much” (Shadeeka, female, IDI_VHC_25). A man said 
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that overall the village had “no unity” (male VHC member, Muslim, Jhorkibas, 
IDI_COM_06). In a focus group, a woman claimed that “everyone is selfish here in 
this village” to the wide agreement of the others, despite examples of families 
working together to help people reach the hospital or access water (Shadeeka, 
women, FGD_VHC_05). A male member blamed “illiterate” women who “cannot 
understand things” for throwing their garbage in public spaces of the village, despite 
later noting that there was no alternative waste management system in place 
(Sojjanpur, male, SC Hindu, IDI_VHC_45). Overall, he felt that the “progressive” and 
“literate” people in the village, most of whom participated in the VHSNC, were up 
against a majority of “illiterate boors”, who impeded efforts for bettering the village 
(Sojjanpur, male, SC Hindu, IDI_VHC_45).  
 
Accepting the dominant discourse of local responsibility thus had a high social cost. 
If the VHSNC was truly responsible for improving the village, the only way to explain 
poor outcomes was to blame one’s community for failing to take up this 
responsibility and improve the village. This perceived failure then reinforced a 
sense that nothing could improve because of the community’s collective failings.  
 
This research joins the work of Marsland (2006) in exploring how power 
inequalities between elites and community members can result in divergent (and 
contradictory) understandings of community participation, with negative effects on 
marginalized communities. Marsland found that Tanzanian participants on 
community malaria control boards also became increasingly disparaging of their 
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peers. She noted that these negative opinions of one’s peers arose as malaria board 
members adopted the language of elites, who explained the poor health of 
marginalized people on their incapacity to solve their own problems.  
 
Cornwall (2002) distinguishes between invited and claimed spaces for participation. 
VHSNCs are invited spaces, created and defined by dominant actors (the state, 
through a contracted NGO) into which community members are invited to enter and 
participate. Spaces for participation developed by elite actors tend to generate 
agreement around pre-determined agendas and further a dominant discourse 
(Mosse 2001). Our findings substantiate Mosse’s concern, illustrating how the 
dominant discourse of local responsibility was accepted as “truth” by many, which 
reinforced negative community identity. However, the transformative potential of 
these social spaces also stems in part from Foucault’s theory of power as a disparate 
and creative force, abounding with resistance (Foucault 1980). As such, the 
justification for the VHSNC was contested by others, who proposed an alternative 
discourse of upstream responsibility. This resonates with Mosse’s findings, which 
highlight community agency in resisting or subverting the agendas of participatory 
development programs (Mosse 2005).  
 
In resisting the dominant discourse, many men refused to take collective 
responsibility for village health, sanitation, and nutrition issues and many explained 
that they would no longer attend VHSNC meetings. They presented extensive 
evidence of the need for upstream government agents to intervene. Accordingly, this 
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resistance, no matter how compelling and justified, removed any agency from the 
community and ultimately left the status quo unaltered.  Some VHSNCs did take 
local actions to support or monitor the anganwadi worker and schools, and to affect 
change, or to coordinate political efforts to push for improved services. There is a 
need for renegotiating the discourse around VHSNCs to create space for 
communities’ legitimate anger at poor services and desperate need for improved 
upstream support, without closing the possibility for smaller scale local action 
within the community.   
 
Whether rejecting or accepting the “truth” that local people can improve their 
health, sanitation, and nutrition through the VHSNC, most people planned to stop 
participating. The lasting effects of entrenched negative views of one’s community 
should not be taken lightly. Nor should the frustration expressed by respondents 
who explained that the VHSNC unfairly expected them to take responsibility for 




6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper asked “What social costs and opportunities arose through participation?” 
We explored this question by examining health committees as “social spaces” where 
power inequalities (both within communities and between communities and 
outsiders) may be reinforced or renegotiated.  
 
In terms of power inequalities within communities, we identified a number of 
opportunities that enabled subtle challenges to pre-existing restrictive gender 
norms. First, requiring a mixed-gender group and expecting them to communicate 
about valued services (health, nutrition, and sanitation) was a radical act in a 
community without any other forums for cross-gender collective dialogue and 
decision making, even if most women did not verbally participate.  
 
Second, some women used their identity as VHSNC members to push the boundaries 
of the acceptable feminine concerns and behaviors: as VHSNC conveners, ASHAs 
took up leadership positions, and several female VHSNC members worked together 
to improve girls’ access to education by speaking to male teachers and headmasters. 
The VHSNC also made it possible for male members to enter the traditionally female 
space of the anganwadi center and take interest in the quality of food and care 
provided there.   
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Third, when some women exercised voice in the VHSNC, it contributed to 
normalizing the idea of women speaking in the presence of male community 
members.  
 
It must be noted however that although the VHSNC opened up some new 
possibilities and enabled some women to express their own and collective female 
voices, for most women speaking openly in front of men continued to be 
unacceptable. Many female participants remained silent, cognizant of the everyday 
reality awaiting them outside the VHSNC, and spoke only with their physical 
presence. Women who pushed the boundaries of acceptable behavior—at times 
invited and cajoled into doing so by NGO facilitators—could not be protected from 
conflict upon returning home, where dominant interests were invested in sustaining 
the status quo.  
 
In terms of power inequalities between communities and outside stakeholders, the 
discourse of local responsibility played out in VHSNCs as both an instrument of 
power used by outside stakeholders and as a point of resistance. Participants who 
accepted the discourse of local responsibility reconciled it with the lack of local 
action by suggesting that their peers were selfish and unwilling to take collective 
action. The VHSNC thus enacted a high social cost by re-entrenching disempowering 
collective identities. However, many in the community resisted the dominant 
discourse and sought to construct a counter-narrative that placed responsibility in 
the hands of upstream government functionaries.  
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There are two central implications of these findings. First, participatory programs 
such as the VHSNC can create some opportunities to challenge power inequalities 
within communities, even in contexts with rigid gender norms such as Manujpur. 
Facilitation by the outside NGO staff emerged as essential to constructing VHSNCs as 
“alternative social spaces” (Kesby et al. 2005) where unfamiliar rules and 
alternative possibilities can be ascribed. This finding is a valuable affirmation of the 
transformative potential of this type of participatory program, in light of concern 
that participatory programs are highly prone to elite capture and the exclusion of 
more marginalized people within villages. However, we must be cautious not to 
overstate the potential of these micro-disruptions to within-community power 
relations. Women and lower caste people continue to face major macro-level 
barriers (including poorer access to education and enormous financial constraints) 
to full participation and self-determination in the decisions that affect their lives.   
 
Second, greater attention must be paid to the fundamental link between 
participation in VHSNC activities and genuine empowerment through gaining 
control over the resources needed for increased opportunities. Campbell (2014) 
highlights that decades of community mobilization work have focused on 
empowerment to overcome symbolic aspects of oppression (such as negative self 
narratives, lack of collective spirit in communities) without adequate attention to 
the materialist roots of oppression (i.e. economic inequality). Just participating in 
meetings and discussions of health, sanitation, and nutrition issues is of little value 
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without the tools to address these issues. Moreover, it is unsustainable.  
Participatory social spaces such as VHSNCs can only have transformative potential if 
they are occupied by community members and thus continue to exist—and 
community members will only occupy these spaces if they are a means to gain 
resources and reduce power inequalities between themselves and outside elites. As 
we saw, people resist dominant discourses that fail to resonate with their 
worldviews by avoiding the spaces where those discourses prevail. The men and 
women whose participation in the VHSNC created spaces to challenge within-village 
power inequalities were unlikely to continue participating in the committee unless 
it brought concrete improvements. 
 
Interventions to strengthen VHSNCs must support social transformation not just 
inside the VHSNC but also beyond the VHSNC in other village level institutions, and 
between communities and elites. The VHSNC can serve as a space in which 
participants can “rehearse for reality” (Welbourn 1998) by practicing alternative 
gender and caste relationships, and strategize about how they can build their 
influence beyond the village (such as how to petition government officials). But 
additional resources and support are required to then enact these alternative norms 
in reality.  
 
Power cannot be avoided but is always at play in social relations and thus must be 
thoughtfully utilized to promote social justice (Kesby 2005b). Examining how power 
inequalities work through participatory spaces can thus enable the creation of 
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participatory programs that better engage with the problem of power inequalities. 
Great potential to extend the VHSNC’s transformative potential lies in strengthening 
the committee’s economic and political power while at the same time sustaining the 
gender and caste co-occupation of space and continuing to build women’s voice on 
the VHSNC. VHSNC policy thus needs to clarify and strengthen the linkages between 
VHSNCs and outside actors, such as the panchayat and government officials, and 
ensure VHSNCs can access funding. As VHSNCs gain greater power, the stakes 
associated with VHSNC participation may rise. More powerful members may try to 
edge women and lower caste people out and the social risks associated with 
violating gender and caste norms will rise. Ongoing support through skilled 
facilitation will be vital to sustain gains and mitigate risks.  
 
Acknowledgements: Sincere thanks to Catherine Campbell for scholarly guidance 
on an early draft of this paper, and to Steven Harvey and Asha George for insightful 
comments.
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CHAPTER 7. GOVERNMENT HELPER AND CITIZEN ADVOCATE? A CASE 
STUDY OF THE MULTIPLE ROLES AND PRESSURES FACING A NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTING A PARTICIPATORY 






Many theorists express concern that the proliferation and professionalization of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) contributes to a de-politicization of 
development, particularly when NGOs take up donor-driven projects or government 
contracts. However, NGOs have the potential to play a valuable role in strengthening 
citizen engagement in the public sector because of their community orientation. 
NGO experiences have not been adequately explored, especially their agency in 
managing their multiple roles as government helpers and community advocates.  
 
Methods 
This paper presents a case study of an NGO implementing a government-designed 
health systems intervention at the local level. We draw from observation (n=54), 
interviews (n=76), focus group discussions (n=18), and secondary review of written 
project materials. Analysis was conducted using the thematic network technique, 
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which enabled the identification of themes, development of connections between 
these themes, and detailed exploration of sub-themes. 
 
Findings 
The NGO was able to work within a challenging context of community mistrust and 
poor government responsiveness to successfully form and support VHSNCs over a 
1.5-year period. Its “in between” status as government helper and community 
advocate enabled a range of positive processes, including helping communities voice 
concerns to government officials, and helping facilitate understanding between 
communities and local level government functionaries. Many of these positive 
processes were made possible by the NGO’s respected interlocutor status in 
communities, pre-existing relationships, and willingness to “sell” involvement in the 
VHSNC as a mechanism for improving village-level health and wellbeing.  However, 
despite enabling many positive processes, concrete improvements in the villages 
were often far below community expectations. NGO staff thus endured community 
frustration on one hand and rebuffs from lower-level officials on the other, while 
feeling under-resourced and under-supported by the contract. When contracted to 
deliver a package of VHSNC supports focused on strengthening the community, the 





Contrary to assumptions in the literature that NGOs become “tamed” through taking 
government contracts, this case study indicates that when contracted to support 
community engagement in the public health system, NGOs take up a necessarily 
political process.  
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What challenges and opportunities arise when non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are contracted by governments to deliver community-participation 
interventions in low and middle income country (LMICs)?  This paper focuses at the 
micro-level on how one Indian NGO team managed the tension between working as 
a government contractor and retaining its community orientation. We position our 
case study within the broader debate about the role NGOs play in society, which 
questions whether providing services through government contracts disallows 




The term NGO encompasses an enormous range of organizations, from large 
international development institutions, which are generally based in high income 
countries and channel resources to LMICs, to small community-based organizations 
working at the grassroots (Nichter 2008).  The value of NGOs in development has 
been attributed to two capacities: an ability to fill gaps in delivering social services 
to communities (“service delivery functions”) and an ability to challenge unequal 
relationships through people-centered approaches (“civil society functions”) 
(Banks, Hulme, and Edwards 2015).  
 
Over the past forty years, Western governments and funding agencies, led by the 
World Bank, have encouraged LMIC governments to shift social service provision 
away from the public sector and towards NGOs (Pfeiffer 2003; Banks, Hulme, and 
Edwards 2015). This shift was rooted in neo-liberal arguments that the public 
sector was inefficient and ineffective, while NGOs could provide better services at 
lower prices (Baqui 2008; Zaidi, Gul, and Nishtar 2012; World Bank 2000b; Gilson et 
al. 1994; Fowler 1988). NGOs were driven to accept these contracts for many 
reasons, including a mandate to alleviate suffering, an interest in accessing 
government funding, disillusionment with public management, and a desire to 
showcase high quality programs as a model to press the government to do more. 
However, taking up government contracts caused concern within many community-
based NGOs, about losing their “watchdog” orientation, drifting away from their 
people-centered attributes or being stifled by the rigid reporting structure imposed 
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by government ministries (Zaidi et al. 2012; Kapoor 2005; Shepard 2006; Zaidi, Gul, 
and Nishtar 2012).  
 
Critical scholarship on NGOs in LMICs has highlighted their movement away from 
civil society functions towards an increasing service delivery role through their 
proliferation and simultaneous professionalization and de-politicization (Kamat 
2004; Kamat 2003; Ayers 2006; Miraftab 1997; Srinivas 2009). NGOs that arose 
from social movements and were once primarily volunteer-driven and politically 
engaged in addressing social inequalities, became increasingly “tamed” (Kaldor 
2003): staffed by inter-changeable professionals (O’Reilly 2011), oriented toward 
record keeping and audits (Strathern 2000), dependent on donors, and engaged in 
delivering technical services (Kamat 2004; Kamat 2003; O’Reilly 2011). For 
example, Miraftab’s research on Mexican NGOs (1997, 373) found that the: 
 
…Recent history of Mexican NGOs marks a major shift in their 
identity and objectives from de-professionlizing to 
professionlizing themselves, from working with the poor to 
working for the poor, from emphasis on opposition to search 
for proposition, and from empowerment to development. 
 
Kamat (2002) tracked an NGO in western India as it shifted from consciousness 
raising and political organizing work to an emphasis on skills training for economic 
livelihood projects. An Indian NGO contracted by the Government of Rajasthan saw 
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its staff composition shift from higher-caste, skilled workers who had a deep 
commitment to social services to lower-caste, less educated workers who saw NGO 
work as a regular job; this shift was caused in part by senior staff choosing to leave 
because the new contract reduced their flexibility and time to build community 
relationships in favor of implementing an externally designed program on a strict 
timeline (O’Reilly 2011).  In Pakistan, Zaidi et al. (2012, 577) documented NGOs 
competing fiercely for government contracts to provide HIV services, which shifted 
NGO focus from “areas such as client empowerment and behavioural change that 
demanded their innovative and client-centred skills … to areas with quantifiable 
clinical targets.” 
 
While most scholarship focuses on concern that NGOs often become apolitical 
replacements for earlier, struggle-based social movements, some theorists argue 
that NGOs continue to play valued and powerful roles in development. For example, 
Oxfam’s Duncan Green highlights the acute awareness of these risks among NGO 
staff, and argues that NGOs exhibit agency in managing these risks and retaining 
their civil society attributes (Green 2012). Some suggest that NGOs can play a 
politically charged, rather than incrementalist, role even when working as service 
providers by developing a “politics of the possible” through showcasing improved 
alternatives to the status quo (Nichter 2008). For example, by providing expensive 
HIV/AIDS treatment in extremely poor settings, Medicine Sans Frontiers in South 
Africa and Partners in Health in Haiti showed that adherence was possible, which 
built global pressure to find the money to provide this treatment (Beyrer and Pizer 
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2007). Srinivas (2009, 623) highlights that social change requires a plurality of civil 
society formulations, with NGOs offering one valuable space for “rehearsing 
differing answers to questions of the public good.” NGOs have a unique capacity to 
develop social capital within society, especially around bridging various groups into 
larger collectives and linking social groups across power differentials (Nichter 
2008). For example, when NGOs work together as networks, they can exercise 
considerable power in influencing policy debates, as showcased by the 
unprecedented involvement of NGO networks in UN consultations on human rights, 
women’s rights, and the environment throughout the 1990s (Shepard 2006). When 
NGOs work on issues alongside other civil society collectives, particularly volunteer-
driven movements and trade unions, they can play a critical role in promoting social 
justice (Waghmore 2012; Racelis 2008).  
 
In light of this debate, we examine how field workers in northern India experience 
working on a government contract to promote community participation in the 
health system: What does their NGO-identity enable? What are the trade offs and 
costs? And, more broadly, how do they manage the tension between advocating for 






This paper draws from data collected as part of a larger study in two states of India, 
which focused on mechanisms through which Village Health, Sanitation and 
Nutrition Committees (VHSNCs) could increase community engagement in public 
systems, and facilitate improved access to and quality of government health 
services. This paper presents one NGO’s experience over a 1.5-year period, during 
which it implemented a government-designed VHSNC support package in rural 
north India.   
 
7.3.1 Study setting 
 
National setting: The Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) 
explicitly promotes the involvement of grassroots NGOs in the public health system 
(MoHFW India 2013c). Five percent of the MoHFW’s National Health Mission budget 
is earmarked for NGO contracts, which translated to Rs. 1055 crore (US $157.7 
million) in 2013-2014 (MoHFW India 2013c). The scope of NGO involvement is 
envisioned “to move beyond reproductive and child health to a more comprehensive 
approach which would include community level interventions” (MoHFW India 
2014b, 7). The MoHFW divides NGOs into two groups: “service delivery NGOs,” 
which deliver health services to underserved areas (such as running hospitals or 
HIV testing and treatment programs), and “field NGOs,” which support community 
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processes, including VHSNCs and associated health monitoring and planning 
(MoHFW India 2014b).  
 
Village Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Committees: VHSNCs are a key 
component of the MoHFW’s strategy to engage rural communities in the 
government health system (MoHFW India 2005b). Launched in 2007, VHSNCs have 
been officially formed in over 500,000 villages across India (MoHFW India 2013a). 
These committees are supposed to meet each month, develop village health plans, 
take action to improve local health, nutrition, and sanitation, monitor the 
performance of local-level health and nutrition services, and allocate a yearly 
“untied fund” of Rs. 10,000 (US $150). Membership brings together the village’s 
female community health worker, called the accredited social health activist (ASHA), 
the anganwadi worker (a female pre-school and nutrition worker), elected ward 
representative in local government (called the panchayat system), and other 
interested community members, such as members of savings collectives and parent-
teacher associations.  
 
VHSNCs are to work closely with health system staff. These staff include auxiliary 
nurse midwives (ANMs), who provide immunization and antenatal care out of 
health sub-centers (HSCs) catering to approximately four or five villages. VHSNCs 
are also supposed to work with the local doctors (called medical officers (MOs)) 
who run primary health centers (PHCs), which are to be around-the-clock referral 
centers for a cluster of four HSCs, and block chief medical officers (BCMOs). BCMOs 
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are in charge of an entire block’s (a sub-district administrative area, population 
~300,000) network of HSCs, PHCs and community health center (CHC), a large 
facility which is to have 11 doctors and 24 additional health staff.   
 
In 2013 the MoHFW released Guidelines for Community Processes, to provide 
additional support for VHSNCs. The Guidelines recognized that so far, “the outcome 
for VHSNC is less satisfactory” than for the ASHA program (MoHFW India 2013a, i). 
In many parts of the country, VHSNCs were meeting irregularly, if at all, were largely 
inactive, lacked training, and had little understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities (Dixit et al. 2008; Malviya et al. 2013; PHRN 2008). Before scaling 
up the Guidelines, the MoHFW worked with our research team and an implementing 
NGO, called “SEEK” (a pseudonym), to implement the intervention in a small area in 
order to derive lessons for scale up.  
 
The VHSNC-support intervention: SEEK implemented the MoHFW’s VHSNC 
support package, as outlined in the Guidelines for Community Processes, for a one-
and-a-half-year period (2014-2015) in 50 villages, covering a rural population of 
approximately 68,000 people. The support package consisted of social mobilization 
in each village to increase community understanding of and support for VHSNCs, 
expanding VHSNC membership from seven to at least 15 members, training the 
VHSNC members, and supporting their monthly meetings and activities. After 
getting the committees up and running, quarterly cluster level meetings were also 
convened, which brought together two or three members from each VHSNC in a 
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cluster of 16-17 VHSNCs to encourage sharing and action among VHSNC members 
from a group of villages. Further details about the package and the context are 
presented in a companion paper (chapter 5). 
 
Profile of the NGO: SEEK was founded in the early 2000s by a now-deceased 
eminent Indian civil servant. SEEK had a central office in the state capital and 
several field offices in highly marginalized blocks across the state. Their work 
focused on adolescent education through providing educational programs to 
supplement the public system, such as running village libraries and summer schools.  
They received funding from private trusts and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives. SEEK’s work on this VHSNC-strengthening intervention was their first 
government contract and first project working with the government health system.  
 
Of the 50 villages receiving the VHSNC-strengthening intervention, SEEK Manujpur 
had previously run education and adolescent development projects in 31 villages. 
The depth of SEEK’s involvement in these villages was moderate: SEEK ran small 
libraries or short adolescent capacity building camps rather than any large 
programs or infrastructure projects. Only some village residents knew of SEEK and 
the VHSNC-support intervention was run by new SEEK field staff, hired specifically 
for the VHSNC intervention.  
 
The study worked with the SEEK field office in a block called “Manujpur” (a 
pseudonym), which had been set up in 2008 and was staffed by a director, senior 
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manager, six field staff, an accountant, and an office support worker. The SEEK 
Manujpur office was a simple five-room cement house located at the edge of 
Manujpur town (population 11,000). The office had overhead fans to help with the 
heat that could reach 49 degrees Celsius, and also a computer, Internet connection, 
TV, basic kitchen, electric water filter, several indoor toilets, a desk and chair for the 
director, mats on the floor for meetings, and four NGO-owned motorcycles parked 
outside.  The walls were covered with shelves of youth education materials, project 
documentation, and village profiles as well as maps, a white board, and inspirational 
posters on the importance of women’s access to education. Electricity cuts were 
frequent.  
 
Profile of NGO’s VHSNC intervention staff: The VHSNC-support project was 
implemented by the director, manager, and three field staff. The director, a general 
caste (non-marginalized) Hindu woman in her 40s, had moved to Manujpur from 
another district in 2014. With post-graduate degrees in library science, law, and 
public administration, she had worked as a block level administrator within the 
government, and on water and education projects with several NGOs. The manager 
was a local general caste Hindu man in his late 40s, with over 15 years of social 
work experience in the block, focused on the right to education. The field staff were 
all in their early 30s. One was a Muslim man from a nearby village with a post-
graduate degree in social work and extensive volunteer experience in youth 
education. The other two were Hindu women (“other backwards caste” (OBC) and 
general caste) who had married into local families and resided with their in-laws. 
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Neither had education beyond class 11 (11th grade) and both had worked for several 
years on education and literacy projects in the area.  
 
The field staff, although locals living in Manujpur, did not have the time to build 
extensive rapport in villages before beginning social mobilization on VHSNCs 
because SEEK was expected to form, train, and facilitate regular VHSNC meetings 
within a year (SEEK’s contract was later extended to 1.5 years). SEEK field staff 
conducted one preliminary visit to each of the 50 village to build a social profile of 
the population and services available. The second visit consisted of social 
mobilization, which involved gathering residents together, explaining the VHSNC, 
and inviting people to become members. The SEEK manager, who was well known 
in some parts of the block, attended many social mobilization activities with the new 
staff to help them.    
 
Social overview of the region: According to the 2011 Indian census, there were 
about 200 villages in Manujpur Block, with an average population of 1300 per 
village. The population was approximately 17% scheduled caste (SC) and 12% 
scheduled tribe (ST). While male literacy was reported at 80%, female literacy was 
only 50% and had not improved since the 2001 census. Based on its own data 
collection, SEEK estimated the Muslim population at over 20%, with literacy among 
Muslim women as low as 13%. Most residents were poor farmers who raised buffalo 
and grew mustard, wheat, and sorghum on small plots of land or worked as migrant 
laborers in farming, construction, or driving. 
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The region was extremely poor and resource-deprived. Roads were potholed and 
nearly impassible during monsoons; schools, anganwadi centers, and health 
facilities were crumbling; toilets were rare; and water and electricity were limited. 
The public health system was extremely understaffed.  According to government 
norms, one ANM should serve approximately five villages, but in this region, ANMs 
covered 15 villages or more –  triple or quadruple the maximum number of villages 
they were expected to reasonably handle.  Several PHCs had no staff or operated 
with one or two staff members when there should have been at least 13. 
 
 
7.3.2 Study design 
 
Throughout SEEK’s implementation of the VHSNC support package, a team of 
researchers led by the Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI), with support from 
the National Health Systems Resource Center (NHSRC) (a government organization 
that provides technical advise to the Indian MoHFW) and the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, conducted an in-depth implementation research 
study.  The over-arching aim of the study was to understand the contexts, pathways, 
and mechanisms that impeded or facilitated intensified community engagement by 
VHSNCs as these committees received the intervention to strengthen their 
functionality. This research included ongoing engagement with SEEK’s staff over the 
 192 
course of the intervention to understand their experiences delivering this VHSNC 
support package.  
 
7.3.3 Data collection 
 
This paper draws from in-depth interviews (IDIs) with SEEK’s staff, VHSNC 
members, non-VHSNC community members, and health system actors; focus group 
discussions (FGDs) with community members; ongoing observation and informal 
discussion with NGO staff; as well as secondary review of written project materials 
(table 15).  
 
We conducted more interviews with women (n=41) than men (n=33) because most 
village-level health and nutrition system actors with a stake in the VHSNC (ASHAs, 
anganwadi workers, and ANMs) were female. We also had more focus group 
discussions with women (n=11) than men (n=7) because male perspectives 
dominated during all public observations, including at VHSNC meetings.  
 
While the majority of the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were in 
our four case study villages, some respondents worked across multiple villages (the 
NGO staff, ANMs, ASHA supervisors, and BCMO). Observations of social mobilization 
and VHSNC activities were in the four case study villages but observation of NGO 
activities, VHSNC trainings, and cluster level meetings took place in Manujpur or 
other villages and included VHSNC members from across the 50 villages. 
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Most of the primary data collection was conducted by co-author GP, a 25-year-old 
male Hindi-speaking researcher who lived in Manujpur during the study. He has a 
master’s degree in public health and was supported closely by the study’s research 
associate (SM) and research coordinator (KES), as well as the broader study team of 
senior researchers at the NHSRC, PHFI, and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health. The interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in Hindi 
and translated and transcribed into English.  
Table 15. Data collected and analyzed for this study 
Data type Data details  
  # of interviews 
  Male Female Total 
74 in-depth 
interviews 
 NGO staff  3 3 6 
 VHSNC members from general community  21 11 32 
  Health and nutrition system actors (ASHAs, 
AWWs, ANMs, ASHA supervisors, BCMO)  
2 24 26 
  Non-VHSNC community members 4 1 5 
  Ward members (who are VHSNC members)  3 2 5 
 Total 33 41 74 




 VHSNC members 4 8 12 
 Non-VHSNC community members 3 3 6 
 Total 7 11 18 
     
1.5 years 
observation  
 NGO facilitator selection and training 
 NGO planning and debrief meetings 
 Social mobilization 
 VHSNC expansion 
 VHCNC member trainings 
 VHSNC meetings 
 Cluster level VHSNC meetings 
   
     
Document 
review 
 NGO’s monthly progress reports & final report 
 Educational materials used by NGO 
 VHSNC meeting minutes 
 Government-issued guidelines 
 Letters from VHSNCs to government  
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7.3.4 Data analysis 
 
The themes presented in this paper, on the role and experiences of an NGO 
implementing a government designed participatory intervention, are a subset of all 
the themes examined in a broader research study. The broader study was not 
specifically focused on NGO experiences, but instead explored VHSNCs as a social 
institution, and engaged community and health system actor perspectives on a wide 
range of processes (such as community embeddedness and inclusiveness).  
 
Our analysis was guided by thematic network analysis (Attride-Stirling 2001), 
whereby a coding framework was developed, guided by our a priori theoretical 
interest in mechanisms that facilitate community participation through VHSNCs and 
ameliorated by codes that emerged from the data itself, including the challenges 
faced by the NGO facilitators. This coding framework was then applied to the text to 
enable us to group text segments into topics. We then read and re-read the data 
outputs as they were presented for each code and extracted the salient, common, 
and significant organizing themes. The organizing themes relevant to the NGO’s 
experience implementing this intervention are presented as the sub sections in the 
findings section. We used the qualitative software ATLAS.ti for coding the text and 





We first briefly explain the context and ongoing challenges that SEEK staff navigated 
in order to implement this intervention, as well as the overall successes. We then 
highlight the key social processes enabled by the NGO’s “in-between” status that 
facilitated community participation in the health system. In the third section we 
present the NGO’s capacities and strategies that made these social processes 
possible. The final section explores the challenges and costs that the NGO bore as a 
result of implementing this intervention.  
 
7.4.1 Project context and challenges  
 
The NGO succeeded in reconstituting and training VHSNCs across 50 villages, and 
was able to facilitate monthly meetings in most villages throughout the intervention 
period. Nonetheless it encountered significant community hesitancy, which was 
reinforced by non-responsiveness by government providers and officials.  
 
Community responses to the intervention, and to the SEEK staff who sought to 
implement it, were colored by a widespread sense that the government was 
inaccessible, unfair, and uncaring. While some communities responded positively to 
the idea of forming a village health committee and were welcoming to SEEK staff, in 
other cases people recounted past government failures and sounded weary of being 
asked to invest energy and hope in a new initiative after previous disappointments. 
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In several instances, efforts to mobilize communities to participate in the VHSNC 
were met with resistance and skepticism, at times bordering on hostility. An NGO 
facilitator described a community’s unwillingness to support the initiative: 
 
There was restlessness among the people. They were not 
willing to sit patiently and listen to me… They were 
complaining that even after they have raised their concern, 
no one listens to them. They said that you or this committee 
cannot be of any use to us. (male, NGO facilitator, Muslim, 
IDI_NGO_01) 
 
In another village, people angrily told him that “nothing ever happens” and said: 
“Even you will not turn up after this meeting” (male, NGO facilitator, Muslim, 
IDI_NGO_01).  
 
SEEK adhered to MoHFW-issued VHSNC guidelines and used MoHFW designed 
handbooks and training manuals, which promoted VHSNCs as bodies that could 
monitor local health, nutrition, and sanitation services and coordinate local level 
action across public sectors. However, the VHSNC’s mandate came from the MoHFW 
without official support from any other ministries or departments. An NGO 
facilitator explained their struggle to reconcile this theorized ideal of intersectoral 
collaboration with reality: 
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It is like the government is running away from us and we 
want to work closely with the government… For VHSNCs 
there are six services at the village level, like anganwadi, 
ANM, mid-day meal [in schools], etc., that should reach 
people.  Our aim is to make people aware and demand… The 
twist is that people have to seek these services from six 
separate departments, like health, education, water, whereas 
the project is only with the health department. (male, NGO 
manager, 50 years, IDI_NGO_02) 
 
Several key determinants of VHSNC success lay beyond the control of the NGO. The 
untied fund of Rs. 10,000 (US $150) for each VHSNC failed to materialize over the 
course of the intervention. Despite repeated inquires, VHSNCs and SEEK staff could 
not determine why the money was being withheld and which level of government 
was holding the money.  SEEK staff also tried, unsuccessfully, to secure formal 
government orders supporting anganwadi collaboration with VHSNCs. SEEK staff 
asked officials in the health department to speak to the Department of Women and 
Child Development, which oversees the anganwadi system, but despite several 




Over the course of the intervention, officials in the panchayat, health, education, and 
many other departments frequently failed to reply to VHSNC requests or they 
promised improvements that never materialized.  
 
 
7.4.2 Positive productive capacity of the NGO’s ‘in-between’ status  
 
Despite the difficulties discussed above, a number of positive processes were made 
possible by the NGO’s  “in-between” status as government agent and community 
advocate.  
 
 Enabling community voice 
 
SEEK staff were able to facilitate community access to government actors in ways 
that had previously not been possible. For instance, before the NGO became 
involved, few people in the village had ever spoken directly to a medical officer. The 
NGO staff found out the block chief medical officer’s mobile phone number and got 
VHSNC members to phone him to invite him to meetings or follow up on requests. 
Through the NGO, community members learned about what services they should 
have been receiving in the village, as well as which department was responsible. 
One facilitator even encouraged VHSNC members to take the issue of water 
shortages to their state-level member of parliament. The NGO staff not only directed 
VHSNC members towards appropriate departments, but also facilitated the 
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communication through writing formal requests on the VHSNC’s behalf, coaching 
VHSNC members on how to speak to government agents, and accompanying VHSNC 
members to deliver requests. An NGO facilitator described his efforts to encourage 
VHSNC members to speak to government officials, although he noted that 
community members still hesitated: 
 
We have told them whenever you approach someone with 
your problem, firstly you should introduce yourself stating 
which committee you belong to and then you should tell your 
problem. As per my observation, even after telling these 
things they are not able to do these things properly and feel 
hesitant to talk... (male, NGO facilitator, IDI_NGO_04) 
 
VHSNC members noted that NGO facilitators played a valuable role in accompanying 
community members to meet with block level government health staff.   
 
Once I went with [NGO facilitator, male] to our MO [medical 
officer]… We went to him regarding our request to provide 
training for the ASHA. We also went for our Rs. 10,000 untied 
fund… So the MO asked why we did not come earlier, [if you 
had] your work would be done. So one day we went directly 
to [the city] hospital with the letter. So [NGO facilitator, male] 
helps us a lot.  (Shadeeka, male, IDI_VHC_37) 
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While the VHSNC members valued having NGO facilitators present during meetings 
with health system officials, many of the requests, including the request for the 
untied fund, did not result in changes, at least during the research period.  
 
NGO staff also led the process of helping VHSNCs write request letters to the 
government.  Although the focus of SEEK’s contract was to form, train, and support 
VHSNCs, within a few months of VHSNC activity SEEK staff began orienting many 
VHSNC meetings around writing request letters to government departments asking 
for service improvements. SEEK made and distributed official looking letter pads to 
each VHSNC and taught members how to compose request letters and where to 
submit them. In meetings, almost every issue discussed concluded with the act of 
writing a request to the government to address a village level problem. For example, 
in one cluster meeting (OBS_VHC_35) we documented seven issues in which the 
NGO staff became involved in trying to solve through writing letters: requesting 
various government officials to release the untied fund, restock ASHA drug kits, fill 
vacant ANM positions, build an anganwadi center in a village that did not have one, 
train the untrained ASHAs, and ensure that a postman delivered pension cheques to 
the elderly.  
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 Facilitate understanding between health system and community 
 
The NGO used its “in-between” status to help the community understand some of 
the challenges facing health workers, as a mechanism to move beyond anger at 
individual government workers towards action at an administrative level. For 
instance, NGO staff explained to VHSNC members in a village with an empty health 
center that the doctor who should serve them had not abandoned his post but had 
instead had been shifted to the CHC.  
 
The NGO coordinated cluster level meetings, in which representatives from 16 to 17 
VHSNCs would come together to discuss their challenges and develop strategies. 
When the NGO was able to convince higher level health system actors to attend, the 
interactions between government and community opened up new possibilities for 
communication and accountability because of the meeting locations and the NGO’s 
mediation. Where VHSNC members could only access the medical officers in their 
governmental or clinical spaces, the NGO brought these health functionaries to more 
neutral or community oriented spaces: the NGO’s office and community centers. In 
these spaces, the interactions took place on the NGO’s terms. The NGO director 
exhibited careful diplomacy in treating health system actors as respected guests, but 
was also able to engage them in exercises of public accountability. Health system 
staff were expected to answer community questions, for example about why VHSNC 
funding had not yet been released, why ASHAs had not been trained or equipped 
with drug kits, and whether vacant positions for ANMs and doctors would be filled. 
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While their answers were sometimes vague and rarely led to immediate tangible 
improvements, this dialogue between community members and government 
officials was nonetheless a first step towards improved accountability, and was 
made possible by the NGO.  
 
Health system staff also worked through the NGO to try to build community 
understanding of their issues, and to engage the community in productive ways. At 
one cluster meeting, the BCMO explained to community members that he did not 
have the power to hire more staff for their health center and requested that 
communities put pressure on politicians to solve the staffing issue:  
 
The BCMO said, “Although I am the head of this CHC, some 
matters, like the appointment of doctors, are controlled by 
politicians. I can’t authorize the appointment of doctors; all I 
can do is depute doctors from one institution to another 
within the CHC area. We have to keep on demanding services 
so that politicians will be become aware of the problem and 
will put pressure on the concerned ministries to solve those 
issues.” (Observation note, cluster meeting, OBS_VHC_26) 
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 Linking and bridging  
 
In addition to building community-government relationships, SEEK staff also linked 
communities to resources and support outside the public sector, through their 
knowledge of other foundations and charities in the region. In one instance, SEEK 
staff invited a representative of a district-level private foundation to a cluster 
meeting. This representative encouraged VHSNC members to write to the 
foundation head, a respected local doctor in a charity-run hospital, and ask for 
money to support their sanitation and health work. In a village where the school’s 
midday meal program was not in operation, NGO staff also encouraged VHSNC 
members to write to a local CSR initiative that was providing what an NGO 
facilitator referred to as “very good meals” in nearby villages (observation notes, 
cluster meeting, OBS_VHC_34). 
 
Through trainings and cluster-level meetings SEEK also created bridges between 
villages, enabling VHSNC members to meet and exchange ideas. The facilitators 
themselves served as bridges by moving between villages and bringing with them 
comparative perspectives. For example, in one VHSNC meeting where members 
complained that the committee was useless because the government was 
unresponsive, a SEEK facilitator told the story of a nearby village’s VHSNC’s 
successful work in improving teacher performance at a school.  
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 Capacity building of government providers and officials 
 
Community level capacity building was an explicit component of their mandate. But 
the NGO staff recognized that health system actors and members of local 
government also needed training, since few were aware of the VHSNC or knew the 
committee’s mandate. SEEK staff organized special trainings after the state-level 
elections to teach newly elected local representatives (ward panch and sarpanch) 
about the VHSNC. SEEK staff also invited ASHA supervisors, ANMs, and medical 
officers to VHSNC trainings and meetings, and tried to build their support and 
interest in responding to these committees. Unfortunately, lower-level health 
system functionaries and ward members lacked the capacity to fix the many village-
level shortcomings—an issue that SEEK could not address.   
 
 Highlighting success stories 
 
SEEK staff encouraged VHSNCs by enabling cross-village sharing, so inactive or 
frustrated VHSNCs could learn about the small successes of other VHSNCs operating 
in the same context. In highlighting these success stories, the NGO was able to 
encourage VHSNC members and help them develop locally feasible action 
strategies—and also legitimize the NGO’s promotion of VHSNCs as a strategy for 




7.4.3 NGO characteristics and strategies to increase the intervention’s success  
 
What enabled the NGO to bring about the positive processes discussed above? Here 
we identify several characteristics of the NGO and strategies used by them to try to 
increase VHSNC functionality, noting their trade-offs and risks.   
 
 NGO staff motivation 
 
Several SEEK staff spoke about the importance of community action in the public 
health system and expressed dedication to seeing the VHSNC strengthening 
intervention succeed. For example, the project director described her desire to 
strengthen the public sector.   
 
And SEEK is working to make the [public] system better… We 
want people to accept the system, work with it, understand it 
and own it. (female, 40 years, project director, IDI_NGO_07) 
 
Over our observation period, the NGO staff consistently displayed high levels of 
commitment to seeing VHSNCs become functioning local institutions for community 
participation. They expended energy and time above and beyond the basic 
requirements to try to engage communities, train VHSNC members, and help the 
VHSNC improve village level health, sanitation, and nutrition services.  
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 Respected interlocutor status 
 
As neither village residents nor government officials, NGO facilitators presented 
VHSNC members an opportunity to engage with a unique set of interlocutors. The 
NGO facilitators were in many ways local: they understood and identified with 
members of the community; people knew their family, caste, religion, and village. 
Yet they were outsiders who brought outside knowledge and had connections to 
government. Unlike government officials, they did not require formal interactions 
and were not seen to be consumed by the indifference and uncontrolled self-interest 
often associated with government officials. Accordingly, this “in between” position 
enabled NGO staff to work in communities in valuable ways.  
 
In most villages, it was risky to openly discuss problems in frontline service 
provision, such as an anganwadi worker taking the supplementary food rations 
home with her. The positions of ward member, ASHA, and anganwadi worker were 
generally occupied by dominant families. It was very difficult for more marginalized 
community members to speak out against members of dominant families and for 
relatives to criticize one another. However, the NGO facilitators were often taken 
into confidence about these local issues by VHSNC members away from the larger 
group. Speaking to the NGO facilitator was a mechanism for taking some action 
against local service provision issues, which was less dangerous than reporting on 
one’s peers to a government worker.  
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Sometimes NGO facilitators were then able to help address the problems by, for 
example, staying with the VHSNC members for anganwadi center monitoring 
immediately after the VHSNC meeting, instead of leaving the monitoring tool with 
the VHSNC members to complete on their own. Although the anganwadi centers did 
not appear to improve as a result of this NGO-supported monitoring during our 
research period, the NGO’s involvement nonetheless enabled the shortcomings of 
the anganwadi center to be noted and exposed anganwadi staff and community 
members to a set of standards. Noting these shortcomings from a community 
perspective has the potential to improve anganwadi system accountability and 
service provision, if upstream officials become involved or if communities gain the 
capacity to resolve village-level service provision problems themselves. 
 
Women, who were generally not able to speak in VHSNC meetings because of social 
norms prohibiting them from speaking in front of male relatives, found it socially 
acceptable to speak to the NGO facilitators, male and female alike.  Women often had 
side conversations with the NGO facilitator that enabled the facilitator to present 
women’s concerns and suggestions to the men at VHSNC meetings. For example, in a 
focus group discussion, a female VHSNC member explained, to general agreement, 
“We do not speak there [in VHSNC meetings] but speak quite a lot to the one who 
comes, [name of female NGO facilitator]” (Hanwari, FGD_VHC_11). 
 
In some cases, the NGO facilitator would use his or her outsider status to press the 
female VHSNC members to speak at the VHSNC meetings in the presence of men, 
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overlooking the local prohibition. While this demand may have made the women 
uncomfortable, the women usually discussed amongst themselves and then got the 
ASHA to present their opinion, which the male VHSNC members seemed to accept. 
As discussed in chapter 6, this micro-violation of gender norms represented an 
acceptable level of risk for the women and was generally accepted by the male 
VHSNC members because men recognized that the NGO facilitator had forced the 
point (rather than the women themselves exhibiting boldness and a desire to be 
heard, which would be unacceptable) and because the ASHA spoke, which could be 
considered an appropriate and necessary act due to her government position as 
health worker.  We learned that some non-ASHA women experienced verbal 
retaliation at home for speaking out in meetings or trainings, but ASHAs did not 
mention any negative consequences.  
 
VHSNC members also noted that visits from outsiders elevated the VHSNC meetings 
above a normal community activity, which helped sustain interest. For example a 
male VHSNC member (Jhorkibas, male, Muslim, IDI_VHC_50) explained that the NGO 
facilitator “makes things lively.” If no outside facilitator came, he and many others 
said, no one in the village would gather.  Some community members felt that 
information from outsiders was given greater weight and was more socially 
acceptable than if it came from a village resident.  
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 Leveraging relationships to meet program goals 
 
NGO staff described leveraging personal and professional relationships to meet the 
VHSNC program’s goals. Some NGO staff had prior relationships with teachers and 
nutrition system staff because of earlier work on different programs. Staff drew 
upon these relationships of trust or obligation to strengthen the VHSNC. Involving 
actors from across departments without official documents of support depended 
entirely upon personal relationships. For example, NGO staff navigated around the 
state-level Department of Women and Child Development’s lack of formal support 
by encouraging anganwadi workers to attend trainings on their personal time:  
 
Then we said, ‘What if they come on off-duty hours?’ So some 
of the anganwadi workers volunteered to come and engage 
in training on off-duty hours. They came because of our 
personal and organizational relationships (Male facilitator 
and manager, IDI_NGO_02).  
 
At the village level, NGO staff sought engagement from local people, including 
elected government officials, through personal connections, earlier work on other 
projects, and shared local identity. When possible, NGO facilitators directly 
approached people in the villages who had been involved in earlier SEEK projects in 
the education and youth development sector. NGO staff would introduce the VHSNC 
intervention to those individuals and ask them to support the project. Some agreed 
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to participate because of their positive earlier relationships with the organization 
and the individual facilitators, particularly the SEEK manager.    
 
Leveraging hard-won relationships to try to make the intervention a success was 
often necessitated by lack of coordination and agreement at higher levels of 
government. This strategy helped achieve program success by enabling the NGO to 
involve key community stakeholders, but also risked eroding NGO-community 
relationships if community members were disappointed.  
 
 Linking personal and organizational reputation to program activities 
 
In many cases, facilitators managed community skepticism by offering up their own 
assurance and character as a testament to their sincerity and the positive potential 
of the VHSNC. Facilitators thus staked their own reputation and word on the 
intervention’s success. They promised that they would see the intervention through 
and that they would be available for the community: 
 
I promised them that I will come every month and also 
whenever they call me. I told them that I will stay in the 
village for a long tenure and will continue to come even after 
forming the committee. The villagers said let’s see how many 
times you visit the village. I told them to trust me and I 




While the facilitator continued to visit the village for the 1.5-year intervention 
period, when the intervention ended he moved on to another job. The NGO 
facilitators gave the VHSNCs advance notice that their support was ending and 
sought to capacitate them to continue functioning without the NGO, but still worried 
that communities would see their facilitation as short-term and insufficient.  
 
In villages where the NGO had previously worked in other sectors, NGO staff sought 
out community members who had been involved in these earlier projects and tried 
to convince them to join the VHSNC. Community members often reported that one 
reason they agreed to get involved was because they knew and trusted the NGO.  
Some community members also mentioned specifically trusting the SEEK manager, 
who had been working in the social sector there for many years, and knowing this 
NGO staff member’s village roots and family reputation. For example, a male VHSNC 
member explained “With the help of [male NGO manager] from [village] we got 
involved in this committee because he is the son of a headmaster” (Hanwari village, 
male, FGD_VHC_06).  
 
Having a good organizational reputation in many communities and a staff composed 
of enthusiastic local people were factors that made this NGO a suitable body to carry 
out this intervention. However these same factors opened up the NGO and 
individual staff to loss of reputation and status if community members felt 
disappointed in the intervention. NGO staff willingness to stake their reputation on 
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the intervention indicates how deeply committed they were to seeing the VHSNCs 
become active.  
 
 Emphasis on positive potential of intervention 
 
Their motivation to see the intervention succeed and their enthusiasm for VHSNCs 
led NGO staff to present the VHSNC to communities in a highly favorable light, with 
an emphasis on the committee’s positive potential. While conducting community 
mobilization in the villages, the NGO facilitators encouraged people to get involved 
in the VHSNC by drawing mobilization messages from the MoHFW’s guidelines, 
including telling people about their public health entitlements (such as the right to 
have a functional health center nearby). NGO staff presented the VHSNC as a means 
of getting the government to deliver on these promises. They also informed the 
community that the members of the VHSNC would be able to allocate a yearly Rs. 
10,000 (US $150) untied fund.  
 
NGO staff repeatedly told communities that they would have to take initiative 
themselves and did not explicitly promise any public health system improvements. 
However interviews with community members indicated that many people took 
away a message that the NGO would bring a great amount of positive change. For 
instance, a woman recalled that the NGO facilitator called them during social 
mobilization and said that the NGO “will make all the [health] facilities available” 
(Shadeeka village, women, FGD_COM_03).  
 213 
 
It would be a naïve reading of the data to assume that the respondents truly 
believed an NGO would quickly fix all their problems.  Nonetheless, we note that 
respondents did frame the VHSNC strengthening intervention as an outcome- rather 
than process-oriented program, focused on improving a range of public services 
under the leadership of the NGO. As the intervention went on, VHSNC members 
increasingly understood that SEEK was not going to bring outside resources to their 
village and that the meetings were supposed to continue without NGO support. 
Many members explained that they were not going to remain involved because “that 
discussion happens in every month but nothing is happening” (women, Shadeeka, 
FGD_VHC_05).  Ensuring regular meetings was a key outcome according to the 
government contract, but was valued in communities only as a means to concrete 
improvements.  
 
7.4.4 Challenges for NGO capacity and relationships 
 
 NGO became the face of the program but lacked control over many 
aspects 
 
Leveraging relationships, linking NGO reputation to the intervention, and 
energetically promoting the positive potential of VHSNCs became problematic for 
NGO staff when important aspects of the intervention did not go as hoped. Repeated 
failures led to disappointment for the VHSNC members and resulted in frustration, 
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which was frequently directed at the NGO staff. For example, some people 
questioned the honesty of NGO facilitators, who had said that the untied fund would 
be arriving in their accounts soon: 
 
Most of the committees have been there for one year. We told 
them that within two months they would get the untied fund 
as per the information given to us. So now the difficulty is 
coming as they are saying that you are lying to us… We 
ourselves don’t have the answer about why it is not coming 
(Female, project director, IDI_NGO_07) 
 
At other times people were frustrated that all their attempts to engage block level 
health system actors failed and held the NGO responsible: 
 
We are going to consult with CMO [Chief Medical Officer] but 
he is not listening to us. Then what should we do? …Here in 
the village malaria is spreading. We are associated with your 
committee; what kind of help can you offer us? (Hanwari 
village, male, FGD_VHC_06) 
 
While communities disparaged the government for failing to provide services, over 
the course of the intervention they began directing frustration at the NGO 
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facilitators for breaking what they had understood to be a promise for major 
improvements in the village:  
 
Respondent 3: Initially he said, there will be a hospital and 
delivery can be taken place in the village itself but nothing 
happened.  
 
Respondent 1: Yes, nothing is happening. Once land for the 
hospital was discussed and my father in law had also shown 
them the suitable land for that hospital. But nothing 
happened… 
 
Respondent 5: Nothing is happening. He [NGO facilitator] just 
comes, does the meeting and goes back. (Shadeeka village, 
women, FGD_VHC_05).  
 
Another respondent said that people were irritated by their NGO facilitator: “People 
say that she speaks too much and we go mad. She doesn’t do any work related to 
development but only makes discussions” (Hanwari village, female, IDI_VHC_47).  
 
The NGO facilitators never had any control over the construction of facilities or 
hiring health workers, and were themselves frequently rebuffed by block level 
health system actors. Their mandate was merely to form VHSNCs, train members, 
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and help VHSNC members conduct meetings. They had no control over how the rest 
of the system engaged with VHSNCs, yet found themselves desperately, and 
generally unsuccessfully, trying to facilitate positive government engagement with 
VHSNCs, which would in turn justify the NGO’s promotion of these committees.   
 
 Efforts to sustain community trust may have reinforced community 
skepticism 
 
We observed the NGO staff engage several strategies to maintain their reputation or 
regain community trust in response to the many barriers that VHSNCs faced.  
 
NGO staff often spoke to one another in front of VHSNC members about the 
government’s rejection of the NGO’s efforts. For example, the director expressed her 
frustration about the BCMO and ASHA supervisor in front of about 40 VHSNC 
members at a cluster meeting, highlighting that the BCMO and ASHA supervisor 
gave conflicting explanations for why they could not attend. The BCMO said that 
there was an important engagement for them that day, while the ASHA supervisor 
said the engagement happened one day earlier and that he was off work on the 
current day because of heatstroke. The SEEK director finished, saying:  
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NGO director (female): See, this is how these government 
people are supporting us. They don’t want to come because 
they will have to answer to the public. (Observation notes 
from cluster meeting, OBS_VHC_34) 
 
In other instances, NGO staff called government officials in front of VHSNC members, 
and showed the VHSNC that the government official could not be reached by phone 
or spoke to the government official and relayed the official’s explanations for non-
attendance or inaction. In this way, NGO staff showed VHSNC members that SEEK 
was working towards the same goals as the VHSNC. These public actions showcased 
the fact that the NGO was unable to bring about improvements and illustrated the 
NGO’s community-aligned (rather than government-aligned) identity.  
 
SEEK also sought to clarify and even downplay their role, by presenting their 
organization as a modest facilitator to the more important community-government 
relationship. For instance, VHSNC members angrily asked the NGO about why the 
VHSNC had not received any money and what the VHSNC was supposed to do when 
the government was not responsive. Some NGO staff responded by aggressively 
reminding VHSNC members that the issue is between the communities and the 




VHSNC member (male): From the beginning you are talking 
about the untied fund but to date you have not given a single 
rupee. 
 
NGO manager (male): That is your VHSNC and your money. 
So who should try to get the money?  
 
VHSNC member (male): But you are saying that that money 
will come, so you are responsible for giving that money. 
 
NGO director (female): We are not providing the money and it 
is not in our hands. The money should come from 
government and that is a matter between the government 
and VHSNC members. We are just a medium in between and 
we are trying to help you. (Observation notes from cluster 
meeting, OBS_VHC_35) 
 
These NGO efforts to sustain community trust involved trade-offs: in showing the 
VHSNC members that the NGO was not at fault, the NGO both encouraged and 
discouraged sustained community participation in the public sector.  They 
encouraged participation and ownership by emphasizing that communities had the 
right to demand their entitlements, including to approach government officials 
about services and to follow up about the untied fund. SEEK facilitators even 
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suggested the VHSNCs file a “right to information” request to find out where the 
money was. However, some of their efforts to sustain their community-oriented 
identity may have adversely affected community willingness to continue engaging in 
the committees. Emphasizing the challenges SEEK faced when trying to work with 
government made some VHSNC members wonder how the VHSNC could succeed if 
even the NGO staff were unsuccessful. In emphasizing village-level responsibility 
and action, SEEK may have inadvertently invalidated or glossed over the enormous 
challenges villagers were facing.  
 
In writing petitions to the government on every issue, the NGO took the only clear 
action available to them and aligned themselves as community advocates. The act of 
writing petitions to the government at the end of meetings satisfied the short-term 
expectation from VHSNC members to see the NGO facilitator take some action. 
Nonetheless, the act of writing requests achieved near-symbolic status, becoming a 
representation of action, rather than meaningful action itself. The main outcome and 
action of NGO facilitators, and as the intervention was phased out, of VHSNC 
members themselves, was the creation of letters. With minimal government 
response to these letters, the short term satisfaction of “doing something” generally 
led to a longer term reinforcement of the government’s inaccessibility and the 
community’s ineffectiveness at resolving upstream public system issues.   
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 NGO staff felt their work was under-valued and under supported 
 
NGO staff were concerned that the government-designed intervention 
underestimated the time and resources required for field activities. They spoke 
frequently about the immense amount of effort required to achieve program goals, 
and expressed concern that the time and resources allotted for their work by the 
government intervention were insufficient.  
 
Social mobilization, for example, was envisioned as a mechanism to create 
widespread awareness in the community about the existence and mandate of 
VHSNCs, and provide an opportunity for interested community members to join. 
Properly introducing the concept of VHSNCs to entire villages required more visits, 
and at multiple times of day, than facilitators felt possible in the time allotted:  
 
You say you have to arrange VHC meeting in one day, but 
arranging meetings requires time and mobilization and it is 
possible that we need to go more than once…. Government 
needs to understand that they have to give priority to people. 
We work like that only. Government says work 10 am to 5 




Another facilitator reported feeling overwhelmed by a hostile crowd during a 
mobilization event and suggested that additional staff would have helped him: “It is 
not possible for a single person to handle so many people. Support could be in terms 
of additional staff to gather and counsel people” (male, facilitator, IDI_NGO_01). 
However, the NGO often lacked the time and human resources for facilitators to 
work in pairs.  
 
Facilitators found that it was necessary to visit communities frequently to gain 
community trust and remind VHSNC members about upcoming meetings. NGO staff 
tried to visit the villages as often as possible, but struggled to pay for their 
transportation costs.  
 
The problem is that the worker should visit his area of work 
at least five times in 30 days so that he can develop a 
relationship with his community. People could have 
discussed their problems with him. The staff were not able to 
do this because the money given to them was insufficient. 
They thought it was a formality and they visited their work 
area only once. If they have to go a second time, they have to 
spend their own money. So to make this project successful, 
the salary structure of grass-root level staff should be 
improved; the staff will also get motivated to work and will 
visit the field again and again. (Male, facilitator, IDI_NGO_04) 
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Female facilitators were in a particularly difficult situation. They could not make use 
of the NGO-owned motorcycles, because it is unacceptable for women in this region 
to drive motorcycles. They had to walk or arrange to be driven by men. 
 
In addition, the officially mandated period for VHSNC expansion, training, and 
support, was also seen as insufficient. NGO staff were concerned that VHSNCs would 
not continue to function once “handed back to the government” with NGO support 
removed.  
 
According to me if the project doesn’t continue then there 
won’t be any meetings or any other activities. It would 
become non-functional like before. Now that we repeatedly 
visit and persuade them so much we have been able to 
motivate them a little.  It won’t be possible in the future if 
they are not given any back up support. (female, NGO 
facilitator, IDI_VHC_05) 
 
Many VHSNC members echoed this concern.   
 
The NGO director also pointed out that the end of the project was a major challenge 
for their own organization’s development. The NGO did not have enough money 
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after the VHSNC-support intervention closed to retain the staff, who had gained 
enormous capacity over the course of the intervention: 
 
I am seeing a challenge too that now this project is getting 
over… The passion and enthusiasm that is in them now… we 
don’t have resources [to sustain] that… So I am feeling that 
perhaps it should not stop here. A lot of energy and 
manpower has been invested in this project… At this point of 
time they are emerging as trainers and if we leave those team 
members right now then our investment on manpower 
would be lost. (female, director, IDI_NGO_07) 
 
Her concerns reflect the wider trend in NGO professionalization and funding-based 
expansion, whereby NGOs expand and then contract according to the availability of 




This paper highlights the challenges, trade-offs, and strategies enacted by an NGO 
implementing a government-designed health system intervention. The NGO worked 
within a difficult context of community mistrust and poor government 
responsiveness to successfully form and support VHSNCs over a 1.5-year period. As 
discussed, they helped communities voice their concerns to government officials, 
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and helped facilitate some understanding between communities and local level 
government functionaries. They built the capacity of some government officials to 
work with VHSNCs and helped link communities with one another and with other 
sources of non-governmental support.  
 
Many of these positive processes were made possible by the NGO’s respected 
interlocutor status in communities, pre-existing relationships, and willingness to 
“sell” involvement in the VHSNC as a mechanism for improving village-level health 
and wellbeing.  
 
However, despite enabling some positive processes, concrete improvements in the 
villages were often far below community expectations. Government support for the 
intervention was considered inadequate by NGO staff and communities, particularly 
evidenced by the government’s failure to release untied funds into VHSNC accounts, 
as well as poor cross-departmental collaboration, and poor response to VHSNC 
requests for improved services. NGO staff thus endured community frustration on 
one hand and rebuffs from lower-level government officials on the other, while 
feeling under-resourced and under-supported by their government contract. The 
NGO risked its reputation in communities by promoting VHSNCs without being able 
to control crucial aspects of the intervention’s success—a fundamental issue with 
development contracts (O’Reilly 2011).  
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SEEK staff promoted a government-mandated process, asking communities to 
engage in a participatory initiative within parameters set by the government. By 
using the guidelines and handbooks developed by the government, the NGO became 
a conduit for government messages and values. Yet the NGO did not gain any of the 
power associated with government bureaucracy, such as access to information on 
disbursement of funds or special access to district levels of government.  
 
Our findings highlight that understanding the changing role of NGOs in society at the 
micro-level, as played out in communities by frontline NGO staff, is more nuanced 
than a straightforward trajectory to depoliticization. Government contracts that hire 
NGOs to increase community participation in the public system, such as the one 
taken up by SEEK, can be enacted by fieldworkers in a manner that mixes a service 
orientation (e.g. providing trainings, facilitating meetings) and a civil society 
orientation (e.g. helping communities increase engagement with government 
officials).  
 
Sustaining community participation in the VHSNC was contingent on community 
members seeing the VHSNC as a mechanism to improve local health, sanitation, and 
nutrition. Thus the NGO became increasingly oriented around working with VHSNCs 
to demand improvements to the public system (i.e. becoming more responsive to 
communities, delivering concrete service improvements). The NGO could not 
successfully fulfill their contractual requirements focused on changing community 
members (i.e. building their capacity and willingness to participate in committees) 
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without also taking up a civil society oriented role that worked on changing the 
system. While the NGO staff may have set out to deliver a series of technical inputs 
(trainings, community meetings), they ended up drafting letters to government 
departments, calling and following up with officials, and even suggesting that 
communities reach out to the media, file right to information requests, and meet 
their state-level member of parliament. The NGO facilitators sought to work within 
the parameters of their government contract to serve the needs of the community, 
particularly through attempting to hold the public sector accountable. They spoke 
frankly about the ways their efforts to spark hope in the communities were 
undermined by government short staffing and unresponsive officials. It became 
imperative for the NGO staff to facilitate small-scale political action in order to 
maintain the trust and participation of the VHSNC community members. 
 
This case study demonstrated that NGO fieldworkers can thus advocate for 
community needs through micro-level political engagement while providing 
services required by government contracts. Miraftab expressed concerned that 
when NGOs provided services for governments they would shift from:  
… Social change through raising consciousness, demand 
making, and opposition with the government, to 
organizations that aim incremental improvement of the 
poor’s living conditions through community self-reliance and 
formulation of workable solutions. (1997, p. 362) 
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The efforts of SEEK staff involved aspects of both: they encouraged community 
advocacy and demand making, while at the same time encouraging self-reliance by 
teaching new skills and encouraging some local monitoring and problem-solving. 
 
However, this case study also highlights that NGOs take on enormous risk through 
engaging in these contracts, especially when formal government promotion of 
community participation (exhibited by the existence of these contracts and national 
policies) is not enacted in reality (exhibited by limited engagement with 
communities by lower level officials). NGOs are at risk of losing community trust 
and enduring distressing interactions with frustrated community members. SEEK’s 
efforts to work alongside communities to change the system by demanding better 
services and seeking greater engagement with officials had limited concrete 
outcomes during the time period of this study. Mobilizing community members to 
engage with the government, without government efforts to engage with 
communities, placed the NGO in a difficult position. The intervention ended with 
many communities unconvinced about the VHSNCs’ utility. This does not bode well 
for sustained community engagement in VHSNCs and may make it more challenging 
for SEEK to work with these communities on future initiatives.  
 
This case study clearly illustrates that NGOs can be invaluable players in 
participatory development programs: they bring important and unique 
characteristics and strategies born of their position between communities and 
governments. However, NGOs need adequate time, resources, and support from the 
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government to generate positive processes that strengthen community-government 
relationships. They need platforms to convey their understanding of the political 
barriers to community participation to program developers. NGOs also need to 
proceed with caution to protect their organizational interests.  It is important that 
NGOs thoroughly consider how to manage the challenges and trade-offs involved in 
working between government and communities when trying to strengthen 
community engagement in the public sector.    
 
7.6 Limitations and opportunities for future research  
 
This NGO contract was granted by the MoHFW’s technical advisory body, the 
NHSRC.  The purpose of the contract was to enable implementation research in 
order to derive lessons for scale up. It was thus atypical to regular NGO contracts 
granted by state-level ministries in several ways.  First, it was more flexible than a 
typical government-NGO service contract, which may have improved some aspects 
of the NGO’s experience. For example, this contract allowed the NGO to add 
additional rounds of training and social mobilization; typical government contracts 
would be less likely to allow for this flexibility. In addition, this contract was initially 
for one year only and was then extended (without additional money) for another six 
months. Typical government-NGO contracts generally close without extension and 
any remaining money would be returned.    
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This contract funded SEEK to support VHSNCs in a small-scale trial, in only 50 
villages. In some ways this could have improved government support for the NGO 
because the NGO was able to write directly to health system officials at the national 
level—however SEEK still felt under-supported and did not feel able to access 
necessary information, such as why the untied fund was not released to the VHSNCs, 
as previously mentioned. On the other hand, some of the main issues that SEEK 
navigated, such as poor intersectoral collaboration, may have occurred in part 
because the intervention was operating on a trial basis. When rolled out across the 
country, higher-level collaboration across social sectors may be established.  
 
At least one researcher from our team (co-author GP) was present throughout the 
intervention, which may have furthered SEEK staff’s motivation to showcase high 
levels of success. However, we engaged in ongoing discussion with NGO staff to 
emphasize that our research was in no way evaluative—that we were seeking to 
understand field realities and barriers to success, to inform scale up. In our 
interviews and discussions with SEEK staff, the staff often restated this point, 
indicating that they understood the researchers’ role.  Moreover, staff were open to 
discussing their challenges with the researchers. Nonetheless, the presence of an 
embedded researcher cannot be discounted; the possibility remains that this may 
have energized and further motivated the team.  
 
There are many opportunities for future research both on NGO-government 
contracting more broadly, and in follow up with this specific case study. We 
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identified increasing politicization through implementing a very specific type of 
government contract: one that sought to build community participation in the 
health system. It would be valuable to explore how other types of government 
contract influence NGOs’ political readings.  
 
Our understanding of the trade-offs and costs born by the NGO through this contract 
was limited by the duration of our research period. We finished data collection at 
the same time as the NGO’s contract to support VHSNCs closed. Since then, most of 
the field workers had to leave the NGO because there was no additional salary 
support. It would be valuable to follow up with staff who remain to ascertain how 
this contract influenced NGO-community relationships while running projects in the 
future. Moreover, it would be fruitful to speak to the NGO staff about whether the 
NGO would work on a government contract again and, if so, what precautions or 




NGOs have a valuable role to play in increasing community participation in 
government systems. They fill a unique position in society that enables them to 
work productively to strengthen community-government relationships. Frontline 
NGO staff can support communities in micro-level political processes by helping 
communities assert their rights to public services. This grass-roots political 
engagement is contrary to assumptions that NGOs are necessarily depoliticized and 
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“tamed” by development contracts. However, NGOs must recognize the risks and 
trade offs associated with trying to maintain an identity as community advocate 
while serving as a government contractor. The risks are particularly acute in 
contexts where the government system lacks the incentives and capacities to 
effectively respond to newly engaged community members.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
 
The popularity of health committees in LMIC health systems shows no sign of 
abating (Mdaka, Haricharan, and London 2014; McCoy, Hall, and Ridge 2011). In 
India, the MoHFW’s Guidelines for Community Processes (MoHFW India 2013a) 
illustrate an ongoing interest in encouraging community participation through 
health committees, and even expands their recommended membership size from 
seven to 15. These committees have the potential to improve the lives of millions in 
rural communities, who remain in desperate need of basic health, sanitation, and 
nutrition services. Knowing more about the barriers facing these committees 
(chapter 5), the costs and opportunities they create for community members 
(chapter 6), and the challenges and trade offs experienced by NGOs seeking to 
support them (chapter 7) will enable policy and programming to be more 
responsive to difficult grassroots realities.    
 
Chapter 5 identified the specific contextual features that challenged VHSNC 
functionality in our case study site in northern India. At the community level, it 
identified social hierarchies that made it difficult for women and some lower caste 
people to participate and that made community members reluctant to speak out 
about issues within the village.  At the health facility level, it illustrated how a 
severely resource-deprived government health system curtails community attempts 
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at engagement. At the administrative level, it outlined challenges in cross-sector 
collaboration. It also highlighted the mismatch between community needs for 
outside inputs (particularly infrastructure development to improve access to water) 
and the VHSNC program’s focus on small-scale village level activities to promote 
health, sanitation, and nutrition. It further emphasized the opaque government 
hierarchies, wherein VHSNC members and NGO staff often had no way to identify or 
access the officials in charge of specific services or activities. Lower level health 
system functionaries, who the VHSNC could directly engage, often lacked the power 
to improve services. At the societal level, despite decentralization reforms to the 
panchayat, the powerful local elected leader (the sarpanch) remained one step 
beyond the VHSNC’s reach. Insufficient development of social services, most 
strikingly illustrated in the central government’s failure to increase health spending 
beyond 1% of the GDP, has forced even the poorest rural people to buy basic 
services such as health care, water, and education in the private sector. The 
discussion section of chapter 5 presents a vision of what a more VHSNC-enabling 
context would require.  
 
Chapter 6 examined how power inequalities are mediated through the VHSNC to 
create social costs and opportunities for participants.  We identified some 
opportunities for the renegotiation of gender and caste relationships, although we 
noted that women and lower caste people were vulnerable to repercussions beyond 
the VHSNC. Power inequalities between communities and outside elites created a 
dominant “discourse of responsibility.” This “discourse of responsibility” portrayed 
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VHSNC members as responsible for improving health, sanitation, and nutrition 
services. Some respondents rejected this discourse, explaining that responsibility 
for these services lay with powerful outside actors. Others accepted this discourse. 
However, to reconcile village-level responsibility with a lack of improvement, they 
blamed their peers as too selfish and lazy to perform their responsibilities. Whether 
accepting or rejecting the discourse, most community members felt that continued 
participation would not be beneficial.   
 
Chapter 7 explored the challenges, trade-offs, and strategies enacted by the NGO 
implementing the government-designed VHSNC-strengthening intervention. It 
found that a number of beneficial processes arose from the NGO’s “in-between” 
position as both community advocate and government helper. The NGO was able to 
support improved communication and understanding between community 
members and frontline government officials. They were also able to bring women’s 
voices into the VHSNC and identify issues at the village level (particularly the 
anganwadi) in socially accepted ways. However, NGO staff were faced with 
community frustration and potential loss of reputation when material 
improvements and support (particularly untied funds) were not forthcoming.  They 
were also rebuffed by some lower-level government officials and felt under-
supported in their government contract. This chapter highlighted how NGO staff 
sought to maintain their community-oriented identity while working as government 
contractors. They did so by going beyond the delivery of community-focused 
technical inputs to supporting VHSNCs in government-focused political efforts. 
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8.2 Concluding points and implications 
 
An anecdote from Sojjapur village provides a useful segue into this study’s 
concluding points and implications for policy and practice. Sojjapur was the case 
study village with an empty PHC; the doctor assigned there had been relocated 
several times to other PHCs and the CHC in Manujpur. He was returned to Sojjapur 
briefly during our research period. But, after only a few days, again stopped coming, 
explaining that there was no reason for him to open the PHC since it had no 
medicine and staff. 
 
A success for Sojjapur’s VHSNC 
 
After we closed data collection, Gupteswar met a male VHSNC member from Sojjapur village 
on a bus while travelling from Manujpur toward Delhi. During their conversation, the man 
informed Gupteswar that after months of frustration, the Sojjapur VHSNC had a major 
victory.  
 
During their final NGO-supported meeting, the NGO facilitator suggested that VHSNC 
members visit the District Chief Medical Officer in the main city and submit a request that 
medicine be supplied to their PHC. The VHSNC did so, and just three days later, the PHC 
received a large supply of medicines, valued approximately Rs. 2,00,000 (US $3000). The 
doctor immediately agreed to come back to the PHC.  
 
Gupteswar visited Sojjapur three weeks later to see for himself. He found the doctor in the 
PHC running an active out-patient department (OPD). He looked at the OPD register and 
noted that an average of 45 patients were receiving care from the doctor and free medicine 
each day. The doctor explained that although the PHC still did not have any equipment, he 
was making do for the time being.  
 
After this success, the male VHSNC members convened another meeting (without NGO 
facilitation) and began focusing on acquiring land for the construction of a new PHC behind 
the current dilapidated one. They are now waiting for the government to respond to their 
request for land. 
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This anecdote provides grounding for several concluding points, with implication 
for policy and practice: 
 
1. Participation as a process not an outcome 
 
When our 1.5-year research period closed, VHSNC members in Sojjapur felt there 
had been little concrete benefit from the VHSNC. Yet, just a few months later, the 
VHSNC succeeding in re-opening their PHC and were working to acquire land for a 
new PHC building.  
 
Community participation is process-orientated, non-linear, and works in complex 
ways over long time horizons (Rifkin 2014; Rifkin 1996; Ebyen 2005). Support for 
VHSNCs, and the assessment of VHSNC success, must account for the ongoing needs 
of communities and the often-slow pace of change in communities and government 
systems. VHSNC functionality may rise and fall as members rally around a specific 
issue then lose interest for a multitude of reasons. Participation through standard 
monthly meetings may never resonate with the seasonality of rural life and the 
issue-specific nature of community action (Nyamu-Musembi 2006).  Our findings 
resonate with other researchers, who call for permanent, or at least longer term, 
support for VHSNCs to increase the likelihood that they survive the fluctuations in 
community enthusiasm and government responsiveness (Khanna and Pradhan 
2013; FRHS 2010). This permanent support could be provided by NGOs or a cadre 
within the public system.   
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2. The role of NGOs  
 
Sojjapur’s VHSNC was formed and capacitated by SEEK. But importantly, SEEK staff 
went beyond delivering the straightforward intervention. They did not just train 
VHSNC members and convene meetings. They suggested and helped enact political 
strategies that enabled Sojjapur’s VHSNC to successfully advocate for their PHC.  
 
As illustrated throughout this dissertation, NGOs can play a valuable role in 
programs seeking to increase community participation in the public sector. The 
NGO’s continuous effort to build community-government communication and 
facilitate VHSNC appeals to government officials enabled the Sojjapur success.  
 
The NGO also managed within-community power inequalities and created space for 
these inequalities to be challenged through participation in the VHSNC. It is thus 
noteworthy that in Sojjapur, after the NGO’s support ended, the first VHSNC meeting 
only included male members. There is an important role for outside facilitation in 
constructing alternative social spaces that enable marginalized people to gain voice 
and power.  As noted in chapter 7, the Indian NRHM earmarks 4% of their budget 
for NGO contracts. Therefore it is important to better understand some of the trade 
offs involved in taking up these types of NGO-government contracts and explore 
ways to protect the NGO’s staff and organizational interests.  
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3. Responsibility for social services  
 
On one hand, Sojjapur’s VHSNC achieved a major success in having medicines 
supplied to their PHC and having the PHC doctor returned. On the other hand, it is 
unacceptable that a PHC was deprived medicine and staff in the first place. 
Moreover, when Sojjapur’s PHC doctor returned, he left an additional vacancy at the 
Manujpur CHC—the BCMO just reshuffles a woefully insufficient health workforce 
between health centers. Sojjapur’s success raises many concerning questions: Why 
was the PHC allowed to fall into disrepair in the first place? Why did earlier requests 
for medicine go unanswered? Why was this PHC supplied medicine while many 
ASHAs, ANMs, HSCs, and other PHCs continue to lack medicine? What will happen 
next month?  
 
The role of community participation (through VHSNCs) in improving rural health, 
sanitation, and nutrition remains unclear because of different answers to a crucial 
question: Where does responsibility for village health, sanitation, and nutrition lie? 
It seems both ethically unacceptable and ultimately futile to expect community 
members to take on total responsibility for demanding government services and 
solving health, sanitation, and nutrition issues themselves.  
 
Higher-level officials are themselves constrained by bureaucratic issues and budget 
shortages (Haider et al. 2008; Bali and Ramesh 2015; George 2009). The type of 
local voluntary action that VHSNC members could take up, such as monitoring 
anganwadi centers and helping the ANM, still require upstream support. As noted 
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by Campbell et al. (2010), community mobilization efforts have often focused on 
helping the marginalized raise their voices, without adequate attention to building 
receptive environments to hear these community voices. Placing high responsibility 
on VHSNCs for demanding government services and improving health in their 
villages is not a feasible mechanism for sustaining the public sector. Moreover, as we 
discussed in chapter 6, when VHSNCs are unable to bring about change, this sense of 
unmet responsibility can have negative effects on community cohesion and 
collective identity. This study highlights the urgent need for more supportive 
contexts in which rural people can not only participate in health committees, but 
also access the power and resources to bring about actual improvements to their 
health and wellbeing.  
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CHAPTER 9. APPENDICES 
 
9.1 In-depth interviews guide for VHSNC members 
 
The in-depth interview guides changed slightly over the course of the research 
period, reflective of the iterative nature of qualitative research. 
 
This is just a guide to help you cover these topics. You can change the order or skip 
questions depending on the interviewee’s responses. Also, for each question, only use 
probes (bullet points) if they are required—and there is no need to use all the probes.  
 
Domain/topic Questions and probes 
1. Personal 
identity 
To start off, can you tell me a bit about yourself? 
2. Village 
context 
What are some of the best things about living in this village? 
What are some of the challenges and problems that people here 
face?  
What are the different communities in this area? How do these 
communities relate?  
3. General 
about VHSNC 
I’m trying to learn as much as I can about VHSNCs. Can you tell me 
about the VHSNC? 
 What kinds of things does the VHSNC do?  
 Why does it exist? 
 What kinds of things do you think the VHSNC should do? 
4. Identity and 
VHSNC 
involvement  
How did you come to be involved in the VHSNC? What do you do 
on the VHSNC? 
 What do people at home (husband/wife/in-laws/child) 
think about your being on the VHSNC? 
 How much time each month do you spend on VHSNC 
activities? Is this okay?  
 What are the good things about being a member? What 
are the bad things?  
 Can you tell me about a time when you were happy to be 
a member? Can you tell me about a time when it was not 
easy being a member? 
5. Information 
on all the 
different 
members 
Can you describe each of the VHSNC members to me?  
 What do they usually do and say at VHSNC 
meetings/events? 
 Are there communities that are not represented on the 
VHSNC?  
 Probe to explore relationships between members 
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Domain/topic Questions and probes 
6. Formation 
and training of 
the committee 
When did you first hear about the committee? What did you think? 
How was the committee formed?   
Can you tell be about the trainings that the committee received? 
What did you like about them? What did you not like? 
7. Untied fund Tell me how the untied fund works 
 What is it used for? Who decides how to use it? 
 What are some good things about it? What are some 
challenges or issues? 
8. Meetings 
and activities 
Can you describe a typical committee meeting? 
 Where would it take place? What do you think about 
this location? 
 Who would be there? Who would not attend the 
meeting?  
 Who coordinates the meetings? 
 What kinds of things happen? What kinds of things are 
talked about? 
 What makes you happy to go to the meetings? What 
makes you not want to go? 
 Who mostly talks? Who mostly stays quiet? Why? 
 
Can you tell me about a time when the VHSNC tried to solve a 
problem? Can you tell me about a time when someone came to the 
VHSNC for help? 
Can you describe a typical Village Health Day?  
Is it easier for men or women to participate in VHSNC/village 
health activities? How come? 
9. Monitoring Is the VHSNC able to monitor health activities and services? 
[PHC/sub-center/AWC)?  Describe how this monitoring works. 
What are some challenges? What is done with this monitoring 
data? How do you feel about this monitoring activity? 
10. Planning Have you ever been involved in health planning activities (Village 
Health Plan/Panchayat Health Plan/PHC health plan)? 
Who all attends the planning meetings? Who leads/coordinates? 
How useful is this? Does it address the real issues? 
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When people get sick, what are some ways they get help?  
 What about when a pregnant woman goes into labor?  
 Do all the children here get immunized? How does this 
immunization happen? Tell me about how your child got 
his/her immunization.  
 What are some reasons that children here might not go to 
the ICDS center/AWC?  
 Have you experienced some good things about the health 
care services here (the clinics, sub-centers, AWCs)? What 
are some of the good things about the doctors, nurses or 
anganwadis?  
 Have you experienced any problems with the health care 
here? What are some problems with the doctors, nurses, 
anganwadis?   
 What is a typical visit to the PHC like? 
 
Have you noticed any changes in health services (PHC, sub center, 
behavior of staff, nurses, ASHAs) over the past few years?  
 What kinds of things have changed? Why? 
 What kinds of things do you wish would change?  How 




What do you think the VHSNC will do over the next year? 
What are the best things about the VHSNC? What are your hopes 
for the VHSNC?  
What are your hopes for your village? For your children? 
What are the challenges facing the VHSNC? What would help the 
VHSNC overcome these challenges? 
13. Other 
committees 
What types of organizations/groups/clubs/committees exist here?  
Probe, asking: “Can you think of any others?” 
For each organization ask: 
 What types of things does this group do? 
 What are their meetings like? 
 Who joins? Who does not join? Why? 






9.2 Focus group discussion guide for VHSNC members 
 
Focus group discussion guides changed over the course of the study. This guide is 
one example.  
 
Part 1: Opening statements 
Thank you for taking the time to join this group. I am ____, the facilitator who will 
guide this discussion. This is _____, the assistant who will help with notes and 
coordination.  You are each experts on this village so I hope you will speak freely 
and comfortably. There are no right or wrong answers. We want to hear from 
everyone here.  
 If you tend to speak a lot, remember to give other people a chance.  
 If you are a quiet person, try to speak up so we learn your opinion.   
 We are recording this conversation because it is hard to write down 
everything.  So please speak one at a time and avoid having side 
conversations.  
 Before we begin the discussion, we will go through the participation 
agreement form and answer any questions. 
 
Part 2: Consent process & filling in the coversheet 
1. Read the study information sheet. 
2. Have everyone sign the consent form. While people are signing the consent 
form, the focus group discussion assistant can fill in the participant 
information on the coversheet.  
3. Give everyone a copy of the information sheet and consent form to take 
home. 
4. Ask “Are there any questions before we begin?” 
 
Part 3: Discussion 
As a way to capture group consensus, throughout you want to check: “Does everyone 
agree with this statement or conclusion?” Paraphrase finding then ask “Would 




1. VHSNC general Please introduce yourselves with your name and a bit about 
your involvement with the VHSNC 
How long has there been a VHSNC? 
What issues do you deal with on the VHSNC?  





What are some of the good things about being on a VHSNC? 
What are some of the challenges?  
What types of people join the VHSNC? 
During last three months who attended the regular monthly 
meetings? 
What special challenges are faced by women who participate 
in the VHSC? What about men? Marginalized people? 
3. VHSNC formation Tell me about how the VHSNC was formed. How did people 
learn about the VHSNC? What happened? 
How were members selected? 
4. Untied fund Let’s talk about the untied fund: what are the good things 
about the untied fund? What are some challenges with it? 
How do you decide how to spend it? Can you give me an 
example? 




How are decisions taken by the committee communicated to 
the community? How often? 
Is there any data collection done by the committee members 
to know the state of health services?  
If no why? If yes what did you do with the data? 
Tell me about a time when there was a problem and the 
VHSNC tried to help?  
Tell me about a time when someone came to the VHSNC for 
help. What happened? 







Tell us about the most recent village health day: what 
happened? What did you do? 
Are there any other village activities that you take part in? 
7. Linkages between 
the VHSNC and PHC 
To what extent does the medical officer or his/her 
representative (BPM/BCM/ASHA supervisor) support the 
VHSNC? Does she or he attend meetings? 
To whom do you submit the Village health action plan?  
 
8. VHSNC and social 
determinants of 
health 
What are some of the social problems in the village?  
Could the VHSNC address ay of these problems? 
If yes than how? If no why? 
What kind of support would be needed to address these 
problems? 
9. VHSNC priorities What are the goals of the VHSNC? 
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Topic Questions/probes 
10. VHSNC role and 
future 
How do you think the public health system is changing? What 
is the National Rural Health Mission/MoHFW/Panchayat 






9.3 Focus group discussion guide for community members 
 
Focus group discussion guides changed over the course of the study. This guide is 
one example.  
 
Part 1: Opening statements 
Thank you for taking the time to join this group. I am ____, the facilitator who will 
guide this discussion. This is _____, the assistant who will help with notes and 
coordination.  You are each experts on this village so I hope you will speak freely 
and comfortably. There are no right or wrong answers. We want to hear from 
everyone here.  
● If you tend to speak a lot, remember to give other people a chance.  
● If you are a quiet person, try to speak up so we learn your opinion.   
● We are recording this conversation because it is hard to write down 
everything.  So please speak one at a time and avoid having side 
conversations.  
● Before we begin the discussion, we will go through the participation 
agreement form and answer any questions. 
 
Part 2: Consent process & filling in the coversheet 
● Read the study information sheet. 
● Have everyone sign the consent form. While people are signing the consent 
form, the focus group discussion assistant can fill in the participant 
information on the coversheet.  
● Give everyone a copy of the information sheet and consent form to take 
home. 
● Ask “Are there any questions before we begin?” 
 
Part 3: Discussion 
 
Topic Questions/probes 
1. Village general What are some of the best things about this village?  
What are some of the challenges people here face?  
2. Discussion 




Let’s talk about sickness and health:  
What types of things do people get sick with here?  
What can be done about these things?  
We’re interested in talking about the clinics here. What are some 
of the things they do there? What type of people work there?  
What would a regular visit to the clinic be like?  
3. Other 
committees that 
have existed here 
What kinds of groups have there been in this village?  
Probe: Who was/is on that one? What did/does it do? What do 







Can you please tell me a bit about the village health committee?  
What is this?  
What kinds of people should be involved? What kinds of things 
do they do?  




How did people come to hear about the VHSNC? Tell me about 





Who participates in the VHSNC?   
Why do some people join and other people not join? 
Any there any people on the VHSNC from your community? If 
yes how he/she selected? 
7. VHSNC 
selection/ 
formation process  
Can you tell me about how the VHSNC is formed? Probe to hear 
the whole story on how it was formed “And then what 
happened?” “How did that go?”… 
 
Tell me some reasons a woman in a village may not to join? 
Which people joined? Why?  






Can you tell me about a time when the VHSNC helped someone 
solve a problem?  




Does the VHSNC provide awareness of government health 
programs and entitlements?  
How does the VHSNC aid in enhancing utilization of health 
services? 
10. VHSNC 
activity for the 
future—hopes, 
plans 
Think about this village or your old village five years ago and 
think about it now. What’s changing in this village? What about 
in the clinic? [Probe: tell me about ASHAs? Health report cards?] 
What ideas do you have to make the village a place with less 




CHAPTER 10. REFERENCES 
 
Abimbola, Seye, Shola K Molemodile, Ononuju A Okonkwo, Joel Negin, Stephen Jan, 
and Alexandra L Martiniuk. 2015. “‘The Government Cannot Do It All Alone’: 
Realist Analysis of the Minutes of Community Health Committee Meetings in 
Nigeria.” Health Policy and Planning, czv066. doi:10.1093/heapol/czv066. 
Adhikari, Bhim, and Jon C Lovett. 2006. “Institutions and Collective Action: Does 
Heterogeneity Matter in Community-Based Resource Management?” The 
Journal of Development Studies 42 (3): 426–45. 
Arnstein, Sherry R. 1969. “A Ladder of Citizen Participation.” JAIP 35 (4): 216–24. 
Atkinson, J A, A Vallely, L Fitzgerald, M Whittaker, and M Tanner. 2011. “The 
Architecture and Effect of Participation: A Systematic Review of Community 
Participation for Communicable Disease Control and Elimination. Implications 
for Malaria Elimination.” Malaria Journal 10. 
Attride-Stirling, Jennifer. 2001. “Thematic Networks: An Analytic Tool for 
Qualitative Research.” Qualitative Research 1 (3): 385–405. 
Awofeso, N, and A Rammohan. 2011. “Three Decades of the Integrated Child 
Development Services Program in India: Progress and Problems.” Health 
Management – Different Approaches and Solutions, 243–58. 
Ayers, Alison J. 2006. “Demystifying Democratisation: The Global Constitution of 
(neo)liberal Polities in Africa.” Third World Quarterly 27 (2): 321–38. 
doi:10.1080/01436590500432606. 
Azad, K, S Barnett, B Banerjee, S Shaha, K Khan, Rego AR, Barua S, et al. 2010. “Effect 
of Scaling up Women’s Groups on Birth Outcomes in Three Rural Districts in 
Bangladesh: A Cluster-Randomised Controlled Trial.” The Lancet 375: 1193–
1202. 
Bajpai, Nirupam, Ravindra H Dholakia, and Jeffrey D Sachs. 2008. “Scaling up 
Primary Health Services in Rural Tamil Nadu: Public Investment Requirements 
and Health Sector Reform.” 
Bajpai, Nirupam, Jeffrey D Sachs, and Ravindra H Dholakia. 2009. “Improving Access, 
Service Delivery and Efficiency of the Public Health System in Rural India: Mid-
Term Evaluation of the National Rural Health Mission.” CGSD Working Papers. 
Vol. No. 37. Center on Globalization and Sustainable Development; The Earth 
Institute at Columbia University. 
Balarajan, S, S. Subramanian, and S Selvaraj. 2011. “India: Towards Universal Health 
Coverage 4: Health Care and Equity in India.” The Lancet 377: 505–15. 
Balarajan, Y, S Selvaraj, and S V Subramanian. 2011. “Health Care and Equity in 
India.” Lancet 377 (9764): 505–15. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)61894-6. 
Bali, A. S., and M. Ramesh. 2015. “Health Care Reforms in India: Getting It Wrong.” 
Public Policy and Administration 30 (3-4): 300–319. 
doi:10.1177/0952076715590697. 
Bandura, A. 2001. “Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective.” Annual Review 
of Psychology 52: 1–26. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Angus Deaton, and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Health Care Delivery in 
Rural Rajasthan.” Economic and Political Weekl 39 (9): 944–49. 
 249 
Banks, Nicola, David Hulme, and Michael Edwards. 2015. “NGOs, States, and Donors 
Revisited: Still Too Close for Comfort?” World Development 66. Elsevier Ltd: 
707–18. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.09.028. 
Baqui, A.H. 2008. “NGO Facilitation of a Government Community-Based Maternal 
and Neonatal Health Programme in Rural India: Improvements in Equity.” 
Health Policy and Planning 23 (4): 234–43. 
Barman, Subhash. 2006. “Knowledge, Attitude and Participation of Elected Gram 
Panchayat Members in Health and Family Welfare Programmes in Hooghly, 
West Bengal.” Health and Population: Perspectives and Issues 29 (2): 102–15. 
———. 2009. “Role of the Elected Panchayat Samity Members in National Health 
and Family Welfare Programs: A Case Study.” The Qualitative Report 14 (1): 20–
41. 
Becher, D. 2010. “The Participant’s Dilemma: Bringing Conflict and Representation 
Back In.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34 (3): 496–511. 
Behar, Amitabh, and Yogesh Kumar. 2002. “Decentralisation in Madhya Pradesh, 
India: From Panchayati Raj to Gram Swaraj ( 1995 to 2001 ).” 170. Livelihood 
Options. London. 
Belaid, Loubna, and Valery Ridde. 2014. “Contextual Factors as a Key to 
Understanding the Heterogeneity of Effects of a Maternal Health Policy in 
Burkina Faso?” Health Policy and Planning, March, 1–13. 
doi:10.1093/heapol/czu012. 
Benova, Lenka, Oliver Cumming, and Oona M R Campbell. 2014. “Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis: Association between Water and Sanitation Environment 
and Maternal Mortality.” Tropical Medicine & International Health : TM & IH 19 
(4): 368–87. doi:10.1111/tmi.12275. 
Beyrer, Chris, and HF Pizer. 2007. Public Health and Human Rights: Evidence-Based 
Approaches. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bhat, P.N., K. Navaneetham, and S.I. Rajan. 1995. “Maternal Mortality in India: 
Estimates from a Regression Model.” Studies in Family Planning 26 (4): 217–32. 
Bhutta, Zulfiqar A, S Soofi, S Cousens, S Mohammad, Z A Memon, I Ali, A Feroze, et al. 
2011. “Improvement of Perinatal and Newborn Care in Rural Pakistan through 
Community-Based Strategies: A Cluster-Randomised Effectiveness Trial.” The 
Lancet 377 (9763): 403–12. 
Bishai, David, Louis W. Niessen, and Mohan Shrestha. 2002. “Local Governance and 
Community Financing of Primary Care: Evidence from Nepal.” Health Policy and 
Planning 17 (2): 202–6. 
Bjorkman, M, and J Svensson. 2009. “Power to the People: Evidence from a 
Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 735–69. 
Black, Robert E, Lindsay H Allen, Zulfiqar A Bhutta, Laura E Caulfield, Mercedes de 
Onis, Majid Ezzati, Colin Mathers, and Juan Rivera. 2008. “Maternal and Child 
Undernutrition: Global and Regional Exposures and Health Consequences.” The 
Lancet 371 (9608): 243–60. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(07)61690-0. 
Black, Robert E, Cesar G Victora, Susan P Walker, Zulfiqar A Bhutta, Parul Christian, 
Mercedes de Onis, Majid Ezzati, et al. 2013. “Maternal and Child Undernutrition 
and Overweight in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries.” The Lancet 382 
 250 
(9890). Elsevier: 427–51. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60937-X. 
Boulle, T, N Makhamendela, R Goremucheche, and Rene Loewenson. 2008. 
Promoting Partnership between Communities and Frontline Health Workers: 
Strengthening Community Health Committees in South Africa. EQUINET PRA 
Paper. Harare, Zimbabwe: Nelson Mandela University South Africa & EQUINET. 
Bukenya, B, and Sophie King. 2012. “The Contextual Factors That Shape Social 
Accountability,” no. June. 
Butler, Judith. 1988. “Performantive Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in 
Phenomenology and Feminist Therory.” Theatre Journal 40 (4): 519–31. 
Campbell, Catherine. 2014. “Community Mobilisation in the 21st Century: Updating 
Our Theory of Social Change ?” Journal of Health Psychology 19 (1): 46–59. 
doi:10.1177/1359105313500262. 
Campbell, Catherine, Flora Cornish, Andy Gibbs, and K Scott. 2010. “Heeding the 
Push from below: How Do Social Movements Persuade the Rich to Listen to the 
Poor?” J Health Psychol 15 (7): 962–71. doi:10.1177/1359105310372815. 
Campbell, Catherine, and Sandra Jovchelovitch. 2000. “Health Community and 
Development: Towards a Social Psych of Participation.” 
Chambers, Robert. 1994. “Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Analysis of 
Experience.” World Development 22 (9): 1253–68. 
Chowdhury, Javid. 2015. “National Health Policy 2015.” Economic & Political Weekly 
50 (9). 
Collins, Charles. 1989. “Decentralization and the Need for Political and Critical 
Analysis.” Health Policy and Planning 4 (2): 168–71. 
Collins, Charles, Andrew Green, and David Hunter. 1999. “Health Sector Reform and 
the Interpretation of Policy Context.” Health Policy 47 (1): 69–83. 
doi:10.1016/S0168-8510(99)00003-2. 
Collins, Charles, Mayeh Omar, Damodar Adhikari, Ramji Dhakal, Nick Emmel, Megha 
Raj Dhakal, Padam Chand, Druba Thapa, and Arjun B Singh. 2007. “Health 
System Decentralisation in Nepal: Identifying the Issues.” Journal of Health 
Organization and Management 21 (6): 535–45. 
doi:10.1108/14777260710834328. 
Cooke, Bill. 2004. “Rules of Thumb for Participatory Change.” In Participation: From 
Tyranny to Transformation, edited by Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan. London, 
UK: Zed Books. 
Cooke, Bill, and Uma Kothari. 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny? New York: Zed 
Books. 
Cornish, Flora. 2004. “Making Context Concrete.” J of Health Psychology 9 (2): 281–
94. 
Cornwall, Andrea. 2002. “Making Spaces, Changing Places: Situating Participation in 
Development.” 170. Brighton, Sussex. 
Cornwall, Andrea, and Vera Schattan P Coelho. 2006. Spaces for Change? The Politics 
of Participation in New Democratic Arenas. Zed Books. 
Credit Suisse. 2014. “Global Wealth Databook 2014.” 
Creswell, J.W. 1997. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five 
Traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
CSHRC. 2013. “Village Health Sanitation and Nutrition Committees (VHSNCs) in 
 251 
Chhattisgarh: An Assessment.” Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 
Cueto, M. 2004. “The Origins of Primary Health Care and Selective Primary Health 
Care.” American Journal of Public Health 94 (11): 1864–74. 
Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Aakash Mohpal, and Karthik Muralidharan. 2015. “Quality 
and Accountability in Healthcare Delivery : Audit Evidence from Primary Care 
Providers in India.” 7334. Policy Research Working Paper 7334. Policy Research 
Working Paper Series. 
Dasgupta, Aniruddha, and Victoria A Beard. 2007. “Community Driven Development, 
Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia.” Development and Change 38 
(2): 229–49. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00410.x. 
Dasgupta, Jashodhara. 2011. “Ten Years of Negotiating Rights around Maternal 
Health in Uttar Pradesh, India.” BMC International Health and Human Rights 11 
Suppl 3 (Suppl 3). BioMed Central Ltd: S4. doi:10.1186/1472-698X-11-S3-S4. 
Denzin, N.K. 1978. Sociological Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Dixit, S, Salil Sakalle, M Bansal, Rajni Bagga, T.G. G Srivastava, V.K. K Tiwari, and 
Deoki Nandan. 2008. “A Study on Utilization of Untied Funds in Sub-Centres in 
Indore Division under National Rural Health Mission.” Health and Population: 
Perspectives and Issues 31 (2). Indore & New Delhi: 94–97. 
Ebyen, R. 2005. “Donors’ Learning Difficulties: Results, Relationships and 
Responsibilities.” IDS Bulletin: Institute of Development Studies 36 (3): 98–107. 
Election Commission of India. 2013. “Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of 
Political Parties and Candidates.” http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/MCC-
ENGLISH_28022014.pdf. 
Falisse, Jean-Benoît B, Bruno Meessen, Juvénal Ndayishimiye, and Michel Bossuyt. 
2012. “Community Participation and Voice Mechanisms under Performance-
Based Financing Schemes in Burundi.” Tropical Medicine and International 
Health 17 (5): 674–82. doi:10.1093/heapol/czr036; 
Fine, B. 1999. “The Developmental State Is Dead--Long LiveSocial Capital?” 
Development and Change 30: 1–19. 
Flores, Walter, Florencia Guerzovich, and Steven Rosenzweig. 2014. “Learning 
across Localities: Looking at Transparency and Accountability’s Local Context 
More Systematically.” 
Foley, E. E. 2001. “No Money, No Care: Women and Health Sector Reform in 
Senegal.” Urban Anthropology 30 (1): 1–50. 
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books. 
———. 1988. The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage Books. 
———. 1990. “The History of Sexuality. Volume 1.” New York: Vintage Books. 
doi:10.2307/1904618. 
Fowler, A. 1988. “Non-Governmental Organizations in Africa: Achieving 
Comparative Advantage in Relief and Micro-Development.” Discussion Paper 
249. 
Freire, Paulo. 1973. Education as the Practice of Freedom. Education for Critical 
Consciousness. New York: Seabury Press. 
FRHS. 2010. “Capacity Building of Village Health and Sanitation Committees (VHSC) 
A Partnership between Gujarat Government and Jan Swaasthya Abhiyan.” 
———. 2011. “Evaluation of VHSC Training and Mentoring Pilot.” 
 252 
Ganesh, S R, S Ganesh Kumar, Sonali Sarkar, Sitanshu Sekhar Kar, Gautam Roy, and K 
C Premarajan. 2013. “Assessment of Village Water and Sanitation Committee in 
a District of Tamil Nadu , India.” Indian Journal of Public Health 57 (1): 3–6. 
doi:10.4103/0019-557X.111376. 
Gatti, R, G Gray-Molina, and J Klugman. 2002. “Determinants of Corruption in Local 
Health Care Provision: Evidence from 108 Municipalities in Bolivia .” Università 
di Pavia: World Bank, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica. 
Geddes, M. 2006. “Partnership and the Limits to Local Governance in England: 
Institutionalist Analysis and Neoliberalism.” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 30 (1): 76–97. 
George, Asha S. 2009. “‘By Papers and Pens, You Can Only Do so Much’: Views about 
Accountability and Human Resource Management from Indian Government 
Health Administrators and Workers.” International Journal of Health Planning 
and Management 24 (3): 205–24. doi:10.1002/hpm.986. 
George, Asha S, Kerry Scott, Surekha Garimella, Shinjini Mondal, Rajani Ved, and 
Kabir Sheikh. 2015. “Anchoring Contextual Analysis in Health Policy and 
Systems Research: A Narrative Review of Contextual Factors Influencing Health 
Committees in Low and Middle Income Countries.” Social Science & Medicine 
133. Elsevier Ltd: 159–67. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.03.049. 
Ghosh, J. 2015. “Deep Cuts to India’s Health Spending Will Delay Universal Access to 
Healthcare.” Bmj 350 (apr09 20): h1632–h1632. doi:10.1136/bmj.h1632. 
Ghosh, S K, R R Patil, and S N Tiwari. 2012. “Socio-Economic-Political-Cultural 
Aspects in Malaria Control Programme Implementation in Southern India.” 
Journal of Parasitology Research 2012. 
Gilson, Lucy, Kara Hanson, Kabir Sheikh, Irene Akua Agyepong, Freddie Ssengooba, 
and Sara Bennett. 2011. “Building the Field of Health Policy and Systems 
Research: Social Science Matters.” PLoS Medicine 8 (8): e1001079. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001081. 
Gilson, Lucy, P D Sen, S Mohammed, and P Mujinja. 1994. “The Potential of Health 
Sector Non-Governmental Organizations: Policy Options.” Health Policy and 
Planning 9 (1): 14–24. 
Glattstein-Young, Gabriela, and Leslie London. 2010. “Community Health 
Committees as a Vehicle for Participation in Advancing the Right to Health.” 
Critical Health Perspectives 2 (1): 1–2. 
GoI Planning Commission. 2011. “Evaluation Study on National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM) in Seven States: Volume I. PEO Report No. 217.” Delhi. 
Goodman, Catherine, Antony Opwora, Margaret Kabare, and Sassy Molyneux. 2011. 
“Health Facility Committees and Facility Management - Exploring the Nature 
and Depth of Their Roles in Coast Province, Kenya.” BMC Health Services 
Research 11 (1). BioMed Central Ltd: 229. doi:10.1186/1472-6963-11-229. 
Government of India. 2013. “Press Note on Poverty Estimates, 2011-12.” Press 
Information Bureau. New Delhi. 
Goyal, OP. 2005. “Water Conservation through Community Participation.” In 
American Water Works Association, 1–11. 
Green, Duncan. 2012. “What Can We Learn from a Really Annoying Paper on NGOs 
and Development?” From Poverty To Power. http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/what-
 253 
can-we-learn-from-a-really-annoying-paper-on-ngos-and-development/. 
Guareschi, P, and S Jovchelovitch. 2004. “Participation, Health, and the Development 
of Community Resources in Southern Brazil.” Journal of Health Psychology 9 (2): 
311–22. 
Guijt, Irene, and Meera Kaul Shah. 1998. The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in 
Participatory Development. Intermediate Technology Publications. 
Gupta, Rajat, Shirish Sankhe, Richard Dobbs, Jonathan Woetzel, Anu Madgavkar, and 
Ashwin Hasyagar. 2014. “From Poverty to Empowerment: India’s Imperative 
for Jobs, Growth, and Effective Basic Services.” McKinsey Global Institute. 
Gurung, G. 2009. “Capacity Building Is Not an Event but a Process : Lesson from 
Health Sector Decentralization of Nepal” 11 (3): 205–6. 
Gurung, G., and S. Tuladhar. 2013. “Fostering Good Governance at Peripheral Public 
Health Facilities: An Experience from Nepal.” Rural and Remote Health 13 
(2042): 1–9. 
Haider, S, S Vivek Adhish, S Gupta, N Dhar, U Datta, S Menon, and D Nandan. 2008. “A 
Rapid Appraisal of Sahiya (ASHA) in Jharkhand.” Health and Population: 
Perspectives and Issues 31 (2): 80–84. 
Harriss, John. 2001. Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and Social Capital. 
London: Anthem Press. 
Hawe, Penelope. 1994. “Capturing the Meaning of ‘community’ in Community 
Intervention Evaluation: Some Contributions from Community Psychology.” 
Health Promotion International 9 (3): 199–210. doi:10.1093/heapro/9.3.199. 
Hickey, Samuel, and Giles Mohan. 2004. Participation: From Tyranny to 
Transformation. London: Zed Books. 
Howard-Grabman, L, and G Snetro. 2003. “How to Mobilize Communities for Health 
and Social Change.” Health Communication Partnership. 
Howarth, Caroline. 2001. “Towards a Social Psychology of Community: A Social 
Representations Perspective.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 
Howarth, Caroline, J Foster, and N Dorrer. 2004. “Exploring the Potential of the 
Theory of Social Representations in Community-Based Health Research—and 
Vice Versa?” Journal of Health Psychology 9 (2): 229–43. 
Hunt, P. 2007. “Oral Remarks to the Press in Delhi, India.” The UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health. 
Israr, Syed Muhammad, and Anwar Islam. 2006. “Good Governance and 
Sustainability : A Case Study from Pakistan Y,” no. September: 313–25. 
doi:10.1002/hpm. 
Iwami, Michiyo, and R Petchey. 2002a. “A CLAS Act? Community-Based 
Organizations, Health Service Decentralization and Primary Care Development 
in Peru.” Journal of Public Health Medicine 24 (4): 246–51. 
Iwami, Michiyo, and Roland Petchey. 2002b. “A CLAS Act? Community-Based 
Organizations, Health Service Decentralization and Primary Care Development 
in Peru.” Journal of Public Health Medicine 24 (4): 246–51. 
doi:10.1093/pubmed/24.4.246. 
Iyer, A, and A Jesani. 1995. Women in Health Care: Auxiliary Nurse Midwives. 
Mumbai/Pune: The Foundation for Research in Community Health. 
Jeffery, Patricia. 2014. “Supply-and-Demand Demographics: Dowry, Daughter 
 254 
Aversion and Marriage Markets in Contemporary North India.” Contemporary 
South Asia 22 (2): 171–88. doi:10.1080/09584935.2014.899982. 
Jeffery, Patricia, and Roger Jeffery. 2010. “Only When the Boat Has Started Sinking: A 
Maternal Death in Rural North India.” Social Science & Medicine 71 (10). 
Elsevier Ltd: 1711–18. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.05.002. 
Joffe, Helene. 2003. “Risk: From Perception to Social Representation.” British Journal 
of Social Psychology 42: 55–73. 
Jones, Emma, and SPEECH. 2001. “‘Of Other Spaces’ Situating Participatory 
Practices: A Case Study from South India.” 137. Brighton, Sussex. 
Kaldor, Mary. 2003. “The Idea of Global Civil Society.” International Affairs 79 (3): 
583–93. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.00324. 
Kamat, Sangeeta. 2003. “The NGO Phenomenon and Political Culture in the Third 
World.” Development 46 (1): 88–93. 
———. 2004. “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a 
Neoliberal Era.” Review of International Political Economy 11 (1): 155–76. 
doi:10.1080/0969229042000179794. 
Kamineni, Vishnu Vardhan, Tahir Turk, Nevin Wilson, Srinath Satyanarayana, and 
Lakbir Singh Chauhan. 2011. “A Rapid Assessment and Response Approach to 
Review and Enhance Advocacy , Communication and Social Mobilisation for 
Tuberculosis Control in Odisha State , India,” 1–13. 
Kapiriri, Lydia, Ole Frithjof Norheim, and Kristian Heggenhougen. 2003. “Public 
Participation in Health Planning and Priority Setting at the District Level in 
Uganda.” Health Policy and Planning 18 (2): 205–13. 
doi:10.1093/heapol/czg025. 
Kapoor, D. 2005. “NGO Partnerships and the Taming of the Grassroots in Rural 
India.” Development in Practice 15: 210–15. 
Kasaje, D, E Sempebwa, and H Spencer. 1987. “Community Leadership and 
Participation in the Sarardid, Kenya, Rural Health Development Programme.” 
Annals of Tropical Medicine and Parasitology 81: 46–55. 
Kassebaum, Nicholas J, Amelia Bertozzi-Villa, Megan S Coggeshall, Katya A 
Shackelford, Caitlyn Steiner, Kyle R Heuton, Diego Gonzalez-Medina, et al. 2014. 
“Global, Regional, and National Levels and Causes of Maternal Mortality during 
1990-2013: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 
2013.” The Lancet 384 (9947). Elsevier: 980–1004. doi:10.1016/S0140-
6736(14)60696-6. 
Katz, Amy S, Rebecca M Cheff, and Patricia O Campo. 2015. “Bringing Stakeholders 
Together for Urban Health Equity : Hallmarks of a Compromised Process.” 
International Journal for Equity in Health. International Journal for Equity in 
Health, 1–9. doi:10.1186/s12939-015-0252-1. 
Kesby, Mike. 2005a. “Re-Theorising Empowerment through Participation as a 
Performance in Space: Beyond a Theory of Tyranny to a Transformative 
Praxis.” Development and Change, 1–31. 
———. 2005b. “Retheorizing Empowerment-through-Participation as a 
Performance in Space: Beyond Tyranny to Transformation.” Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 30 (4): 2037–65. 
Kesby, Mike, Andrea Cornwall, Vera Schattan P Coelho, Emma Jones, SPEECH, Gillian 
 255 
Rose, Mike Kesby, et al. 2005. “Retheorizing Empowerment-through-
Participation as a Performance in Space: Beyond Tyranny to Transformation.” 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30 (4). Brighton, Sussex: 2037–
65. doi:10.1080/713668879. 
Khanna, R, and A Pradhan. 2013. “Evaluation of the Process of Community Based 
Monitoring and Planning of Health Services in Maharashtra, Supported by the 
National Rural Health Mission.” Pune. 
KSHSRC. 2012. “An Exploratory Study of VHSC and ARS Functioning.” 
Kumar, A K Shiva, Lincoln C Chen, Mita Choudhury, Shiban Ganju, Vijay Mahajan, 
Amarjeet Sinha, and Abhijit Sen. 2011. “Financing Health Care for All: 
Challenges and Opportunities.” The Lancet 377 (9766): 668–79. 
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)61884-3. 
La Forgia, G. 1985. “Fifteen Years of Community Organization for Health in Panama: 
An Assessment of Current Progress and Problems.” Social Science & Medicine 
20: 55–65. 
Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Leppard, Margaret, Sarawat Rashid, Atiya Rahman, and Mahmuda Akhter. 2011. 
“Voice and Accountability: The Role of Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health 
Committee.” 26. Vol. 7. Research and Evaluation Division. Dhaka. 
Loewenson, Rene. 2000a. “Public Participation in Health Systems.” Report of the 
EQUINET / TARSC Regional Meeting. Harare, Zimbabwe: IDS Bulletin 31: 15–20. 
———. 2000b. “Public Participation in Health Systems.” In Report of the EQUINET / 
TARSC Regional Meeting. Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Loewenson, Rene, I Rusike, and M Zulu. 2004a. “Assessing the Impact of Health 
Centre Committees on Health System Performance and Health Resource 
Allocation.” EQUINET Discussion Paper 18. Harare, Zimbabwe: EQUINET. 
———. 2005. “The Impact of Health Centre Committees on Health Outcomes in 
Zimbabwe: Paper Presented to Forum 9, Global Forum for Health Research.” 
Forum 9, Global Forum for …. Mumbai. 
Loewenson, Rene, Itai Rusike, and M Zulu. 2004b. “Assessing the Impact of Health 
Centre Committees on Health System Performance and Health Resource 
Allocation.” EQUINET Discussion Paper 18. Harare, Zimbabwe: EQUINET. 
Macwan’gi, M., and Alasford Ngwengwe. 2004. “Effectiveness of District Health 
Boards in Interceding for the Community: EQUINET Discussion Paper 19.” The 
Institute of Economic and Social …. 
Malviya, Amit, S Dixit, AK Bhagwat, SB Bansal, and AK Khatri. 2013. “Assessment of 
Functioning of Village Health and Sanitation Committees (VHSCs) of Indore 
District.” Online Journal of Health and Allied Sciences 12 (4): 1–5. 
Manandhar, Dharma S, David Osrin, Bhim Prasad Shrestha, Natasha Mesko, Joanna 
Morrison, Kirti Man Tumbahangphe, Suresh Tamang, et al. 2004. “Effect of a 
Participatory Intervention with Women’s Groups on Birth Outcomes in Nepal: 
Cluster Randomised Controlled Trial.” The Lancet 364 (9438): 970–79. 
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(04)17021-9. 
Marsland, Rebecca. 2006. “Community Participation the Tanzanian Way: Conceptual 
Contiguity or Power Struggle?” Oxford Development Studies 34 (1): 65–79. 
doi:10.1080/13600810500496053. 
 256 
MASUM & SATHI. 2005. “How Are Village Level Untied Funds Being Utilized? A Brief 
Study in Pune District.” 
McCoy, DC C David C, Jennifer A JA A Hall, and Melanie Ridge. 2011. “A Systematic 
Review of the Literature for Evidence on Health Facility Committees in Low- 
and Middle-Income Countries.” Health Policy and Planning 27 (6): 449–66. 
doi:10.1093/heapol/czr077. 
McPake, B, A D Asiimwe, F Mwesigye, M Ofumbib, L Ortenbladd, P Streeflandd, and A 
Turindeb. 1999. “Informal Economic Activities of Public Health Workers in 
Uganda: Implications for Quality and Accessibility of Care.” Social Science & 
Medicine 49 (7): 849–65. 
McTague, C, and S Jakubowski. 2013. “Marching to the Beat of a Silent Drum: Wasted 
Consensus-Building and Failed Neighbourhood Participatory Planning.” Applied 
Geography 44: 182–91. 
Mdaka, K., H Haricharan, and L London. 2014. “The Role of Health Committees in 
Equitable, Peoplecentred Health Systems in the Southern and East African 
Region.” Cape Town. 
Mead, G.H. H. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Meier, Benjamin Mason, Caitlin Pardue, and Leslie London. 2012. “Implementing 
Community Participation through Legislative Reform: A Study of the Policy 
Framework for Community Participation in the Western Cape Province of 
South Africa.” BMC International Health and Human Rights 12 (1): 15. 
doi:10.1186/1472-698X-12-15. 
Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, and Margreet Zwarteveen. 1998. “Gendered Participation in 
Water Management: Issues and Illustrations from Water Users’ Associations in 
South Asia.” Agriculture and Human Values 15: 337–45. 
doi:10.1023/A:1007533018254. 
Menghaney, L. 2015. “Bureaucracy and Budget Revision: How Spending Cuts Are 
Affecting India’s Public Health Programmes.” Bmj 350 (apr09 19): h1734–
h1734. doi:10.1136/bmj.h1734. 
Ministry of Home Affairs. 2011a. “Urban Rural Distribution of Population 
(Provisional Population Totals) Census of India.” New Delhi. 
———. 2011b. “Census of India, 2011, State Overview.” Government of India. 
Miraftab, Faranak. 1997. “Flirting with the Enemy: Challenges Faced by NGOs in 
Development and Empowerment.” Habitat International 21 (4): 361–75. 
doi:10.1016/S0197-3975(97)00011-8. 
Mishra, S, R Duggal, L Lingam, and A Pitre. 2008. “A Report on Health Inequalities in 
Maharashtra.” Pune. 
MoHFW India. 2005a. “National Rural Health Mission (2005-2012): Mission 
Document.” New Delhi. 
———. 2005b. “National Rural Health Mission: Mission Document.” New Delhi. 
———. 2006a. “Guidelines for Village Health and Sanitation Committees, Sub 
Cenres, PHCs and CHCs.” 
———. 2006b. “Indian Public Health Standards for Sub-Centres: Guidelines.” 
———. 2007. “National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), 2005–06: India: Volume II.” 
Mumbai: International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and Macro 
International. 
 257 
———. 2012a. “Guidelines for Primary Health Centres.” New Delhi. 
———. 2012b. “Guidelines for District Hospitals.” 
———. 2013a. “Guidelines for Community Processes.” New Delhi. 
———. 2013b. “Handbook for Trainers.” 
———. 2013c. “Financial Outlays & Outcome Budget 2013-14, Chapter 2.” 
———. 2014a. “Annual Report 2013-14.” New Delhi. 
doi:10.1080/13439009808719972. 
———. 2014b. “Guidelines for NGO Involvement under National Health Mission in 
the Twelth Five Year Plan.” 
Molyneux, Sassy, Martin Atela, Vibian Angwenyi, and Catherine Goodman. 2012. 
“Community Accountability at Peripheral Health Facilities: A Review of the 
Empirical Literature and Development of a Conceptual Framework.” Health 
Policy and Planning 27 (7): 541–54. doi:10.1093/heapol/czr083. 
Morrison, Joanna, Suresh Tamang, Natasha Mesko, David Osrin, Bhim Shrestha, 
Madan Manandhar, Dharma S Manandhar, Hilary Standing, and Anthony 
Costello. 2005. “Women’s Health Groups to Improve Perinatal Care in Rural 
Nepal.” BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth 5 (6): 1–12. doi:10.1186/1471-2393-5-6. 
Morrison, Joanna, Kirti Man Tumbahangphe, Bharat Budhathoki, Rishi Neupane, 
Aman Sen, Kunta Dahal, Rita Thapa, et al. 2011. “Community Mobilisation and 
Health Management Committee Strengthening to Increase Birth Attendance by 
Trained Health Workers in Rural Makwanpur, Nepal: Study Protocol for a 
Cluster Randomised Controlled Trial.” Trials 12 (1). BioMed Central Ltd: 128. 
doi:10.1186/1745-6215-12-128. 
Mortier, S Du, and Monica Arpagaus. 2005. “Quality Improvement Programme on 
the Frontline: An International Committee of the Red Cross Experience in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.” International Journal for Quality in Health Care 
17 (4): 293–300. 
Moscovici, S. 2000. Social Representations: Explorations in Social Psychology. New 
York: New York University Press. 
Mosquera, M, Y Zapata, K Lee, C Arango, and A Varela. 2001. “Strengthening User 
Participation through Health Sector Reform in Colombia : A Study of 
Institutional Change and Social” 16 (Suppl 2): 52–60. 
Mosse, David. 1994. “Authority, Gender and Knowledge: Theoretical Reflections on 
the Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal.” Development and Change 25 (3): 
497–526. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.1994.tb00524.x. 
———. 2001. “‘People’s Knowledge’, Participation and Patronage: Operations and 
Representations in Rural Development.” In Participation: The New Tyranny, 
edited by Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, 16–35. London: Zed Books. 
———. 2005. Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. 
London: Pluto. 
Mubyazi, Godfrey M, and Guy Hutton. 2003. “Understanding Mechanisms for 
Integrating Community Priorities in Health Planning , Resource Allocation and 
Service Delivery Results of a Literature Review [EQUINET Discussion Paper No. 
13].” In Health. 
Mubyazi, Godfrey M, Adiel K Mushi, Elizabeth Shayo, Kassembe Mdira, and Joyce 
Ikingura. 2007. “Local Primary Health Care Committees and Community-Based 
 258 
Health Workers in Mkuranga District, Tanzania: Does the Public Recognise and 
Appreciate Them?” Ethno-Med 1 (1): 27–35. 
Mubyazi, Godfrey M, Adiel Mushi, Mathias Kamugisha, Julius Massaga, Kassembe Y 
Mdira, Method Segeja, and Kato J Njunwa. 2007. “Community Views on Health 
Sector Reform and Their Participation in Health Priority Setting: Case of 
Lushoto and Muheza Districts, Tanzania.” Journal of Public Health 29 (2): 147–
56. doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdm016. 
Murray, C J, and Alan D Lopez. 1997. “Global Mortality, Disability, and the 
Contribution of Risk Factors: Global Burden of Disease Study.” The Lancet 349 
(9063): 1436–42. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(96)07495-8. 
MWCD India. 2012. “Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme.” Vol. 
2013. 
Nagar, Richa. 2000. “Mujhe Jawab Do! (Answer Me!): Women’s Grass-Roots Activism 
and Social Spaces in Chitrakoot (India).” Gender, Place & Culture 7 (4): 341–62. 
doi:10.1080/713668879. 
Naimoli, Joseph F., Diana E. Frymus, Estelle E. Quain, and Emily L. Roseman. 2012. 
“Community and Formal Health System Support for Enhanced Community 
Health Worker Performance.” 
Nandan, Deoki, Manmath K Mohanty, Sundarsan Das, MM Misro, P Kumar, and JP 
Sridasani. 2008. “Rapid Appraisal of Functioning of Village Health and 
Sanitation Committees (VHSCs) under NRHM in Orissa.” New Delhi & 
Bhubaneswar. 
Ngulube, T.J. J, Laxonie Mdhluli, Khuzwayo Gondwe, and C.A. A Njobvu. 2004. 
“Governance, Participatory Mechanisms and Structures in Zambia’s Health 
System: An Assessment of the Impact of Health Centre Committees (HCCs) on 
Equity in Health and Health Care: EQUINET Discussion Paper 21.” Governance, 
Participatory Mechanisms and Structures in Zambia’s Health System: An 
Assessment of the Impact of Health Centre Committees (HCCs) on Equity in Health 
and Health Care. Lusaka, Zambia. 
Nichter, Mark. 2008. “NGOs, Social Capital, and the Politics of the Possible.” In Global 
Health: Why Cultural Perceptions, Social Representations, and Biopolitics Matter, 
133–49. 
Nongdrenkhomba, H N, B M Prasad, B K Shome, and A C Baishya. 2012. “Community-
Based Health Committee Initiatives in India: A Descriptive Analysis of Village 
Health Sanitation and Nutrition Committee Model.” BMC Proceedings 6 (Suppl 
5): O29. 
NSSO. 2006. “National Sample Survey 60th Round. Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation. .” Delhi: National Sample Survey Organization 
(NSSO), Government of India. 
Nyamu-Musembi, C. 2006. “From Protest to Proactive Action: Building Institutional 
Accountability through Struggles for the Right to Housing.” In Rights, Resources 
and the Politics of Accountability, edited by P Newell and J. Wheeler. London: 
Zed Books. 
O’Meara, Wendy P., Benjamin Tsofa, Sassy Molyneux, Catherine Goodman, F Ellis 
Mckenzie, Wendy Prudhomme, O Meara, et al. 2011. “Community and Facility-
Level Engagement in Planning and Budgeting for the Government Health Sector 
 259 
– A District Perspective from Kenya” 99: 234–43. 
doi:10.1016/j.healthpol.2010.08.027. 
O’Reilly, Kathleen. 2006. “‘Traditional’ Women, ‘Modern’ Water: Linking Gender and 
Commodification in Rajasthan, India.” Geoforum 37 (6): 958–72. 
doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.05.008. 
———. 2007. “‘Where the Knots of Narrative Are Tied and Untied’: The Dialogic 
Production of Gendered Development Spaces in North India.” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 97 (3): 613–34. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8306.2007.00566.x. 
———. 2011. “‘We Are Not Contractors’: Professionalizing the Interactive Service 
Work of NGOs in Rajasthan, India.” Economic Geography 87 (2): 207–26. 
OECD. 2011. “OECD Economic Surveys: India. Overview. .” Edited by OECD 50. 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/48108317.pdf. 
Patel, Vikram, Somnath Chatterji, Dan Chisholm, Shah Ebrahim, Gururaj 
Gopalakrishna, Colin Mathers, Viswanathan Mohan, et al. 2011. “Chronic 
Diseases and Injuries in India.” The Lancet 377 (9763). Elsevier: 413–28. 
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)61188-9. 
Patton, M. 1990. “Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods.” Qualitative 
Evaluation and Research Methods, 169–86. doi:10.1002/nur.4770140111. 
———. 1999. “Enhancing the Quality and Credibility of Qualitative Analysis.” HSR: 
Health Services Research 34 (5): 1189–1208. 
Paxman, John M., Abu Sayeed, Ann Buxbaum, Sallie Craig Huber, and Charles Stover. 
2005. “The India Local Initiatives Program: A Model for Expanding 
Reproductive and Child Health Services.” Studies in Family Planning 36 (3): 
203–20. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4465.2005.00062.x. 
Peters, D, Subrata Chakraborty, Prasanta Mahapatra, and Laura Steinhardt. 2010. 
“Job Satisfaction and Motivation of Health Workers in Public and Private 
Sectors: Cross-Sectional Analysis from Two Indian States.” Human Resources for 
Health 8 (27). 
Pfeiffer, James. 2003. “International NGOs and Primary Health Care in Mozambique: 
The Need for a New Model of Collaboration.” Social Science & Medicine 56 (4): 
725–38. doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(02)00068-0. 
PHRN. 2008. “An Assessment of the Status of Village Health and Sanitation 
Committees in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa.” New Delhi: Public 
Health Resource Network. 
Planning Commission. 2012. Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017): Social Sectors. Vol. 
III. 
Planning Commission, and HLEG. 2011. “High Level Expert Group Report on 
Universal Health Coverage for India.” Edited by High Level Expert Group 
(HLEG) instituted by the Planning Commission of India. New Delhi: Planning 
Commission of India. 
Porichha, D, V Rao, P Samal, and A Rao. 2011. “Transfer of Disability Care of Leprosy 
to the Affected Persons and the Community Members.” Indian Journal of 
Leprosy 83 (2): 81–86. 
Prost, Audrey, Tim Colbourn, Nadine Seward, Kishwar Azad, Arri Coomarasamy, 
Andrew Copas, Tanja A J Houweling, et al. 2013. “Women’s Groups Practising 
 260 
Participatory Learning and Action to Improve Maternal and Newborn Health in 
Low-Resource Settings: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” The Lancet 
381 (9879). Elsevier Ltd: 1736–46. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60685-6. 
Racelis, M. 2008. “Anxieties and Affirmations: NGO–donor Partnerships for Social 
Transformation.” In Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development 
Alternatives, edited by A Bebbington, S Hickey, and D Mitlin, 196–218. London 
and New York: Zed Books. 
Raju, M, and P Rao. 2011. “Sustainability of Integrated Leprosy Services in Rural 
India.” Indian Journal of Leprosy 83 (2): 87–93. 
Raju, M, P Rao, and R Mutatkar. 2008. “A Study on Community-Based Approaches to 
Reduce Leprosy Stigma.” Indian Journal of Leprosy 80 (3): 267–73. 
Ramiro, Laurie S., Fatima A. Castillo, Tessa Tan-Torres, Cristina E. Torres, G Josefina, 
Rolando G. Talampas, Laura Hawken, Josefina G. Tayag, Rolando G. Talampas, 
and Laura Hawken. 2001. “Community Participation in Local Health Boards in a 
Decentralized Setting: Cases from the Philippines.” Health Policy and Planning 
16 (Suppl 2): 61–69. 
Rao, Vijayendra, and Ana María Ibáñez. 2005. “The Social Impact of Social Funds in 
Jamaica: A ‘Participatory Econometric’ Analysis of Targeting, Collective Action, 
and Participation in Community-Driven Development.” Journal of Development 
Studies 41 (5): 788–838. doi:10.1080/00220380500145297. 
Rappaport, Julian. 1987. “Terms of Empowerment/Exemplars of Prevention: 
Toward a Theory for Community Psychology.” American Journal of Community 
Psychology 15 (2): 121. doi:10.1007/BF00919275. 
Rath, Suchitra Shibanand, Nirmala Nair, Prasanta K Tripathy, Sarah Barnett, Suchitra 
Shibanand Rath, Rajendra Mahapatra, Rajkumar Gope, et al. 2010. “Explaining 
the Impact of a Women’s Group Led Community Mobilisation Intervention on 
Maternal and Newborn Health Outcomes : The Ekjut Trial Process Evaluation.” 
BMC International Health and Human Rights 10 (1). BioMed Central Ltd: 25. 
doi:10.1186/1472-698X-10-25. 
Raut, Manoj Kumar, and T.V. Sekher. 2013. “Decentralization of Health Care 
Systems: Findings from Odisha and Gujarat, India.” Journal of Health 
Management 15 (2): 235–51. doi:10.1177/0972063413489007. 
Reddy, K. Srinath, B Shah, C Varghese, and A Ramadoss. 2005. “Chronic Diseases 3: 
Responding to the Threat of Chronic Diseases in India.” The Lancet. 
Ridde, Valery, Slim Haddad, Moussa Yacoubou, and Ismaelou Yacoubou. 2010. 
“Exploratory Study of the Impacts of Mutual Health Organizations on Social 
Dynamics in Benin.” Social Science & Medicine 71 (3): 467–74. 
doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.03.047. 
Ridde, Valery, M Yaogo, Y Kafando, O Sanfo, N Coulibaly, P A Nitiema, and A Bicaba. 
2010. “A Community-Based Targeting Approach to Exempt the Worst-off from 
User Fees in Burkina Faso.” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 64 
(1): 10–15. doi:10.1136/jech.2008.086793. 
Rifkin, Susan B. 1983. “Primary Health Care in Southeast Asia: Attitudes about 
Community Participation in Community Health Programmes.” Social Science & 
Medicine 17 (19): 1489–96. 
———. 1996. “Paradigms Lost: Towards a New Understanding of Community 
 261 
Participation in Health Programmes.” Acta Tropica 61: 79–92. 
———. 2014. “Examining the Links between Community Participation and Health 
Outcomes: A Review of the Literature.” Health Policy and Planning 29 Suppl 2 
(suppl_2): ii98–106. doi:10.1093/heapol/czu076. 
Rigon, Andrea. 2014. “Building Local Governance: Participation and Elite Capture in 
Slum-Upgrading in Kenya.” Development and Change 45 (2): 257–83. 
doi:10.1111/dech.12078. 
Sarkar, Sudipta, John E. Greenleaf, Anirban Gupta, Debabrata Ghosh, Lee M. Blaney, 
P. Bandyopadhyay, R.K. Biswas, Amal K. Dutta, and Arup K. SenGupta. 2010. 
“Evolution of Community-Based Arsenic Removal Systems in Remote Villages in 
West Bengal, India: Assessment of Decade-Long Operation.” Water Research 44: 
5813–22. 
Sarker, Kanchan. 2009. “Economic Growth and Social Inequality: Does the Trickle 
Down Effect Really Take Place?” New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and … 3 (1): 
42–60. 
Schüth, Tobias, Tolkun Jamangulova, Shaken Janikeeva, and Temir Tologonov. 2005. 
“Power from below: Enabling Communities to Ensure the Provision of Iodated 
Salt in Kyrgyzstan.” Food and Nutrition Bulletin 26 (4): 366–75. 
Scrimshaw, N. S., and J. P. SanGiovanni. 1997. “Synergism of Nutrition, Infection, and 
Immunity: An Overview.” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition. 
Semwal, V, S Jha, CMS Rawat, S Kumar, and A Kaur. 2013. “Assessment of Village 
Health Sanitation and Nutrition Committee under NRHM in Nainital District of 
Uttarakhand.” Indian Journal of Community Health 25 (4): 472–79. 
Sen, A.K. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. 
Sepehri, A, and J Pettigrew. 1996. “Primary Health Care, Community Partici- Pation 
and Community-Financing: Experiences of Two Middle Hill Villages in Nepal.” 
Health Policy and Planning 11 (1): 93–100. 
Shepard, Bonnie. 2006. Running the Obstacle Course to Sexual and Reproductive 
Health: Lessons from Latin America. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 
doi:10.1080/13691050802661274. 
Shukla, Abhay, Kerry Scott, and Dhananjay Kakde. 2011. “Community Monitoring of 
Rural Health Services in Maharashtra.” Economic & Political Weekly xlvi (30): 
78–85. 
Singh, C.M., P.K. Jain, K.S. Nair, P. Kumar, N. Dhar, and Deoki Nandan. 2009. 
“Assessment of Utilization of Untied Fund Provided under the National Rural 
Health Mission in Uttar Pradesh.” Indian Journal of Public Health 53 (3): 137–
42. 
Singh, R, and B Purohit. 2012. “Limitations in the Functioning of Village Health and 
Sanitation Committees in a North Western State in India.” International Journal 
of Medicine and Public Health 2 (3). 
Singh, S, A Das, and S Sharma. 2010. “Reviving Hopes, Realizing Rights: A Report on 
the First Phase of Community Monitoring under NRHM.” New Delhi, India. 
Smith, H. 2004. “Costa Rica’s Triangle of Solidarity: Can Government-Led Spaces for 
Negotiation Enhance the Involvement of Civil Society in Governance?” Environ 
Urban 16 (1): 63–77. 
Sohani, S. 2005. “Health Care Access of the Very Poor in Kenya.” Meeting the Health 
 262 
Related Needs of the Very Poor, DFID Workshop 14-15 February: Workshop Paper 
11. Kenya: Aga Khan Health Service. 
Srinivas, Nidhi. 2009. “Against NGOs? A Critical Perspective on Nongovernmental 
Action.” Nonprofit and Volunatary Sector Quarterly 38 (4): 614–26. 
Stalker, Linda. 2001. “Why Some Village Water and Sanitation Committees Are 
Better than Others: A Study of Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh (India).” Water and 
Sanitation Program. New Delhi, India. 
Strathern, M. 2000. Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics 
and the Academy. Routledge. 
Tawil, O, A Verster, and K O’Reilly. 1995. “Enabling Approaches for HIV/AIDS 
Prevention: Can We Modify the Environment and Minimise the Risk?” AIDS 9: 
1299–1306. 
Tripathy, Prasanta, Nirmala Nair, Sarah Barnett, Rajendra Mahapatra, Josephine 
Borghi, Shibanand Rath, Suchitra Rath, et al. 2010. “Effect of a Participatory 
Intervention with Women’s Groups on Birth Outcomes and Maternal 
Depression in Jharkhand and Orissa, India: A Cluster-Randomised Controlled 
Trial.” The Lancet 375 (9721). Elsevier Ltd: 1182–92. doi:10.1016/S0140-
6736(09)62042-0. 
UNFPA, and United Nations Population Fund. 2007. “Maternal Mortality Declining in 
Middle Income Countries.” Joint Press Release. 
Vora, K, D Mavalankar, K V Ramani, M Upadhyaya, B Sharma, S Iyengar, V Gupta, and 
K Iyengar. 2009. “Maternal Health Situation in India: A Case Study.” J Health 
Popul Nutr 27 (2): 184–201. 
Waghmore, Suryakant. 2012. “Beyond Depoliticization? Caste, NGOs and Dalit Land 
Rights in Maharashtra, India.” Development and Change 43 (6): 1313–36. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2012.01801.x. 
Walt, Gill, and Lucy Gilson. 1994. “Reforming the Health Sector in Developing 
Countries : The Central Role of Policy Analysis.” Health Policy and Planning 9 
(4): 353–70. 
Welbourn, Alice. 1998. “Gender, Participation, and HIV: A Positive Force for Change.” 
In The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in Participatory Development, edited 
by Irene Guijt and Meera Kaul Shah, 131–40. London: Intermediate Technology 
Publications. 
WHO. 2008. “The World Health Report 2008. Primary Health Care - Now More than 
Ever.” The World Health Report. Vol. 26. Geneva, Switzerland. 
doi:10.12927/hcpol.2013.22778. 
———. 2015a. “Improving Nutrition Outcomes with Better Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene.” Geneva, Switzerland. 
———. 2015b. “Global Health Observatory Data Repository.” World Health 
Statistics; Demographic and Socioeconomic Statistics. 
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.CBDR107?lang=en. 
WHO/UNICEF. 1978. “Primary Health Care: Report of the International Conference 
on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR. 6–12 September, 1978, Jointly 
Sponsored by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s 
Fund.” Geneva. 
Wijngaarden, Jeroen D H Van, Gerard R M Scholten, and Kees P Van Wijk. 2012. 
 263 
“Strategic Analysis for Health Care Organizations : The Suitability of the SWOT-
Anaylsis.” International Journal of Health Planning and Management 27 (July 
2015): 34–49. doi:10.1002/hpm. 
Wilkes, Andreas. 2000. “The Functions of Participation in a Village-Based Health 
Pre-Payment Scheme.” IDS Bulletin 21 (1): 31–36. 
Williams, Glyn. 2004. “Evaluating Participatory Development: Tyranny, Power and 
(re)politicisation.” Third World Quarterly 25 (3): 557–78. 
doi:10.1080/0143659042000191438. 
World Bank. 2000a. “Overview of Rural Decentralization in India.” Vol. 1. 
———. 2000b. “The World Bank-Civil Society Relations: Fiscal 1999 Progress 
Report.” Washington DC. 
———. 2015. “Databank.” World Databank: Indicators. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/. 
Yin, Robert K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th Edition. Edited by 
Leonard Bickman and Debra J Rog. Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in 
Organizational Research. Vol. 5. Applied Social Research Methods Series. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. doi:10.1097/FCH.0b013e31822dda9e. 
Yin, Robert K. 2016. Qualitative Research from Start to Finish. 2nd ed. New York & 
London: The Guilford Press. 
Zaidi, Shehla, Xaher Gul, and NA Nishtar. 2012. “Parallel NGO Networks for HIV 
Control: Risks and Opportunities for NGO Contracting.” Global Journal of Health 
Science 5 (2): 171–76. doi:10.5539/gjhs.v5n2p171. 
Zaidi, Shehla, Susannah H Mayhew, John Cleland, and Andrew T Green. 2012. 
“Context Matters in NGO-Government Contracting for Health Service Delivery: 
A Case Study from Pakistan.” Health Policy and Planning 27 (7): 570–81. 
doi:10.1093/heapol/czr081. 
Zakus, J David L. 1998. “Resource Dependency and Community Participation in 
Primary Health Care.” Social Science & Medicine 46 (4-5): 475–94. 
doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(97)00192-5. 
Zakus, J David L, and Catherine L Lysack. 1998. “Revisiting Community 




CHAPTER 11. AUTHOR CV 
 
KERRY SCOTT 
Born: 26 February 1985, Toronto, Canada 
Current address: No 303, 9th Main, HRBR Layout, 1st Block, Kalyan Nagar,  
Bangalore, Karnataka, India, 560043 




E D U C A T I O N  
 
PhD candidate, International Health 
Johns Hopkins School of Public Health (JHSPH), Baltimore, USA 
2011–2016 
(expected) 
 Focus: social and behavioural health interventions in low income countries. Subjects 
include biostatistics, epidemiology and qualitative health research and data analysis. 
Dissertation work on community engagement in the public health system in India.  
 
MSc Health, Community and Development (Distinction) 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK 
2007–2008 
 
B. Arts and Science (Honours), Combined Honours in Political Science 
McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada 
2003–2007 
 




Research Assistant (three assistantships), JHSPH  2011–2013 
 
Research Associate, Youth Voices Research Group  
Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Canada 
 2010–2012 
 
Research Officer, Prof. Catherine Campbell,  
London School of Economics, UK 
2008–2011 
(six contracts)  
 
Research and Writing Consultant, Support for Advocacy to 
Training and Health Initiatives (SATHI), Pune, India 
2009–2010  
 
Research Coordinator, Interface HIV Project 




Research Coordinator, Public Health Foundation of India 
 Conducted implementation research on a village health 
committee strengthening intervention in rural India 
2013-2015 
Teaching Assistant, Department of International Health, JHSPH 
 Four courses: Health Behavior Change; Qualitative Research 
Theory & Methods; Qualitative Data Analysis; Health Systems 
Research in Low and Middle Income Countries 
2012-2013 
 265 
H O N O U R S  A N D  A C H I E V E M E N T S  
 
Emerging Voices for Global Health, Cape Town, scholarship 
participant 
2014 
Departmental scholarship (full PhD funding), Johns Hopkins 
University 
2011–2015 
Commonwealth Scholarship (full MSc funding), UK Government 2007–2008 
Political Science Honours Essay Prize 2007 
Dr. Harry Lyman Hooker Scholarship  2006 
Dr. Mary E. Keyes Leadership Program Award 2005 
McMaster Honour Award 2003 
 
P U B L I C A T I O N S :  A R T I C L E S  I N  R E F E R E E D  J O U R N A L S  
 
George, A, Mehra, V, Scott, K & Sriram, V. (2015). Community Participation in Health 
Systems Research: A Systematic Review Assessing the State of Research, 
the Nature of Interventions Involved and the Features of Engagement with 
Communities. PLoS ONE 10(10): e0141091. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.014109 
 
George, A., Scott, K., Garimella, S., Ved, R., Mondal, S. & Sheikh, K. (2015) Anchoring 
contextual analysis in health policy and systems research: A narrative review 
of contextual factors influencing health committees in low and middle income 
countries. Social Science and Medicine 133: 159-167. 
 
Campbell, C., Scott, K., Mupambireyi, Z., Nhamo, M., Nyamukapa, C., Skovdal, M., & 
Gregson S. (2014). Community resistance to a peer education programme in 
Zimbabwe. BMC Health Serv Res 14(1):574. 
 
Scott, K., Campbell, C., Madanhire, C., Skovdal, M., Nyamukapa, C. & Gregson, S. 
(2013). In what ways do community groups support optimal access and 
adherence to antiretroviral treatment in Zimbabwe? Health Promotion 
International. doi:10.1093/heapro/dat014 
 
Scott, K., McMahon, S., Yumkella. F., Diaz, T. & George, A. (2013). Navigating multiple 
options and social relationships in plural health systems: a qualitative study 
exploring health care seeking for sick children in Sierra Leone. Health Policy 
and Planning. doi:10.1093/heapol/czt016 
 
Campbell, C., Scott, K., Nhamo, M., Nyamukapa, C., Madanhire, C., Skovdal, M., Sherr 
L. & Gregson, S. (2013) Social capital and HIV Competent Communities: 
The role of community groups in managing HIV/AIDS in rural Zimbabwe. 
AIDS Care, 25 (supplement 1): (S114-S122). 
 
Campbell, C., Nhamo, M., Scott, K., Madanhire, C., Nyamukapa, C., Skovdal, M. and 
Gregson, S. (2013). The role of community conversations in facilitating local 
HIV competence: Case study from eastern Zimbabwe. BMC Health Services 
Research, 13:354.  
 
Harvey, S., Olórtegui, P., Leontsini, E., Asayag, C., Scott, K. & Winch, P. (2013). Trials 
of improved practices (TIPs): a strategy for making long-lasting nets last 
 266 
longer? American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, 88(6): 1109–
1115. 
 
Broaddus, E., Scott, K., Gonsalves, L., Parrish, C., Rhodes, R., Donovan, S. & Winch, 
P. (2013). Building Connections between Officers and Baltimore City Youth: 
Key Components of a Police-Youth Teambuilding Program. Journal of 
Juvenile Justice, 3(1): 48-62.  
 
Scott, K., Campbell, C., Skovdal, M., Madanhire, C. & Gregson, S. (2012). What can 
companies do to support HIV-positive workers? Recommendations for 
medium and large sized African workplaces. International Journal of 
Workplace Health Management, 3(6). ISSN 1753-8351. 
 
Campbell, C. & Scott, K. (2011). Retreat from Alma Ata: The WHO’s report on Task 
Shifting to community health workers for AIDS care in poor countries. Global 
Public Health, 6(2):125-38. 
 
Campbell, C., Scott, K., Madanhire, C., Nyamukapa, C., & Gregson, S. (2011). A ‘good 
hospital’: Nurse and patient perceptions of good clinical care for HIV positive 
people on antiretroviral treatment in rural Zimbabwe—a mixed-methods 
qualitative study. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 48(2): 175-183. 
 
Campbell, C., Scott, K., Madanhire, C., Nyamukapa, C., & Gregson, S. (2011). Sources 
of motivation and frustration among healthcare workers in the new era of HIV 
care brought about by ARV roll-out in rural Zimbabwe. AIDS Care, 23(7): 
797-802. 
 
Shukla, A., Scott, K. & Kakde, D. (2011). Community based monitoring of NRHM: 
Lessons learned from the pilot phase in Maharashtra. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 46(30): 78-85. 
 
Scott, K. & Shanker, S. (2010). Tying their hands? Institutional obstacles to the success 
of the ASHA community health worker program in rural north India. AIDS 
Care, 22 (supplement 2): 1606-1612. 
 
Campbell, C., Cornish, F., Gibbs, A. & Scott, K. (2010). Heeding the Push from Below: 
How do social movements persuade the rich to listen to the poor? Journal of 
Health Psychology, 15(7): 962-971. 
 
Campbell, C. & Scott, K. (2010). Mediated communication in promoting health-
enhancing dialogue about AIDS. African Journal of Rhetoric, 1(2):10-37.  
 
 
P U B L I C A T I O N S :  B O O K  C H A P T E R S  
 
Campbell, C. & Scott, K. (2012). Community health and social mobilization. In Obregon, 
R & Waisbord, S (Eds.), The Handbook of Global Health Communication 
(pp. 177-193). West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
 267 
Campbell, C. & Scott, K. (2011). Mediated health campaigns: from information to social 
change. In Hook, D, Franks, B, Bauer, M (Eds.), Social psychology of 
communication (pp. 266-284). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
P U B L I C A T I O N S :  O T H E R  
 
Scott, K. (2010). Understanding the Canadian, Thai and Brazilian universal healthcare 
systems: a focus on regulation and lessons for India. Medico Friends Circle 
Bulletin, August 2010 – January 2011, 342-344: 43-56.  
 
C O N F E R E N C E  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  
 
George, A., Scott, K., Garimella, S., Mondal, S., Ved, R. & Sheikh, K. (2015, March). A 
Narrative Review Of Contextual Factors Influencing Health Committees In 
Low And Middle Income Countries. Poster presentation at the 4th Annual 
PHFI Research Symposium, Delhi. 
 
Scott, K. (2014, October). Strengthening village health committees in India. Panel 
presentation at the Third Global Symposium on Health Systems Research, 
Cape Town. 
 
Scott, K., Garimella, S., Mondal, S., George, A., Gaitonde, R., Raman VR & Sheikh, K. 
(2014, October). Complex world, complex research: Reflections on multi-
stakeholder collaboration for implementation research. Poster at the Third 
Global Symposium on Health Systems Research, Cape Town.  
 
Mondal, S., Sheikh, K., Scott, K., Garimella, S., George, A., Gaitonde, R. & Ved, R. 
(2014, October). The VOICES initiative to strengthen village health 
committees in two Indian states. Oral presentation at the Third Global 
Symposium on Health Systems Research, Cape Town.  
 
Scott, K., George, A., Garimella, S., Ameerkhan K., Mondal, S., T. Sharanaya, Kamal, 
J. & Sheikh, K. (2014, September). Government helper and citizen 
advocate? A case study on the multiple roles and pressures facing civil 
society organizations implementing a village health committee support 
program in India. Oral presentation at the Symposium on Global Governance 
and Commercialisation of Public Health, Delhi.  
 
Scott, K., Garimella, S., Mondal, S., Raman VR, Gaitonde, R. & Sheikh, K. (2014, 
March). Implementation research to strengthen community engagement 
through village health committees: A case study in multi-stakeholder 
collaboration. Poster presentation at the 4th Annual PHFI Research 
Symposium, Delhi.  
 
George, A, Scott, K, Guttierez, J, Ghosh, U, Waiswa, P, & Peters, D. (12 Oct-3 Nov, 
2012). Assessing how community capability features in health systems 
research in low- and middle-income countries: A systematic review. Future 




Campbell, C, Nhamo, M, Nyamukapa, C, Madanhire, C, Scott, K, Skovdal, M, Sherr, L, 
& Gregson, C. (22-27 July 2012). Social capital and AIDS competent 
communities: evidence from eastern Zimbabwe. TUPDE0105. XIX 
International AIDS Conference. Washington, D.C. USA.  
 
Scott, K. (30 April 2012). Participant in roundtable author discussion at book launch of 
The Handbook of Global Health Communication. George Washington 
University, Washington DC, USA. 
 
Scott, K. & Campbell, C. (6 November 2010). The role of activism and advocacy in 
tackling maternal mortality amongst poor women in India. Reproductive 
morbidity and poverty conference. LSE & Economic and Social Research 
Council, UK. 
 
Scott, K. (10 July 2010). Understanding the Canadian, Thai and Brazilian universal 
healthcare systems: a focus on regulation and lessons for India. Medico 
Friends Circle conference on universal access to health in India, Wardha, 
Maharashtra, India. 
 
Scott, K. (22 September 2009). Exploring the potential of CHW programmes to create 
health enabling contexts: A study of the ASHA programme in rural north 
India. Creating contexts for successful community-led health interventions. 
London School of Economics, UK. 
 
P E E R  R E V I E W  
 
Reviewer for articles submitted to: AIDS and Behavior, Contemporary Nursing Journal, 
Contemporary Nurse, Health Policy and Planning, Human Resources for Health, 
International Journal of Nursing Studies, Journal of the International AIDS Society, 
Papers on Social Representations, Social Science and Medicine, Tropical Medicine and 
International Health, WHO SEA 
 
A D D I T I O N A L  S K I L L S  
 
 Proficient in SPSS, STATA & MPLUS statistical software, and NVivo, Atlas.ti and 
Anthropac qualitative data software. 
 Strong editing skills and interest in magazine and newspaper production (eg. Editor-
in-Chief, Incite Magazine, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada, 2006-7). 
 Teaching and mentoring (ex. Incentive Mentoring Program Dunbar High School 
mentor, Baltimore, 2011-2013, Mentor, Life Skills Club, Beormund School, London, 
UK 2007-8). 
 
 
 
